Trade Review Act of 2025

— 811 — Trade contains the Sections 201 and 301 tariff delegations. TPA, then called fast-track, has aided several trade agreements, including NAFTA and the USMCA, which took effect in 2020. TPA has lapsed before during slow periods in trade policy, most recently in July 2021, and remains lapsed today. The President should work with Congress to renew TPA to rationalize negoti- ations for upcoming trade agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. Both supporters and critics have questions regarding TPA’s implications for the constitutional separation of powers, and policymakers should take those questions seriously. As things currently stand, Congress has some oversight powers over the President’s negotiations under TPA, but they are limited. Congress can increase its oversight by passing new legislation superseding relevant provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. However, that is a double-edged sword. A Congress that largely favors free trade could exercise oversight to keep the President on the straight and narrow in trade negotiations. A progressive Congress would instead insist that the President negotiate for as many trade-unrelated provisions as possible to benefit labor and green constituencies while pushing progressive policies on the U.S. and its trading partners. On balance, a single voice at the negotiating table that is subject to congressional oversight is the best posture for American workers and consumers. A fractious Congress has yet to demonstrate the capacity to negotiate with other nations, but it can help to hold the Administration accountable. Trade Agreements with the United Kingdom, European Union, and Others. Even with a renewed TPA, trade agreement negotiations will likely take years. The Trump and Biden Administrations were not inclined to start the process, so that job may well fall to the next Administration. In that sense, the delays may end up being worth it. If there is one lodestar to follow, it is to restrict these agreements to trade issues only. Ever since NAFTA, trade-unrelated provisions have taken on a greater role in trade agreements. These create sticking points and are routinely hijacked by rent-seeking special interests and progressive ideologues who demand subsidies, carve-outs, and economically distorting labor and environmental standards that have nothing to do with trade. If governments are to negotiate these issues, they should do so in separate agreements so they do not torpedo efforts to liberalize and engage with allies. Trade agreements should lighten burdens, not create new ones by attempting to address non-trade issues. Policy leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, including experts from The Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Enterprise Insti- tute, have prepared a model trade agreement along these lines.73 Along with TPA renewal, this would greatly reduce negotiating costs. This template is also readily adaptable for agreements with Europe and any other allies that are willing to — 812 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liberalize their economies and build a stronger alliance with America. The draft U.S.–U.K. agreement includes an accession chapter to allow others to join on the same terms. Restoring or Replacing the WTO Dispute Resolution Process. The World Trade Organization as we know it may be mortally wounded. This deprives the U.S. of the WTO’s dispute resolution process, under which the U.S. it won 85 percent of the cases it brought. The WTO’s slow death began under the Obama Administra- tion, which refused to allow appointees to the WTO’s appellate board, which as a consequence is now nonfunctional. Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have continued the Obama Administration’s approach. That means that every case in the dispute resolution process will sputter to a halt as parties file appeals that cannot be heard. If the WTO is no longer fit for that purpose, it may be better to look in a different direction. More than 20 years ago, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow proposed that America and other free economies should form a Global Free Trade Alliance that is open to all countries that adhere to a truly free market system with appropriate safeguards such as property rights, lack of corruption, and enforcement of contracts.74 Alongside a general agreement on low to zero tariffs, the alliance would move to reduce the effect of nontariff barriers (such as the previously noted baby formula ingredient and labeling barriers) by basing trade around the principle of mutual recognition. Such an alliance could be started by a trade agreement between the United States and, for example, the United Kingdom with an accession chapter allowing others to join if they meet the criteria. It would be essential for a Global Free Trade Alliance to avoid the WTO’s most serious problem: the exemptions from its rules that are granted to developing countries. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was granted developing-na- tion status, which it continues to use to dodge rules that should apply to it. Other countries have used that status to delay needed reforms. Rule exemptions give some countries a perverse incentive to remain poor and autocratic. A Global Free Trade Alliance would allow the U.S. to enjoy the benefits of a rules- based international trading system without the WTO’s shortcomings. Negotiation costs would be lower because the countries would already be allied on many issues. In addition, there would be no separate tiers with different rules, and this would give developing countries an incentive to liberalize. In addition to being good for its own sake, liberalization would give them entry into a prestigious club that tilted toward America’s orbit and away from China’s. Closing the Export–Import Bank. The Export–Import Bank (EXIM) is an unusually clear example of how vulnerable trade protectionism is to being hijacked by special interests.75 In most years, about half of EXIM’s business benefits a single company, Boeing. Their relationship is so cozy that EXIM’s nickname around Washington is “the Bank of Boeing.”

