Dairy Nutrition Incentive Program Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2496
Last Updated: April 6, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Costa, Jim [D-CA-21]

ID: C001059

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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Dairy Nutrition Incentive Program Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted bill that claims to promote the purchase and consumption of "naturally nutrient-rich dairy" among households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. The real objective? To line the pockets of the dairy industry with taxpayer dollars, while pretending to care about nutrition.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a program that provides grants or cooperative agreements to eligible entities (read: dairy industry shills) to develop and test methods for increasing the purchase of naturally nutrient-rich dairy products. The Secretary of Agriculture will oversee this boondoggle, ensuring that funds are allocated to projects that prioritize direct incentives for SNAP participants. Because, you know, the best way to improve nutrition is by bribing people with free cheese.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

* Dairy industry lobbyists and their Congressional lapdogs * Eligible entities (non-profits, state/local governments) looking to score some easy cash * SNAP recipients, who will be "incentivized" to buy more dairy products (because they clearly need guidance on what to eat) * Taxpayers, who will foot the bill for this nonsense

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "follow the money." The dairy industry will reap the benefits, while SNAP recipients might see some short-term gains in terms of access to dairy products. However, the long-term effects on nutrition and public health are dubious at best.

In reality, this program will likely:

* Increase demand for resource-intensive dairy products, contributing to environmental degradation and animal welfare concerns * Perpetuate a system that prioritizes processed foods over whole, nutrient-dense options * Waste taxpayer dollars on ineffective programs that fail to address the root causes of nutrition-related health issues

In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of how special interests can hijack public policy for their own gain. It's a cynical exercise in legislative theater, designed to appease the dairy industry while pretending to care about nutrition. As with most Congressional bills, it's a case of "same old, same old" – more money for cronies, less attention to actual problems.

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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Costa, Jim [D-CA-21]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$94,000
25 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$16,700
Committees
$0
Individuals
$77,300

No PAC contributions found

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TABLE MOUNTAIN RANCHERIA
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No committee contributions found

1
KAPLAN, DAVID
2 transactions
$6,600
2
KAPLAN, MEREDITH
2 transactions
$6,600
3
RESNICK, LYNDA RAE
2 transactions
$6,600
4
ARK, MANDEEP
1 transaction
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5
AFZAL, TEHMINA
1 transaction
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SINGH, JASPREET
1 transaction
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7
COSTA, NADINE
1 transaction
$5,000
8
GUNNER, RICHARD V.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
SANDBERG, SHERYL
1 transaction
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10
MCDIARMID, SUZANNE V.
1 transaction
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11
CAGLIA, RICHARD
1 transaction
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RICHARDS, THOMAS G.
1 transaction
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13
JONES, TIM
1 transaction
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14
GUNNER, MIMI
1 transaction
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15
SIMPSON, STEPHEN J.
1 transaction
$3,300
16
CAMPOS, TONY
1 transaction
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17
VERMA, ADITYA MD
1 transaction
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Donor Network - Rep. Costa, Jim [D-CA-21]

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Total contributions: $94,000

Top Donors - Rep. Costa, Jim [D-CA-21]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Moderate 61.6%
Pages: 332-334

— 299 — Department of Agriculture largely hidden. There are means-tested food-support programs in the USDA (specially FNS), whereas most means-tested programs are at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). All means-tested anti- poverty programs should be overseen by one department—specifically HHS, which handles most welfare programs. Reform SNAP. Ostensibly, SNAP sends money through electronic-bene- fit-transfer (EBT) cards to help “low-income” individuals buy food. It is the largest of the federal nutrition programs. Food stamps are designed to be supplemented by other forms of income—whether through paid employment or nonprofit support. SNAP serves 41.1 million individuals—an increase of 4.3 million people during the Biden years.55 In 2020, the food stamp program cost $79.1 billion. That number continued to rise—by 2022, outlays hit $119.5 billion.56 The next Administration should: l Re-implement work requirements. The statutory language covering food stamps allows states to waive work requirements that otherwise apply to work-capable individuals—that is, adult beneficiaries between the ages 18 and 50 who are not disabled and do not have any children or other dependents in the home.57 Even in a strong economy, work expectations are fairly limited: Individuals who are work-capable and without dependents are required to work or prepare for work for 20 hours per week.58 The work requirements are then implemented unless the state requests a waiver from the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services.59 Waivers from statutory work requirements can be approved in two instances: an unemployment rate of more than 10 percent or a lack of sufficient jobs.60 The Trump Administration bolstered USDA work expectations in the food stamp program. In February 2019, FNS issued a modest regulatory change that applied only to able-bodied individuals without dependents— beneficiaries aged 18 to 49, not elderly or disabled, who did not have children or other dependents in the home (ABAWD).61 The FNS rule changed when a state could receive a waiver from implementing the ABAWD work requirement. Under the new rule, in order to waive the work requirement, the state’s unemployment rate had to be above 6 percent for more than 24 months. The rule also defined “area” in such a way that states would be unable to combine non-contiguous counties in order to maximize their waivers.62 Of — 300 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise the more than 40 million food stamp beneficiaries, the Trump rule would have applied only to 688,000 individuals in fiscal year 2021.63 The Trump reform was scheduled to go into effect, but a D.C. district court federal judge enjoined the rule.64 The USDA filed an appeal in late December 2020,65 but the Biden Administration withdrew from defending the challenge, and the rule was never implemented.66 Beyond the able-bodied work requirement, FNS should implement better regulation to clarify options for states to implement the general work requirement. This requirement is an option states can apply to work- capable beneficiaries aged 16 to 59. If beneficiaries’ work hours are below 30 hours a week, states can implement the general work requirements to oblige beneficiaries to register for work or participate in SNAP Employment and Training or workfare assigned by the state SNAP agency.67 Increased clarity for states would include items like states being required to offer employment and training spots for those that request them—not simply budgeting for every currently enrolled able-bodied adult. l Reform broad-based categorical eligibility. Federal law permits states to enroll individuals in food stamps if they receive a benefit from another program, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. However, under an administrative option in TANF called broad- based categorical eligibility (BBCE), ”benefit” is defined so broadly that it includes simply receiving distributed pamphlets and 1–800 numbers.68 This definition, with its low threshold to trigger a “benefit,” allows individuals to bypass eligibility limits—particularly the asset requirement (how much the applicant has in resources, such as bank accounts or property).69 Adopting the BBCE option has even allowed millionaires to enroll in the food stamp program.70 The Trump Administration proposed to close the loophole with a rule to “increase program integrity and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.”71 The regulation was not finalized before the end of the Trump Administration. l Re-evaluate the Thrifty Food Plan. In a dramatic overreach, the Biden Administration unilaterally increased food stamp benefits by at least 23 percent in October 2021.72 Through an update to the Thrifty Food Plan, in which the USDA analyzes a basket of foods intended to provide a nutritious diet, the USDA increased food stamp outlays by between $250 billion and $300 billion over 10 years.73

