To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide special rules for purposes of determining if financial guaranty insurance companies are qualifying insurance corporations under the passive foreign investment company rules.
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Rep. Moore, Gwen [D-WI-4]
ID: M001160
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative legerdemain. HR 2567 is a bill that reeks of desperation, a Hail Mary pass from the financial guaranty insurance industry to Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity.
**The Disease:** Regulatory capture, plain and simple. The financial guaranty insurance industry has managed to convince our esteemed lawmakers to create special rules for their benefit. It's like asking a patient to diagnose themselves â not exactly a recipe for objectivity.
**Symptoms:**
* New regulations are being created or modified to favor financial guaranty insurance companies, allowing them to game the system and avoid paying their fair share of taxes. * The affected industries are, unsurprisingly, those with deep pockets and influential lobbyists. Expect the usual suspects â big banks, investment firms, and other financial institutions â to reap the benefits. * Compliance requirements and timelines are murky at best, leaving room for creative accounting and exploitation. * Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? Ha! Don't make me laugh. The bill's language is deliberately vague, ensuring that any attempts to hold these companies accountable will be met with a barrage of lawyers and loopholes.
**Diagnosis:** This bill is a classic case of " regulatory myopia" â the tendency for lawmakers to focus on short-term gains while ignoring long-term consequences. It's a cynical ploy to line the pockets of special interests at the expense of taxpayers and the broader economy.
**Prognosis:** Expect this bill to pass with flying colors, courtesy of our bought-and-paid-for Congress. The financial guaranty insurance industry will reap the benefits, while the rest of us are left to foot the bill. It's just another example of how our system is rigged against the little guy.
In conclusion, HR 2567 is a textbook case of regulatory capture, where special interests dictate policy and the public interest takes a backseat. Don't be fooled by the complex language or the pretentious title â this bill is nothing more than a handout to the financial elite. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch our politicians prostitute themselves to the highest bidder.
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Rep. Moore, Gwen [D-WI-4]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 610 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise making new pension promises. More timely and detailed reporting should be imposed. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor- poration (PBGC) insures benefits for private sector pension plans, with separate single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs. l The PBGCâs annual report must be submitted on time, and with timely data that uses fair-market value principles to calculate the PBGCâs finances. The PBGC has been submitting portions of statutorily required annual reports many months late and using out-of-date data. And PBGC's data on plans is almost five years old. These problematic practices make it difficult for Congress to become aware of serious problems in the insurance programs, which received a bailout of over $85 billion in the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act. The PBGC should use existing statutory authority to protect workers, retirees, employers, and taxpayers by closely monitoring and taking appropriate remedial action with regard to badly run and underfunded multiemployer union pension plans, including termination where appropriate. The PBGC's refusal to use such authority helped cause its multiemployer program deficit to go from less than $500 million in 2008 to over $65 billion in 2017. l Congress should increase the variable rate premium on underfunding and eliminate the per-participant cap in order to appropriately take into account risk and limit the degree to which well-funded pension plans must subsidize underfunded plans. Reforms should proportionately reduce the fixed per-participant premium to ease the burden on well-funded plans and also increase premiums on multiemployer plans to match single-employer plans. Improving Access to Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are ERISA-covered employee retirement savings plans that allow employees to receive compensation in the form of equity in their employer business. These arrangements enable employees to formally partici- pate as investors in how their employersâ businesses are run. And they also align employerâemployee incentives by giving employees a greater financial stake in the success of their employers. With over half of small businesses owned by business owners over the age of 55, ESOPs also create advantageous succession oppor- tunities that support the continuity of local businesses and regional economic â 611 â Department of Labor and Related Agencies development. Finally, ESOPs can enable greater investment returns for employees. However, ESOPs have to date lacked clear rules under ERISA that recognize their unique structure and benefits, and this opacity can serve as a barrier to employers considering adopting ESOPs. l Provide clear regulations for ESOP valuation and fiduciary conduct. DOL should make it easier for employers to offer ESOPs by providing clear regulations for ESOP valuation and fiduciary conduct that encourages the participation of employee beneficiaries in corporate governance, while recognizing the importance of financial diversification for retirement security. Alternative View. Conservatives believe that it is important for American fami- lies to have control over their savings and to be able to hold diversified assets. While ESOPs can be a beneficial part of a workerâs and familyâs savings, some conserva- tives believe that the government should not favor one form of investment over another or make it harder for families to have a diversified investment portfolio. PUTTING AMERICAN WORKERS FIRST A labor agenda focused on the strength of American families must put American workers first. As the family necessarily puts the interests of its members first, so too the United States must put the interests of American workers first. Immigration. The H-2A visa, meant to allow temporary agricultural work- ers into the United States, also suffers frequent employer abuse. The low cost of H-2A workers undercuts American workers in agricultural employment. The H-2A program is not subject to any statutory numerical cap and has been expanding in recent years, surpassing 200,000 visa issuances for the first time in 2019. l Cap and phase down the H-2A visa program. Congress should immediately cap this program at its current levels and establish a schedule for its gradual and predictable phasedown over the subsequent 10 to 20 years, producing the necessary incentives for the industry to invest in raising productivity, including through capital investment in agricultural equipment, and increasing employment for Americans in the agricultural sector. l Encourage the establishment of an industry consortium and match funding. Congress should also encourage the establishment of an industry consortium of agricultural equipment producers and other automation and robotics firms interested in entering the sector and match funding invested by the industry, with intellectual property developed within the consortium freely available to all participants.
Introduction
â 837 â Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHORâS NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the DoddâFrank Act.32 Since the Bureauâs inception, its status as an âinde- pendentâ agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investorâs Business Daily accused the CFPB of âdiverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Partyâ and plan- ning âto create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutionsâ that would use âramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigationsâ to âbankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.â34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as âa victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.â39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of DoddâFrank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and â 838 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite âconsumer educationâ and âfinancial literacyâ programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what âconsumer educationâ or âfinancial literacy programsâ to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPBâs leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because â[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.â46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPBâs âperpetual insulation from Congressâs appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau âno longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountableâ to Congress and, ultimately, to the peopleâ48 and that â[b]y abandoning its âmost complete and effectualâ check on âthe overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the governmentââindeed, by enabling them in the Bureauâs caseâCongress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.â49 The Court further remarked that the CFPBâs âcapacious portfolio of authority acts âas a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.ââ50
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16.
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.