Uyghur Policy Act of 2025

— 817 — Trade Internet memes, fashion, movies, student exchange programs, tourism, and more. China’s leaders are set in their ways, especially with Xi Jinping presumably now in power for life, but the younger generation is more open than their parents were—more individualistic and open to change. Effective outreach to the Chinese people will need the same humility that other sound trade policies require. Government-directed cultural and economic outreach risks being heavy-handed and could backfire. Everyone involved needs to know that the process is generational in scope and will not work overnight. At the very least, Washington should stay out of the way as much as possible when regular people want to contact each other across national, language, and cultural divides. Each of these many components, from tariffs to trade agreements to culture, is a small part of a larger China policy. Many are not attention-grabbing and cannot be put into sound bites. Cultural engagement is not something Washington can plan. China’s own demographic and debt problems, along with aging leadership and growing discontent over the zero-COVID policy, might even cause an internal collapse. American policy must therefore be prepared to face any contingency. CONCLUSION A conservative trade policy needs a conservative vision. America’s found- ing institutions, based on free trade and entrepreneurship, have made America the world’s leading economy and will help keep America strong through the next century. However, recent departures from those principles have hurt America’s econ- omy and weakened alliances that are necessary to contain threats from Russia and China. Reaffirming those principles through policies of openness, dynamism, and free trade will boost America’s economy, make us more resilient against crises, and remove opportunities for progressives and rent-seekers to use the levers of gov- ernment for their own purposes. Rediscovering conservative principles on trade policy and embracing America’s long history as the world’s leading commercial republic are an important part of restoring a government of, by, and for the people. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this analysis could not have been completed without the valuable support of a small, sturdy, and principled community of trade policy experts. Among them, my colleagues at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ryan Young, Iain Murray, and Ivan Osorio were essential. The author alone is responsible for this report. No views herein should be attributed to any other individual or institution. — 818 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. Warren E. Buffett and Carol J. Loomis, “America’s Growing Trade Deficit Is Selling the Nation Out from Under Us. Here’s a Way to Fix the Problem—And We Need to Do It Now,” Fortune, November 10, 2003, https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/11/10/352872/index.htm (accessed February 25, 2023). 2. 2017 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 115th Congress, 1st Session, November 2017, p. 24, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_ Congress.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 3. JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. Government Accountability Office, “China Trade: WTO Membership and Most-Favored-Nation Status,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-209, June 17, 1998, p. 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/t- nsiad-98-209.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 4. News release, “U.S. Trade in International Goods and Services, December and Annual 2022,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, February 7, 2023, https://www.bea.gov/news/2023/us- international-trade-goods-and-services-december-and-annual-2022 (accessed February 25, 2023); “Table 1. U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: Exports, Imports, and Balances,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, last updated November 3, 2022, https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-11/trad-time-series-0922.xlsx (accessed February 25, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,” January 15, 2021, https://2017-2021.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/index.html (accessed February 25, 2023); Interim Report, An Analysis of the Origins of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Minority Oversight Staff, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S. Senate, October 2022, https://www.help. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/report_an_analysis_of_the_origins_of_covid-19_102722.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 6. Barmini Chakraborty, “China Hints at Denying Americans Life-Saving Coronavirus Drugs,” Fox News, March 13, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/world/chinese-deny-americans-coronavirus-drugs (accessed February 25, 2023). 7. Jim Garamone, “Trump Announces New Whole-of-Government National Security Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 18, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1399392/ trump-announces-new-whole-of-government-national-security-strategy/ (accessed February 26, 2023). Emphasis added. 8. “Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address,” The White House, February 5, 2019, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address-2/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 9. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Deficit Effects, May 2019, https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/RTAReport. pdf?mod=article_inline (accessed February 26, 2023); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Trade Analysis Information System,” https://databank.worldbank.org/source/unctad-%5E-trade-analysis- information-system-(trains) (accessed February 26, 2023); Trefor Moss, “China to Cut Import Tariff on Autos to 15% from 25%,” The Wall Street Journal, updated May 22, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ china-to-cut-import-tariff-on-autos-to-15-from-25-1526980760 (accessed February 26, 2023); U.S. International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (2019 Revision 3), https://hts.usitc.gov/view/ release?release=2019HTSAREV3 (accessed February 26, 2023). 10. This code is commonly used to determine customs duty classifications for goods internationally. 11. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Deficit Effects, p. 15. 12. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, 116th Congress, introduced January 24, 2019, https://www. congress.gov/116/bills/hr764/BILLS-116hr764ih.pdf (accessed February 26, 2023). 13. Harvard Center for American Political Studies and Harris Poll, “Monthly Harvard–Harris Poll: February 2019,” https://harvardharrispoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HHP_Feb2019_RV_topline.pdf (accessed February 26, 2023).

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more