District of Columbia One Vote One Choice Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2562
Last Updated: April 6, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt denizens of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "District of Columbia One Vote One Choice Act" (because who needs clever titles when you can just vomit out a slogan?) aims to prohibit ranked-choice voting in Washington D.C. elections. Wow, what a bold move! I'm sure the sponsors, Mr. Lawler and his merry band of co-conspirators, are simply bursting with civic virtue.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Help America Vote Act of 2002 by inserting a new section (SEC. 305) that explicitly prohibits ranked-choice voting in D.C. elections. Because, you know, democracy is all about limiting voter choice and ensuring that only the most mediocre candidates win.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: voters, politicians, special interest groups, and the poor souls who have to administer this mess. But let's be real, the only stakeholders who truly matter are the ones with deep pockets and a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "solution in search of a problem." Ranked-choice voting has been used successfully in various jurisdictions to promote more nuanced and representative elections. But hey, who needs that when you can just stick with the tried-and-true method of "winner-takes-all" and pretend it's democratic?

The real disease here is the politicians' addiction to power and their willingness to manipulate the system to maintain their grip on it. This bill is merely a symptom – a cynical attempt to limit voter choice and ensure that only the most entrenched interests are represented.

In medical terms, this bill would be diagnosed as "Acute Politicosis" – a condition characterized by an excessive desire for power, a complete disregard for democratic principles, and a severe case of cognitive dissonance. Treatment options include a healthy dose of transparency, accountability, and a strong antiseptic to clean out the corruption.

But don't worry, folks! I'm sure this bill will be thoroughly debated, and its proponents will provide plenty of intellectually honest justifications for why ranked-choice voting is the devil's spawn. (Spoiler alert: they won't.)

Related Topics

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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$86,668
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$85,668

No PAC contributions found

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
BATMASIAN, JAMES
2 transactions
$13,200
2
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
2 transactions
$13,068
3
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
2 transactions
$7,800
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
5
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
1 transaction
$5,300
6
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
1 transaction
$3,400
7
BANKE, BARBARA
1 transaction
$3,300
8
BERTUSSI, THOMAS P. MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BOONE, DAN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
CHRISTIE, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
11
CLAUGUS, THOMAS
1 transaction
$3,300
12
DUBITSKY, ALEX
1 transaction
$3,300
13
FORCHHEIMER, JODY
1 transaction
$3,300
14
GINSBURG, MARTIN
1 transaction
$3,300
15
GROSSMAN, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300
16
HARRIS, JOSH
1 transaction
$3,300
17
HUGIN, KATHLEEN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

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Showing 19 nodes and 21 connections

Total contributions: $86,668

Top Donors - Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

1 Org17 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 47.9%
Pages: 898-900

— 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner. — 867 — Federal Election Commission ENDNOTES 1. 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. 2. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). 3. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(c) and (d). 4. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, “A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,” 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 162. 5. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2). 6. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1). 7. Former Commissioner Steven Walther (2006–2022) was listed nominally as an independent but he was recommended to President George W. Bush for nomination by former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid (D) and almost always voted in line with the Democrat commissioners on the FEC. 8. Hans von Spakovsky served as a commissioner from 2006 to 2007 in a recess appointment. While no other nominee has been rejected by the Senate, the tradition of bipartisan voice vote confirmation has largely ended. Two Republican nominees—Allen Dickerson and Sean Cooksey—were confirmed on party-line votes in 2020. And one Democrat—Dara Lindenbaum—was confirmed with the support of only six Republican senators in 2022. 9. The term of the 6th Commissioner, Dara Lindenbaum (D), will expire on April 30, 2027. 10. 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(6). 11. “Statement of Chairman Allen J. Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. ‘Trey’ Trainor, III Regarding Concluded Enforcement Matters,” Federal Election Commission (May 13, 2022), https://www. fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/Redacted_Statement_Regarding_Concluded_Matters_13_ May_2022_Redacted.pdf. 12. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 13. It should be noted, however, that the constitutional authority of a President to, among other things, remove appointees and direct the actions of independent agencies is a hotly contested and increasingly litigated issue. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); and Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021). 14. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021–2022). 15. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, “A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,” 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 171. 16. Id.

Introduction

Low 46.4%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Low 46.4%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.