Block the Use of Transatlantic Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2505
Last Updated: July 17, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

ID: K000375

Follow the money

The bill

Block the Use of Transatlantic Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act

HR. 2505, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$60,750 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

June 8, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Block the Use of Transatlantic Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act (HR 2505) claims to prevent the export of certain technologies to Iran that could be used in their drone program. How quaint. The real purpose is to grandstand on national security, appease lobbyists, and pretend to care about the Iranian threat.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of State to develop strategies to prevent the export of technologies like microcontrollers, GPS modules, and microprocessors that could be used in Iranian drones. Because, you know, Iran wouldn't just find alternative suppliers or manufacture their own components. The bill also mandates reports, briefings, and consultations with various agencies, because what's a congressional bill without some bureaucratic busywork?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the Iranian government (who will likely ignore this bill), US manufacturers of dual-use technologies (who will face additional regulatory burdens), and foreign companies that might be tempted to sell these technologies to Iran (who will probably just find ways to circumvent the restrictions). Oh, and let's not forget the lobbyists for the defense and tech industries, who will use this bill to justify more funding and subsidies.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It won't stop Iran's drone program, but it might slow it down slightly. The real impact will be on US businesses, which will face increased regulatory costs and potential losses due to decreased exports. The bill also sets a precedent for further restrictions on technology exports, which could harm innovation and competitiveness in the long run.

In conclusion, HR 2505 is a classic example of congressional posturing, designed to score political points rather than address the actual complexities of the issue. It's a symptom of a deeper disease: the inability of politicians to think critically about national security and the economy. So, let's give it a diagnosis: "Acute Case of Legislative Theater-itis," with symptoms including grandstanding, bureaucratic bloat, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy. Prognosis: more of the same, until voters wake up and demand actual leadership rather than empty rhetoric.

Related Topics

Trade & International Commerce
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$60,750
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$60,750

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
GREEN, LAWRENCE ALAN
2 transactions
$6,600
2
LEITER, DAVID J.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
MCCANN, WILLIAM J.
2 transactions
$6,200
4
MCCARTNEY, CHRISTINE B.
2 transactions
$5,600
5
EPPERLY, MATTHEW THOMAS
1 transaction
$3,300
6
WORLEY, RICHARD
1 transaction
$3,300
7
FISH, JOHN F.
1 transaction
$3,300
8
MCCLENNEN, JAMES C.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
ABRAHAM, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
10
FLAHERTY, SEAN C.
1 transaction
$3,300
11
MORAN, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
12
SCHELL, J. MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
13
BARNES, BEN FRANK
1 transaction
$2,600
14
GRAINGER, GARY B.
1 transaction
$2,500
15
SMITH, JAMES
1 transaction
$2,250
16
CHASE, OLIVE M.
1 transaction
$2,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Wilson, Joe [R-SC-2]

ID: W000795

Top Contributors

10

1
CATAWBA INDIAN NATION
OrganizationROCK HILL, SC
$2,000
May 6, 2024
2
LEVKOWITZ, HOWARD
SELF EMPLOYED • INVESTOR
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$6,600
Nov 28, 2023
3
VICKAR, KERRY
LKV MANAGEMENT • CHAIRMAN
IndividualCHARLOTTE, NC
$5,000
Nov 21, 2023
4
LOWELL, RANDY R.
BURR FORMAN • ATTORNEY
IndividualISLE OF PALMS, SC
$3,700
May 8, 2024
5
VALLARINO, MANUEL R.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE BEACH, SC
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
6
VALLARINO, MARY EMILY J.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE BEACH, SC
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
7
CASSELS, W. TOBIN III
SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES • PRESIDENT
IndividualCOLUMBIA, SC
$3,300
Dec 1, 2023
8
CASSELS, W. TOBIN JR.
SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualCOLUMBIA, SC
$3,300
Dec 1, 2023
9
HOEFER, JOHN M. S. ESQ.
WILLOUGHBY & HOEFER P.A. • ATTORNEY
IndividualCOLUMBIA, SC
$3,300
Nov 8, 2023
10
LIEBERMAN, JEREMY A.
KLEE TUCHIN BOGDANOFF & STERN LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualFLUSHING, NY
$3,300
Oct 31, 2023

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

10

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Tenney, Claudia [R-NY-24]

