Train Noise and Vibrations Reduction Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2569
Last Updated: April 6, 2025

Sponsored by

Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large]

ID: N000147

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Train Noise and Vibrations Reduction Act of 2025 is a classic case of "we care about your noise complaints, but not enough to actually do anything." The bill's primary objective is to create the illusion of action while kicking the can down the track (pun intended). It requires the Comptroller General to produce a report with recommendations to reduce train noise and vibrations near homes. Wow, a whole report! I'm sure it'll be a thrilling read.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill is a laundry list of vague suggestions, carefully crafted to avoid any actual commitment or meaningful change. It's like a medical prescription that says "take two aspirin and call me in the morning" – utterly useless. The provisions are so watered down that they might as well be written on a Post-It note: "Hey, maybe we should look into modifying trains and tracks... or not."

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: homeowners near train tracks (who will likely remain unaffected), the railroad industry (which will probably just lobby to water down any real regulations), and politicians who want to pretend they care about their constituents' noise complaints. Oh, and let's not forget the Comptroller General, who'll get to write a report that will collect dust on some shelf in Washington.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a perfect example of "legislative placebo effect." It might make some voters feel better, but it won't actually address the issue. The real impact will be zero – zilch – nada. But hey, at least we'll have a nice report to show for it! In the meantime, train noise and vibrations will continue to disturb homeowners, and politicians will continue to pretend they're doing something about it.

Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Legislative Laryngitis" – an inability to speak truth to power or actually address real problems. The underlying disease is a bad case of " Politician-itis," characterized by a strong desire to appear effective while accomplishing nothing. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism, a pinch of outrage, and a whole lot of mockery.

Related Topics

Civil Rights & Liberties State & Local Government Affairs Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Government Operations & Accountability National Security & Intelligence Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Federal Budget & Appropriations Congressional Rules & Procedures
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No campaign finance data available for Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large]

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 44.4%
Pages: 673-675

— 640 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2023 Budget Highlights, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot. gov/files/2022-03/Budget_Highlights_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 2. U.S. Department of Transportation, DEIA [Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility] Strategic Plan FY22– FY26, p. 2, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-09/DOT%20DEIA%20Strategic%20Plan. pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 3. 23 U.S. Code §§ 601–609, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23 (accessed March 3, 2023). 4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 248 (December 27, 2019), pp. 71714–71734, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/regulations/361831/fed-reg-published-final-admin- rule.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Build America Bureau, “About the Build America Bureau,” last updated October 24, 2022, https://www.transportation.gov/buildamerica/about (accessed March 3, 2023). 6. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law No. 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1995, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 7. 42 U.S. Code Chapter 85, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 (accessed March 3, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 84 (May 2, 2022), pp. 25710–26092, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05- 02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 235 (December 7, 2020), pp. 78707–78718, https://www.transportation.gov/ sites/dot.gov/files/2020-12/Defining%20Unfair%20or%20Deceptive%20Practices%20Final%20Rule%20-%20 85%20FR%2078707.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Procedures in Regulating Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 22 (February 2, 2022), pp. 5655–5659, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-02/pdf/2022-01589.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 11. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2023, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/FAA_Budget_Estimates_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 12. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control, Hudson Institute Initiative on Future Innovation, November 2013, https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/researchattachments/ attachment/1199/poole_hi_res.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). Also published subsequently as Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 431, January 2014, https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/air_traffic_ control_organization_innovation.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 13. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 14. S. 6, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law 88-365, 88th Congress, July 9, 1964, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg302-2.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “About Us,” last updated March 23, 2022, https:// www.maritime.dot.gov/about-us (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. H.R. 10378, Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law 66-261, 66th Congress, June 5, 1920, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg988.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). — 641 — 20 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS Brooks D. Tucker MISSION STATEMENT The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the primary provider of health care, benefits, and memorial affairs for America’s veterans and their families. The VA has the noble responsibility to render exceptional and timely support and services with respect, compassion, and competence. The veteran is at the forefront of every VA process and interaction. The VA must continually strive to be recognized as a “best in class,” “Veteran-centric”1 system with an organizational ethos inspired by and accountable to the needs and problems of veterans, not subservient to the parochial preferences of a bureaucracy. OVERVIEW At the end of the Obama Administration, the VA was held in low esteem both by the veterans it served and by the employees who served these former warriors. Eroding morale caused by the downstream effects of a health care access crisis in 2014 led to the resignation of Secretary Eric Shinseki and extensive oversight investigations by Congress from 2015–2016. By 2020, however, the VA had become one of the most respected U.S. agencies. This significant progress was due in part to the leadership of Secretary Robert Wilkie (2018–2021) and his team of political appointees and career senior executives, many of them veterans, who led the effort to ensure that the VA became “Veteran-centric” in its governance decisions and fostered a more positive work environment. This mindset translated into a department that was better attuned to employees’ and veterans’ needs and experiences in the daily operations of health care, benefits,

