ENCRYPT Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2508
Last Updated: April 6, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36]

ID: L000582

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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Representatives Lieu and DelBene. The ENCRYPT Act of 2025: because who needs actual encryption when you can just pretend to care about national security?

Let's dissect this farce:

**New regulations:** This bill preempts state data security vulnerability mandates and decryption requirements. Translation: it allows tech companies to ignore state-level attempts to regulate their egregious data collection practices.

**Affected industries:** The usual suspects – tech giants, online service providers, and anyone who makes a buck off your personal data. They're the ones who'll benefit from this bill's "protections."

**Compliance requirements:** None, really. This bill is more about what states can't do than what companies must do. It's a clever way to hamstring state-level efforts to regulate the tech industry.

**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ha! Don't make me laugh. There are no meaningful enforcement mechanisms or penalties in this bill. It's all just a bunch of empty words designed to placate the gullible public.

Now, let's talk about the real motivations behind this bill:

* **Money:** Tech companies want to keep collecting and selling your data without any pesky state regulations getting in the way. * **Power:** By preempting state laws, Congress is asserting its dominance over the tech industry – or rather, allowing the tech industry to dominate Congress. * **Ego:** Representatives Lieu and DelBene get to pretend they're doing something about national security while actually just serving their corporate masters.

The economic and operational impacts of this bill? Well, it's a win-win for tech companies: more data collection, less regulation. For the rest of us, it means our personal data will continue to be exploited and sold without any meaningful protections.

In conclusion, the ENCRYPT Act of 2025 is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak – a bill that claims to protect national security while actually just shielding tech companies from accountability. It's a testament to the boundless creativity of politicians when it comes to serving their corporate overlords. Bravo, Representatives Lieu and DelBene. You've truly earned your paychecks this time.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations Small Business & Entrepreneurship Transportation & Infrastructure State & Local Government Affairs Congressional Rules & Procedures Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement National Security & Intelligence Civil Rights & Liberties Government Operations & Accountability
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$82,600
26 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$19,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$62,700

No PAC contributions found

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
2 transactions
$4,300
2
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
3
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
4
DEMOCRACY ENGINE
2 transactions
$3,000
5
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$2,000
6
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$2,000
7
ONEIDA NATION
1 transaction
$1,000
8
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
CHENG, DUNSON
2 transactions
$6,600
2
ADLER, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
3
CUI, YI
1 transaction
$3,300
4
POLESE, DONALD
1 transaction
$3,300
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WANG, SHA
1 transaction
$3,300
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ADAMS, HAYDEN
1 transaction
$3,300
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BAKER, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
8
BERNSTEIN, JULIE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BERNSTEIN, KEVIN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
BRODIE, JACOB
1 transaction
$3,300
11
CHU, KEVIN
1 transaction
$3,300
12
FONG, KENNETH S Y
1 transaction
$3,300
13
HACKMAN, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
14
JANG, SHENG ZHEN
1 transaction
$3,300
15
LI, KAI
1 transaction
$3,300
16
LIEBERMAN, BOB
1 transaction
$3,300
17
LIEU, GEORGE
1 transaction
$3,300
18
LIEU, KERRY
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36]

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Total contributions: $82,600

Top Donors - Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 56.0%
Pages: 882-884

— 849 — Federal Communications Commission Big Tech, and it should look to Section 230 and the Consolidated Reporting Act as potential sources of authority.19 In acting, the FCC could require these platforms to provide greater specificity regarding their terms of service, and it could hold them accountable by prohibiting actions that are inconsistent with those plain and particular terms. Within this framework, Big Tech should be required to offer a transparent appeals process that allows for the challenging of pretextual takedowns or other actions that violate clear rules of the road. l Support legislation that scraps Section 230’s current approach. The FCC should work with Congress on more fundamental Section 230 reforms that go beyond interpreting its current terms. Congress should do so by ensuring that Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections. As part of those reforms, the FCC should work with Congress to ensure that antidiscrimination provisions are applied to Big Tech—including “back-end” companies that provide hosting services and DDoS protection. Reforms that prohibit discrimination against core political viewpoints are one way to do this and would track the approach taken in a social media law passed in Texas, which was upheld on appeal in late 2022 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.20 In all of this, Congress can make certain points clear. It could focus legislation on dominant, general-use platforms rather than specialized ones. This could include excluding comment sections in online publications, specialized message boards, or communities within larger platforms that self-moderate. Similarly, Congress could legislate in a way that does not require any platform to host illegal content; child pornography; terrorist speech; and indecent, profane, or similar categories of speech that Congress has previously carved out. l Support efforts to empower consumers. The FCC and Congress should work together to formulate rules that empower consumers. Section 230 itself codifies “user control” as an express policy goal and encourages Internet platforms to provide tools that will “empower” users to engage in their own content moderation. As Congress takes up reforms, it should therefore be mindful of how we can return to Internet users the power to control their online experiences. One idea is to empower consumers to choose their own content filters and fact checkers, if any. The FCC should also work with Congress to ensure stronger protections against young children accessing social media sites despite age restrictions that generally prohibit their use of these sites. — 850 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrude— unlawfully in their view—on the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCC’s roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agency’s affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumers’ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal government’s universal service investments—using those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profits—these large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCC’s current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCC’s current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCC’s universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the program’s entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal government’s existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting America’s National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national