ID: T000478

Top Contributors

10

1
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$27,879
Oct 22, 2024
2
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$21,566
Oct 29, 2024
3
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$10,970
Nov 25, 2024
4
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$5,493
Nov 19, 2024
5
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,000
Nov 5, 2024
6
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Jun 18, 2024
7
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Jun 18, 2024
8
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
Mar 31, 2023
9
TEXTOR, DONALD
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualLOCUST VALLEY, NY
$13,200
Apr 17, 2024
10
WINE, SCOTT
POLARIS • CEO
IndividualEXCELSIOR, MN
$6,600
Sep 30, 2024

Rep. LaLota, Nick [R-NY-1]

ID: L000598

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]

ID: N000193

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
May 29, 2024
2
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF ND
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
May 29, 2024
3
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
OrganizationTAMA, IA
$2,500
Dec 31, 2024
4
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
OrganizationTAMA, IA
$1,000
Sep 1, 2023
5
SMITH, JOHN M.
CRST TRUCKING • CEO
IndividualCEDAR RAPIDS, IA
$6,600
Oct 28, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Oct 17, 2023
7
EMMET, RICHARD
JANE STREET CAPITAL • FINANCE
IndividualLARCHMONT, NY
$6,600
Nov 21, 2023
8
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W.
SELF EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$6,600
Nov 7, 2023
9
STERN, ELIZABETH
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSCARSDALE, NY
$6,600
Dec 6, 2023
10
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Feb 15, 2024

Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32]

ID: S000344

Top Contributors

10

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Oct 30, 2023
2
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,000
Oct 5, 2023
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$700
Oct 21, 2024
7
AHMED, TAIMOOR
MARKHOR LOGISTICS • CEO
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
8
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
9
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
10
GARHWAL, SANJEEV
WWMG • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEATTLE, WA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023

Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]

ID: G000583

Top Contributors

10

1
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$22,941
Apr 12, 2024
2
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$10,621
May 10, 2024
3
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
May 15, 2024
4
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 15, 2024
5
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 30, 2024
6
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$5,751
Apr 1, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SEKAS LAW GROUP LLC
OrganizationENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NJ
$1,500
Apr 12, 2024
9
SANDOR F. GENET & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
OrganizationNORTH MIAMI BEACH, FL
$250
Apr 12, 2024
10
FIRESTONE MILKEN, SARAH
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Jul 2, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 45 nodes and 32 connections (36 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $158,065

Top Donors - Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Section 4(a)(1) requires a strategy to prevent export of microelectronics including microcontrollers, voltage regulators, digital signal controllers, GPS modules, and microprocessors to Iran, which are products of the semiconductor industry; this imposes regulatory costs and restrictions on manufacturers.

  • −Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85

    Section 4(c)(1) requires the Secretary of Defense to develop options to counter Iran's acquisition of technologies used in unmanned aircraft systems, including CAD software and CNC machines, which are supplied by defense contractors; this imposes compliance burdens and potential restrictions on sales.

  • Section 4(c)(1)(F) includes Computer Aided Design (CAD) software in the range of options to be developed by the Secretary of Defense; CAD software is a key product of AI/cloud infrastructure providers (e.g., Autodesk, Siemens), and restrictions on its export to Iran could harm their market.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2505 seeks to strengthen U.S. export controls to block illicit transfers of drone-related technologies to Iran, which aligns with Project 2025’s push to modernize and tighten the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for countries of concern, enhance enforcement, and close licensing loopholes."

Key themes:export controlstechnology transfer preventionlicensing tighteningenforcement strategydual-use technology

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 61%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2505 seeks to strengthen U.S. export controls on drone-related technologies to Iran, mirroring Project 2025’s call for tighter regulation of emerging/foundational technologies, improved BIS processes, licensing transparency, and robust end-use checks—though the bill targets Iran specifically while Project 2025 focuses broader reforms for China and Russia."

Key themes:export controlsemerging technology regulationinteragency coordinationlicensing transparencyend-use verification

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Trade

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 852-854AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2505 focuses on using export controls to deny Iran access to UAS-related technologies, which aligns with the Project 2025 trade theme of protecting U.S. technology from adversarial acquisition through export control mechanisms, though the bill targets Iran while Project 2025 emphasizes China."

Key themes:export controlstechnology transfernational securitydual-use technologyadversarial nations

— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023).

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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