Introduction

Low 44.4%
Pages: 673-675

— 640 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2023 Budget Highlights, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot. gov/files/2022-03/Budget_Highlights_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 2. U.S. Department of Transportation, DEIA [Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility] Strategic Plan FY22– FY26, p. 2, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-09/DOT%20DEIA%20Strategic%20Plan. pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 3. 23 U.S. Code §§ 601–609, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23 (accessed March 3, 2023). 4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 248 (December 27, 2019), pp. 71714–71734, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/regulations/361831/fed-reg-published-final-admin- rule.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Build America Bureau, “About the Build America Bureau,” last updated October 24, 2022, https://www.transportation.gov/buildamerica/about (accessed March 3, 2023). 6. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law No. 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1995, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 7. 42 U.S. Code Chapter 85, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 (accessed March 3, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 84 (May 2, 2022), pp. 25710–26092, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05- 02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 235 (December 7, 2020), pp. 78707–78718, https://www.transportation.gov/ sites/dot.gov/files/2020-12/Defining%20Unfair%20or%20Deceptive%20Practices%20Final%20Rule%20-%20 85%20FR%2078707.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Procedures in Regulating Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 22 (February 2, 2022), pp. 5655–5659, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-02/pdf/2022-01589.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 11. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2023, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/FAA_Budget_Estimates_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 12. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control, Hudson Institute Initiative on Future Innovation, November 2013, https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/researchattachments/ attachment/1199/poole_hi_res.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). Also published subsequently as Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 431, January 2014, https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/air_traffic_ control_organization_innovation.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 13. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 14. S. 6, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law 88-365, 88th Congress, July 9, 1964, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg302-2.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “About Us,” last updated March 23, 2022, https:// www.maritime.dot.gov/about-us (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. H.R. 10378, Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law 66-261, 66th Congress, June 5, 1920, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg988.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023).

Introduction

Low 42.9%
Pages: 658-660

— 626 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise environment. They need to account for rapidly moving and out-of-line-of-sight vehicles as well as pedestrians, bicyclists, and other road users. They should account for the potential for radio interference, and they should address security. This is why in 1999, in response to a request from Congress, the Federal Com- munications Commission allocated the 5.9 GHz band of spectrum to traffic safety and intelligent transportation systems (ITS). In 2020, the FCC took away 45 MHz of the 75 MHz it had added, leaving only 30 MHz for transportation safety and ITS. DOT needs to represent the transportation community and make the case for needed spectrum to the public and Congress. CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS One reason for the high numbers of injuries on American roadways is that national fuel economy standards raise the price of cars, disincentivizing people from purchasing newer, safer vehicles. Congress requires the Secretary of Transportation to set national fuel econ- omy standards for new motor vehicles sold in the United States. This mandate was established in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA),6 a law passed in the wake of the Arab oil embargo to promote greater energy efficiency and lessen the national security threat of U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The stat- ute directs DOT to prescribe the “maximum feasible” mileage requirements for different categories of internal-combustion engine (ICE) automobiles for each model year. The standards must be achievable using available ICE technologies running on gasoline, diesel fuel, or similar combustible fuels and must not be set so high as to prevent automakers from profitably producing new vehicles at sufficient volume to meet consumer demand. Congress recognized that the ICE-powered automobile has been instrumen- tal to advancing the mobility and prosperity of the American people and that the domestic mass production of new ICE vehicles generates millions of jobs and remains critical to the overall health of the U.S. economy and the strength of the nation’s industrial base. Accordingly, Congress took care to ensure that the mileage requirements issued by DOT would not undermine the vitality of America’s auto industry or interfere with the market economics that drives consumer demand for new vehicles. This rulemaking authority, which has been delegated by the Secretary to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, is exclusive to DOT. EPCA expressly preempts states from adopting or enforcing any different requirement “related to fuel economy standards” for new motor vehicles. While the statute instructs DOT to consult with the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in formulating its standards, no other federal agency, including EPA, has clear authority to set fuel economy requirements in place of NHTSA. The Clean Air Act7 gives EPA general authority to establish emissions — 627 — Department of Transportation limits for new motor vehicles for air pollutants that are found to pose a danger to humans. However, there is no reason to believe Congress ever contemplated that EPA’s authority to address automotive air pollution might be used to displace or supersede NHTSA’s fuel economy mandate under EPCA. Congress chose to assign the power to set fuel economy standards to DOT rather than EPA. This was not only because DOT understands the technologies and economics of the auto industry, but also because NHTSA is the nation’s leading motor vehicle safety regulator, and Congress sought to ensure that fuel economy requirements would not adversely affect highway safety. Unfortunately, the Biden Administration has flouted these statutory limitations in nearly every respect. The predictable result is higher expected transportation costs for Americans. l In pursuit of an anti–fossil fuel climate agenda never approved by Congress, the Biden Administration has raised fuel economy requirements to levels that cannot realistically be met by most categories of ICE vehicles. The purpose is to force the auto industry to transition away from traditional technologies to the production of electric vehicles (EVs) and compel Americans to accept costly EVs despite a clear and persistent consumer preference for ICE-powered vehicles. In further support of this agenda, federal regulators administer a scheme of generous fuel economy credits that subsidize EV producers such as Tesla at the expense of legacy automakers. l Moreover, and contrary to Congress’s design, the Biden EPA has been given preeminence in the regulation of fuel economy through the setting of carbon dioxide emissions limits for new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. Because carbon dioxide emissions levels correspond to mileage in automobiles powered by fossil fuels, these EPA rules are de facto fuel economy requirements that apply independently of NHTSA’s standards. l The Biden Administration has also granted California a special waiver under the Clean Air Act that permits the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to issue its own fuel economy directives, notwithstanding EPCA’s prohibition on state standards. Under this waiver, CARB has ordered automakers to phase out the sale of ICE-powered automobiles in California and transition to the production of zero-emission vehicles by 2035. The Clean Air Act allows other states to follow California’s requirements; thus, CARB is effectively determining fuel economy policies for the entire nation. As a result of these regulatory actions, automobiles will be significantly more expensive to produce, there will be fewer affordable new vehicle options for Amer- ican families, and fewer new vehicles will be sold in the U.S. That will do more than

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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.