Introduction

Moderate 61.6%
Pages: 332-334

— 299 — Department of Agriculture largely hidden. There are means-tested food-support programs in the USDA (specially FNS), whereas most means-tested programs are at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). All means-tested anti- poverty programs should be overseen by one department—specifically HHS, which handles most welfare programs. Reform SNAP. Ostensibly, SNAP sends money through electronic-bene- fit-transfer (EBT) cards to help “low-income” individuals buy food. It is the largest of the federal nutrition programs. Food stamps are designed to be supplemented by other forms of income—whether through paid employment or nonprofit support. SNAP serves 41.1 million individuals—an increase of 4.3 million people during the Biden years.55 In 2020, the food stamp program cost $79.1 billion. That number continued to rise—by 2022, outlays hit $119.5 billion.56 The next Administration should: l Re-implement work requirements. The statutory language covering food stamps allows states to waive work requirements that otherwise apply to work-capable individuals—that is, adult beneficiaries between the ages 18 and 50 who are not disabled and do not have any children or other dependents in the home.57 Even in a strong economy, work expectations are fairly limited: Individuals who are work-capable and without dependents are required to work or prepare for work for 20 hours per week.58 The work requirements are then implemented unless the state requests a waiver from the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services.59 Waivers from statutory work requirements can be approved in two instances: an unemployment rate of more than 10 percent or a lack of sufficient jobs.60 The Trump Administration bolstered USDA work expectations in the food stamp program. In February 2019, FNS issued a modest regulatory change that applied only to able-bodied individuals without dependents— beneficiaries aged 18 to 49, not elderly or disabled, who did not have children or other dependents in the home (ABAWD).61 The FNS rule changed when a state could receive a waiver from implementing the ABAWD work requirement. Under the new rule, in order to waive the work requirement, the state’s unemployment rate had to be above 6 percent for more than 24 months. The rule also defined “area” in such a way that states would be unable to combine non-contiguous counties in order to maximize their waivers.62 Of

Introduction

Low 56.1%
Pages: 335-337

— 302 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Re-evaluate excessive regulation. As for baby formula regulations generally, labeling regulations and regulations that unnecessarily delay the manufacture and sale of baby formula should be re-evaluated.80 During the Biden Administration, there have been devastating baby formula shortages. Return to the Original Purpose of School Meals. Federal meal programs for K–12 students were created to provide food to children from low-income families while at school.81 Today, however, federal school meals increasingly resemble enti- tlement programs that have strayed far from their original objective and represent an example of the ever-expanding federal footprint in local school operations. The NSLP and SBP are the two largest K–12 meal programs provided by federal taxpayer money. The NSLP launched in 1946 and the SBP in 1966, both as options specifically for children in poverty.82 During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal policymakers temporarily expanded access to school meal programs, but some lawmakers and federal officials have now proposed making this expansion per- manent.83 Yet even before the pandemic, research found that federal officials had already expanded these programs to serve children from upper-income homes, and these programs are rife with improper payments and inefficiencies. Heritage Foundation research from 2019 found that after the enactment of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) in 2010, the share of students from middle- and upper-income homes receiving free meals in states that participated in CEP doubled, and in some cases tripled—all in a program meant for children from families with incomes at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty line (Children from homes at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible for free lunches, while students from families at or below 185 percent of poverty are eligible for reduced-priced lunches).84 Under CEP, if 40 percent of students in a school or school district are eligible for federal meals, all students in that school or district can receive free meals. However, the USDA has taken it even further, improperly interpreting the law85 to allow a subset of schools within a district to be grouped together to reach the 40 percent threshold, As a result, a school with zero low-income students could be grouped together with schools with high levels of low-income students, and as a result all the students in the schools within that group (even schools without a single low-in- come student) can receive free federal meals.86 Schools can direct resources meant for students in poverty to children from wealthier families. Furthermore, the NSLP and SBP are among the most inaccurate federal programs according to PaymentAccuracy.gov, a project of the U.S. Office of Man- agement and Budget and the Office of the Inspector General.87 Before federal auditors reduced the rigor of annual reporting requirements in 2018, the NSLP had wasted nearly $2 billion in taxpayer resources through payments provided to ineligible recipients.88 Even after the auditing changes, which the U.S. Government

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.