Introduction

Low 56.0%
Pages: 882-884

— 849 — Federal Communications Commission Big Tech, and it should look to Section 230 and the Consolidated Reporting Act as potential sources of authority.19 In acting, the FCC could require these platforms to provide greater specificity regarding their terms of service, and it could hold them accountable by prohibiting actions that are inconsistent with those plain and particular terms. Within this framework, Big Tech should be required to offer a transparent appeals process that allows for the challenging of pretextual takedowns or other actions that violate clear rules of the road. l Support legislation that scraps Section 230’s current approach. The FCC should work with Congress on more fundamental Section 230 reforms that go beyond interpreting its current terms. Congress should do so by ensuring that Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections. As part of those reforms, the FCC should work with Congress to ensure that antidiscrimination provisions are applied to Big Tech—including “back-end” companies that provide hosting services and DDoS protection. Reforms that prohibit discrimination against core political viewpoints are one way to do this and would track the approach taken in a social media law passed in Texas, which was upheld on appeal in late 2022 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.20 In all of this, Congress can make certain points clear. It could focus legislation on dominant, general-use platforms rather than specialized ones. This could include excluding comment sections in online publications, specialized message boards, or communities within larger platforms that self-moderate. Similarly, Congress could legislate in a way that does not require any platform to host illegal content; child pornography; terrorist speech; and indecent, profane, or similar categories of speech that Congress has previously carved out. l Support efforts to empower consumers. The FCC and Congress should work together to formulate rules that empower consumers. Section 230 itself codifies “user control” as an express policy goal and encourages Internet platforms to provide tools that will “empower” users to engage in their own content moderation. As Congress takes up reforms, it should therefore be mindful of how we can return to Internet users the power to control their online experiences. One idea is to empower consumers to choose their own content filters and fact checkers, if any. The FCC should also work with Congress to ensure stronger protections against young children accessing social media sites despite age restrictions that generally prohibit their use of these sites.

Introduction

Low 51.3%
Pages: 885-887

— 852 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Publish a foreign adversary transparency list. As part of the FCC’s ongoing work to secure our networks from entities that would do the bidding of our foreign adversaries, the FCC should do more to shine the light of transparency on the scope of the problem. To this end, the FCC should compile and publish a list of all entities that hold FCC authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority with more than 10 percent ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including the governments of China, Russia, Iran, Syria, or North Korea. A bipartisan bill that would require the FCC to publish this type of list has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Elise Stefanik (R–NY), Ro Khanna (D– CA), and Mike Gallagher (R–WI).24 l Fully fund the federal “rip and replace” program. In 2019, Congress established a $1.9 billion Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (known colloquially as the “rip and replace” program) to reimburse communications providers for the reasonable expenses they would incur to remove, replace, and dispose of insecure Huawei and ZTE gear. However, $1.9 billion is about $3 billion short of the total amount of funding needed to complete the rip and replace process. A new Administration should ensure that the program is fully funded and should look first at repurposing and applying unused COVID-era emergency funds for this purpose. l Launch a Clean Standards Initiative. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. government launched a worldwide Clean Networks program.25 As a result of this initiative, many of the U.S. government’s allies started the process of ending their relationships with Huawei. It is time for an Administration to build and expand on this groundbreaking work by taking a similar approach to the standard-setting process. Right now, the CCP is seeking to extend its influence by exerting control over the development of standards in a variety of areas, including technology and telecommunications. It is vital that the United States meet this threat with a comprehensive clean standards initiative. l Stop aiding the CCP’s authoritarian approach to artificial intelligence. The CCP has set itself a goal of becoming the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. Beijing is bent on using this technology to exert authoritarian control domestically and export its authoritarian governance model overseas. U.S. businesses are aiding Beijing in this effort— often unwittingly—by feeding, training, and improving the AI datasets of companies that are beholden to the CCP. One way that U.S. companies

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.