— 795 — Trade against trade cheaters who dump products below cost into American markets or unfairly subsidize their exports. In fact, much of the cheating that does take place in the global trading arena can be addressed through such antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases. Within the West Wing itself, it is equally critical that the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) all be aligned on trade policy. During the Trump Administration, with the notable exception of the President’s third National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, and third CEA Chairman, Tyler Goodspeed, this regrettably was not the case. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in trade policy, at least when it comes to advancing Section 232 cases. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,40 the President has the authority, through tariffs or other means, to reduce imports from other countries “if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” As a practical matter, the Secretary of Commerce spearheads any Section 232 cases, but in order to proceed with a Section 232 case, Commerce must obtain signoff from the Secretary of Defense. When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland. CONCLUSION A Harvard professor once told me during my doctoral thesis days that “if I tell you how it is, I’ve told you why it can’t change.” Despite the obvious exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers by the international trading system and Communist Chinese aggression, powerful political forces none- theless exist that profit from the status quo. The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institution- ally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. Addressing these two challenges would go a long way toward restoring American greatness, both economically and militarily. Ignoring these two challenges will simply continue the parasitic draining of the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. However, the author would particularly like to thank Joanna Miller for her dedicated work and significant contribution to the chapter.

— 795 — Trade against trade cheaters who dump products below cost into American markets or unfairly subsidize their exports. In fact, much of the cheating that does take place in the global trading arena can be addressed through such antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases. Within the West Wing itself, it is equally critical that the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) all be aligned on trade policy. During the Trump Administration, with the notable exception of the President’s third National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, and third CEA Chairman, Tyler Goodspeed, this regrettably was not the case. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in trade policy, at least when it comes to advancing Section 232 cases. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,40 the President has the authority, through tariffs or other means, to reduce imports from other countries “if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” As a practical matter, the Secretary of Commerce spearheads any Section 232 cases, but in order to proceed with a Section 232 case, Commerce must obtain signoff from the Secretary of Defense. When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland. CONCLUSION A Harvard professor once told me during my doctoral thesis days that “if I tell you how it is, I’ve told you why it can’t change.” Despite the obvious exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers by the international trading system and Communist Chinese aggression, powerful political forces none- theless exist that profit from the status quo. The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institution- ally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. Addressing these two challenges would go a long way toward restoring American greatness, both economically and militarily. Ignoring these two challenges will simply continue the parasitic draining of the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. However, the author would particularly like to thank Joanna Miller for her dedicated work and significant contribution to the chapter. — 796 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE Kent Lassman Trade policy is about more than goods and services: It is a statement of Amer- ican identity. Our trade policy choices reveal America’s values and where we put our trust. Do we place our trust in Washington elites to revive a declining coun- try, or do we trust in America’s tradition of entrepreneurs and everyday people blazing new trails? Do we follow China by copying its strong-arm trade policies, or do we lead China and the rest of the world by forging our own path? Our trade policy decisions will tell you what we Americans really think of ourselves. A CONSERVATIVE VISION FOR TRADE The policy recommendations in this chapter reflect a belief in the strength of America’s founding institutions, its economy, and its people. They are based on data showing decades of American progress with all that this implies. They also reflect a realistic understanding of the fact that trade policy has limited capabilities and is vulnerable to mission creep and regulatory capture. Policymakers should be modest about what they can accomplish through trade policy and need to exercise constant vigilance against abuses. For example: l Trade can lower consumer prices for ordinary Americans and open new markets for American businesses and their goods. l Trade can help American workers and businesses to specialize in what they do best—which is how they outcompete the rest of the world in technology, manufacturing, agriculture, and other areas. l In foreign policy, trade can help to preserve and strengthen alliances. At the same time, sound trade policy requires humility. It is not a panacea for every policy problem. Trade policy cannot favor one sector over another without causing tradeoffs that outweigh the benefits.41 Neither free trade nor protectionism will create jobs. Trade affects the types of jobs people have, but it has no long-run effect on the number of jobs. Labor force size is tied to population size more than anything else. The American people are smart and sophisticated enough to hear these truths. It is not just conservatives who overestimate the power of trade policy. Recent progressive attempts to use trade policy to advance whole-of-government initia- tives on climate, equity, and other issues will fail for the same reason that a hammer cannot turn a screw: It is the wrong tool for the job. Conservatives should be sim- ilarly skeptical of recent attempts on the Right to use progressive trade policy to punish political opponents, remake manufacturing, or accomplish other objectives