The bill
Protecting Our Courts from Foreign Manipulation Act
HR. 2675, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.
Sponsored by
Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]
ID: C001118
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2675, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 608.
June 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The "Protecting Our Courts from Foreign Manipulation Act" - because, you know, our courts were just begging to be protected from those dastardly foreigners. (Sarcasm alert.)
Let's dissect this farce. The bill claims to increase transparency and oversight of third-party funding by foreign persons, but don't worry, it's just a smokescreen for the real agenda: lining the pockets of special interest groups and campaign donors.
Now, about those "total funding amounts and budget allocations"... (dramatic pause) Oh wait, there aren't any. This bill is more concerned with grandstanding than actual governance. It's like trying to diagnose a patient without checking their vitals - pointless.
As for "key programs and agencies receiving funds", I'll give you a hint: it's not about funding courts or protecting national security. It's about feeding the beast of bureaucratic red tape and empowering lawyers to litigate ad nauseam.
Notable increases or decreases? Ha! This bill is a masterclass in obfuscation. You'll need a team of forensic accountants to untangle the web of amendments, riders, and policy provisions attached to this monstrosity.
Speaking of which, let's talk about those "riders or policy provisions". Ah, yes, the usual suspects: more power for the Attorney General, more money for lawyers, and more opportunities for crony capitalism. It's like a bad game of legislative Jenga - remove one block, and the whole thing comes crashing down.
Fiscal impact and deficit implications? (Chuckles) Oh, please. This bill is a drop in the ocean compared to the real fiscal hemorrhaging happening in Washington. It's like trying to treat a patient with a Band-Aid when they need open-heart surgery.
In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to manipulate public opinion while serving the interests of the powerful and well-connected. So, to all the voters out there, let me offer some advice: don't be fooled by the fancy title or the pseudo-patriotic rhetoric. This bill is a disease, and the only cure is to vote out the incompetent politicians who keep peddling this nonsense.
Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: F000475
Top Contributors
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ID: W000804
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ID: G000603
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ID: V000138
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ID: F000474
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ID: I000056
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ID: S001224
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ID: B001295
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ID: K000399
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ID: A000379
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 40 nodes and 36 connections (30 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $105,237
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2(c) prohibits third-party funding by foreign states and sovereign wealth funds, which may limit the ability of private equity and hedge funds to engage in certain litigation funding activities.
Section 2(b) requires disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements, which may increase transparency and scrutiny of lobbying and law firms involved in such activities.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Treasury/CFIUS section aim to curb foreign influence on U.S. institutions by increasing transparency, imposing disclosure requirements, and establishing enforcement mechanisms to protect national security interests."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Treasury policy emphasize transparency and disclosure to counter foreign illicit influence; the bill applies similar principles to litigation financing, aligning with Treasury's focus on financial transparency and anti‑illicit cash measures."
— 715 — Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines “financial institutions” to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, “The Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Re: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,” Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498–59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022–2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, “Paris Agreement,” 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” GE.5–62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. “What Is ESG?” ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, “Why Business Should Dispense with ESG,” American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, “What are the Principles for Responsible Investment?” https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, “Articles of Association of PRI Association,” Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the FCC policy aim to increase transparency and guard against foreign adversary influence, though they apply to different sectors (courts vs. communications)."
— 852 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Publish a foreign adversary transparency list. As part of the FCC’s ongoing work to secure our networks from entities that would do the bidding of our foreign adversaries, the FCC should do more to shine the light of transparency on the scope of the problem. To this end, the FCC should compile and publish a list of all entities that hold FCC authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority with more than 10 percent ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including the governments of China, Russia, Iran, Syria, or North Korea. A bipartisan bill that would require the FCC to publish this type of list has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Elise Stefanik (R–NY), Ro Khanna (D– CA), and Mike Gallagher (R–WI).24 l Fully fund the federal “rip and replace” program. In 2019, Congress established a $1.9 billion Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (known colloquially as the “rip and replace” program) to reimburse communications providers for the reasonable expenses they would incur to remove, replace, and dispose of insecure Huawei and ZTE gear. However, $1.9 billion is about $3 billion short of the total amount of funding needed to complete the rip and replace process. A new Administration should ensure that the program is fully funded and should look first at repurposing and applying unused COVID-era emergency funds for this purpose. l Launch a Clean Standards Initiative. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. government launched a worldwide Clean Networks program.25 As a result of this initiative, many of the U.S. government’s allies started the process of ending their relationships with Huawei. It is time for an Administration to build and expand on this groundbreaking work by taking a similar approach to the standard-setting process. Right now, the CCP is seeking to extend its influence by exerting control over the development of standards in a variety of areas, including technology and telecommunications. It is vital that the United States meet this threat with a comprehensive clean standards initiative. l Stop aiding the CCP’s authoritarian approach to artificial intelligence. The CCP has set itself a goal of becoming the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. Beijing is bent on using this technology to exert authoritarian control domestically and export its authoritarian governance model overseas. U.S. businesses are aiding Beijing in this effort— often unwittingly—by feeding, training, and improving the AI datasets of companies that are beholden to the CCP. One way that U.S. companies
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Taxpayer Funds Oversight and Accountability Act
A resolution to constitute the majority party's membership on certain committees for the One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, or until their successors are chosen.
Providing for consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 25) providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Internal Revenue Service relating to "Gross Proceeds Reporting by Brokers That Regularly Provide Services Effectuating Digital Asset Sales"; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1156) to amend the CARES Act to extend the statute of limitations for fraud under certain unemployment programs, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1968) making further continuing appropriations and other extensions for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2025, and for other purposes; and for other purposes.