To codify Executive Order 14248, entitled "Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections".

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2499
Last Updated: April 6, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Hamadeh, Abraham [R-AZ-8]

ID: H001098

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. HR 2499 is a bill that reeks of desperation, a Hail Mary pass to salvage what's left of their credibility.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to codify Executive Order 14248, which was likely written on a cocktail napkin during a particularly dull meeting. The objective? To "preserve and protect the integrity of American elections." Oh, how noble. In reality, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to consolidate power, restrict voting rights, and further erode the already-tenuous trust in our electoral system.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill essentially takes an existing Executive Order and turns it into law, because who needs due process or meaningful debate when you can just rubber-stamp a hastily written EO? The key provision is that it gives the executive branch even more authority to "preserve and protect" elections, which is code for "do whatever we want to maintain our grip on power." Existing laws will be modified to accommodate this new power grab, because who needs checks and balances when you have a Congress that's too afraid to do its job?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include the American people, who will once again be treated like pawns in a game of partisan politics. The stakeholders? Well, it's the usual suspects: politicians looking to maintain their power, special interest groups seeking to influence the outcome, and lobbyists who'll stop at nothing to line their pockets.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact is a further erosion of trust in our electoral system, more voter suppression, and a continued slide into authoritarianism. The implications? A complete disregard for democratic principles, a Congress that's too afraid to stand up to the executive branch, and a population that's increasingly disillusioned with the entire process.

Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Power-itis," a disease characterized by an insatiable lust for control and a complete disregard for the well-being of the American people. The symptoms include a lack of transparency, a dearth of meaningful debate, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy. Treatment? A strong dose of accountability, a dash of courage from our elected officials, and a healthy serving of skepticism from the American people.

Prognosis: Poor. This bill will likely pass with flying colors, because who needs integrity when you have party loyalty and a desire to maintain power at all costs? The American people will be left to suffer the consequences, while our esteemed leaders pat themselves on the back for a job well done.

Related Topics

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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Hamadeh, Abraham [R-AZ-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$192,436
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$17,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$175,136

No PAC contributions found

1
CLB PARTNERS
1 transaction
$12,000
2
ADVANTAGE INSURANCE PLLC
1 transaction
$3,300
3
JARDIN RATZKEN PLLC
2 transactions
$2,000

No committee contributions found

1
HAYDEN, STEPHEN
2 transactions
$26,400
2
KAYALI, ZEID
2 transactions
$16,000
3
MOJAHED, ROMEIN A
2 transactions
$15,000
4
OLSON, JOSH
2 transactions
$15,000
5
FISHMAN, DAVID
2 transactions
$13,636
6
HAMADEH, WASEEM J
1 transaction
$13,200
7
MANLEY, DWIGHT
1 transaction
$13,200
8
PRICE, KAPU
1 transaction
$13,200
9
NOWOCIEN, PIOTR
1 transaction
$9,900
10
BAILEY, B JAN
1 transaction
$6,600
11
BAILEY, JOHN S
1 transaction
$6,600
12
HASBINI, LEENA
1 transaction
$6,600
13
HILLMAN, TATANALL LEA
1 transaction
$6,600
14
HOWARD, DAX
1 transaction
$6,600
15
HOWARD, NICO
1 transaction
$6,600

Donor Network - Rep. Hamadeh, Abraham [R-AZ-8]

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Total contributions: $192,436

Top Donors - Rep. Hamadeh, Abraham [R-AZ-8]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 56.8%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Low 56.8%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Introduction

Low 54.8%
Pages: 75-77

— 42 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 3. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3. 4. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 5. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 6. H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/ PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). — 43 — 2 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Russ Vought In its opening words, Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes it abundantly clear that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 That enormous power is not vested in departments or agencies, in staff or administrative bodies, in nongovernmental organizations or other equities and interests close to the government. The President must set and enforce a plan for the executive branch. Sadly, however, a President today assumes office to find a sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly “woke” faction of the country. The modern conservative President’s task is to limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people. This challenge is created and exacerbated by factors like Congress’s decades-long tendency to delegate its lawmaking power to agency bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “inde- pendence” that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the presumed inability to hold career civil servants accountable for their performance, and the increasing reality that many agencies are not only too big and powerful, but also increasingly weaponized against the public and a President who is elected by the people and empowered by the Constitution to govern. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison warned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”2 Regrettably, that wise and cautionary note describes to a significant degree the modern executive branch, which—whether controlled

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.