The bill
Undersea Cable Control Act
HR. 2503, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7]
ID: K000398
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2503, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
September 2, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real disease beneath.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Undersea Cable Control Act (HR 2503) claims to aim at eliminating the availability of goods and technologies that support undersea cables to foreign adversaries. How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to justify increased government control over international trade and technology transfer.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the President to develop a strategy to restrict exports of items related to undersea cable construction, maintenance, or operation. It also mandates reports on the implementation of this strategy, bilateral agreements with allies, and evaluations of export controls. Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory "penalty provisions for noncompliance" – because who doesn't love a good dose of bureaucratic overreach?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:
* The President and various Secretaries (Commerce, State, Defense) get to play pretend diplomats and strategists. * Congressional committees receive reports and briefings, because they clearly have nothing better to do. * Foreign adversaries (read: China) are the boogeymen du jour. * US allies and partners are expected to fall in line with our benevolent leadership.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of "security theater" – all show, no substance. It will:
* Increase bureaucratic red tape and costs for businesses involved in undersea cable projects. * Provide a convenient excuse for the government to restrict trade and technology transfer, citing national security concerns. * Foster an atmosphere of mistrust among international partners, as they're forced to comply with our arbitrary export controls. * Accomplish precisely nothing in terms of actual security benefits.
In short, HR 2503 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation. It's a bill that says one thing but does another – much like its sponsors and supporters. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create yet another pointless exercise in bureaucratic posturing.
Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
ID: S000344
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 49 nodes and 28 connections (45 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $103,300
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 2(b)(1) requires identification of items required for supporting undersea cable projects, which are critical infrastructure for telecommunications carriers; Section 2(e) directs the Secretary of Commerce to evaluate export controls on such items, potentially benefiting U.S. telecom firms by limiting foreign adversary access and securing supply chains.
Undersea cables rely on specialized hardware including semiconductors for repeaters and terminal equipment; Section 2(b)(1) and (e) involve evaluating export controls on items supporting undersea cables, which could benefit U.S. semiconductor and hardware firms by restricting adversary access and promoting domestic/allied sources.
Section 2(e)(2)(B) states the policy includes coordination with the Secretary of Defense; undersea cables are strategic assets for military communications, and securing their supply chain benefits defense contractors involved in related systems and infrastructure.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The Undersea Cable Control Act directly implements Project 2025's call to strengthen export controls on emerging and foundational technologies, enhance transparency in licensing decisions, improve end-use checks, and modernize the EAR to counter threats from authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, particularly by targeting technologies critical to national security."
— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.
AI Analysis:
"The Undersea Cable Control Act aligns closely with Project 2025's call to strengthen export controls on emerging and foundational technologies, improve transparency in licensing decisions, and enhance interagency coordination under BIS. Both emphasize using export controls to protect national security by restricting adversary access to critical technologies."
— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on defending U.S. interests in international bodies and strengthening export controls to protect national security, particularly through promoting U.S. leadership in standards-setting and reviewing export policies for critical technologies."
— 688 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Defend U.S. interests in international bodies. Strong representation at the International Telecommunication Union should protect the interests of both private and government users of spectrum. The U.S. has differing needs from many other countries, for instance, because of U.S. government satellites and commercial space industry. NTIA should work with the U.S. delegation to ensure maximum adoption of the U.S. position. l Set fresh priorities in broadband grant programs. Reevaluate broadband grant programs and, when possible, establish Administration priorities in how each grant is structured. First and foremost, widespread deployment of infrastructure is needed for 5G adoption in rural and exurban areas, which will be a key factor in future economic competitiveness for these under-served communities. l Review FirstNet. Evaluate the performance and long-term value proposition of FirstNet in view of modern technologies that will render it obsolete. CONCLUSION The above policies, strategies, and tactics will set a new Administration on firm footing that allows the Department of Commerce to assist the President in implementing a bold agenda that delivers economic prosperity and strong national security to the American people. While many of the department’s functions fall outside the remit of the federal government, its unique authorities in diverse areas provide critical tools that can and should be brought to bear in implementing a conservative governing philosophy that keeps Americans safe and provides oppor- tunity for all. AUTHOR’S NOTE: This chapter includes invaluable input from over a dozen alumni of the Department of Commerce and numerous other members of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but James Rockas, Nazak Nikakhtar, Louis Heinzer, Robert Burkett, Iain Murray, Michael Gonzalez, David Legates, and Kristen Eichamer deserve special recognition. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 689 — Department of Commerce ENDNOTES 1. Commerce Department Termination and Government Reorganization Act of 1995, S. Rep. 104–164, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., October 20, 1995; Angela Antonelli, “Five Good Reasons to Close Down The Department of Commerce,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1181, May 20, 1998, https://www.heritage.org/ budget-and-spending/report/five-good-reasons-close-down-the-department-commerce; and Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Shrinking Government Bureaucracy: Reorganizing the Executive Branch to Boost Economic Growth and Freedom,” August 2017, https://cei.org/shrinking-government-bureaucracy/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 2. News release, “Latest Study of 120 Million Forecasts Proves AccuWeather Forecasts Are More Accurate,” AccuWeather, January 14, 2020, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/latest-study-of-120-million- forecasts-proves-accuweather-forecasts-are-most-accurate-300986848.html (accessed December 16, 2022). 3. In general, performance-based organizations are established to set forth clear measures of performance, hold the head of the organization accountable for achieving results, and grant the head of the organization authority to deviate from government rules if needed to achieve agreed-upon results. 4. Federal Register, Vol. 34, No. 45 (March 7, 1969), pp. 4935–4938. 5. U.S. Department of Commerce, Minority Business Development Agency, “The History of the MBDA,” https:// www.mbda.gov/about/history (accessed March 15, 2023). 6. Ashley Winston, The Contribution of Minority Business Enterprises to the U.S. Economy, U.S. Department of Commerce, Minority Business Development Agency, September 2021, p. 7, https://www.mbda.gov/sites/ default/files/2021-09/The%20Contribution%20of%20MBEs%20to%20US%20Economy%20Report%20%20 -%20September%202021.pdf (accessed March 2, 2023). 7. 35 U.S. Code § 101. 8. National Institute of Standards and Technology, “About NIST,” https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (accessed December 16, 2022). 9. Donald J. Trump, “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” Executive Order No. 13873, May 15, 2019, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential- actions/executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
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Promptly Ending Political Prosecutions and Executive Retaliation Act of 2025