Romance Scam Prevention Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2481

Last Updated: September 1, 2026

Romance Scam Prevention Act

HR. 2481, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.

The sponsor

Rep. Valadao, David G. [R-CA-22]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$79,400 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Read twice. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 438.

June 16, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Romance Scam Prevention Act (HR 2481) is a congressional bill that aims to regulate online dating services and prevent romance scams. As a self-serving billionaire, I will analyze this bill from the perspective of its potential impact on my wealth and power.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to require online dating service providers to provide fraud ban notifications to their members, thereby preventing romance scams. This is a classic example of government overreach, attempting to stifle innovation and impose unnecessary regulations on the tech industry. My think tank, the "Liberty Institute," has estimated that such regulations could lead to a 10% decrease in online dating service providers' revenue, resulting in a potential loss of $1.2 billion in annual profits.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill mandates online dating service providers to provide clear and conspicuous notifications to members when they have interacted with a banned member. This includes providing the username or profile identifier of the banned member, as well as information on best practices to avoid online fraud. These provisions will undoubtedly lead to increased compliance costs for online dating service providers, which could be passed on to consumers in the form of higher subscription fees. Our projections suggest that these costs could reach $500 million annually, a significant burden on an industry that is already struggling to maintain profitability.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The primary stakeholders affected by this bill are online dating service providers, their members, and law enforcement agencies. As a billionaire investor in the tech industry, I have a vested interest in ensuring that these regulations do not stifle innovation or limit the growth potential of online dating services. My portfolio companies, including "LoveConnect" and "MatchMax," could be significantly impacted by these regulations, with potential losses reaching $200 million annually.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The Romance Scam Prevention Act has significant implications for the tech industry and my own business interests. By imposing additional regulatory burdens on online dating service providers, this bill could lead to increased costs, reduced innovation, and decreased competitiveness. Furthermore, the bill's emphasis on government enforcement and oversight could set a troubling precedent for future regulations, potentially threatening the very fabric of our free market system. My think tank has estimated that the cumulative impact of such regulations could reach $5 billion in lost economic output over the next five years, a staggering figure that underscores the need for deregulation and privatization.

In conclusion, the Romance Scam Prevention Act is a misguided attempt to regulate the tech industry, driven by a flawed assumption that government intervention is necessary to protect consumers. As a billionaire investor, I will continue to advocate for deregulation and privatization, ensuring that my business interests are protected and that the free market is allowed to flourish. The potential consequences of inaction are too great to ignore, and it is imperative that we take a proactive approach to shaping the regulatory landscape in our favor.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

As I taught you in 8th grade civics, the legislative process involves introducing a bill, debating it, and voting on its passage. In this case, we have HR 2481, the Romance Scam Prevention Act, which aims to protect online dating service users from romance scams. Remember when we learned about the importance of committees in reviewing bills? Well, this bill has been read twice and placed on the calendar in the Senate, indicating it's moving through the process.

The main purpose of HR 2481 is to require online dating service providers to notify members if they've interacted with a banned member who may have been using a false identity or attempting to defraud others. As we covered in middle school, bills often have multiple objectives; here, the key provisions include providing clear and conspicuous notifications, including information on best practices to avoid online fraud, and establishing enforcement mechanisms.

These changes will affect online dating service providers, their members, and law enforcement agencies. Providers must implement new notification systems, while members will receive more information about potential scams. Law enforcement can request delays in notifications if an investigation is ongoing. As I emphasized in class, understanding the roles of different stakeholders is crucial in evaluating a bill's impact.

The potential impact of HR 2481 is significant, as it could reduce the number of romance scams and protect vulnerable individuals. However, it also raises questions about the balance between user protection and provider liability. In an ideal system, as we discussed in civics class, checks and balances would ensure that power is distributed evenly among branches of government. Unfortunately, the reality often falls short, and bills like HR 2481 must navigate complex interests and competing priorities.

In conclusion, HR 2481 is a bill that aims to address a specific issue through targeted regulations. As we learned in middle school, understanding how a bill becomes a law is essential for evaluating its potential impact. By examining the main purpose, key provisions, affected parties, and potential implications of HR 2481, we can better appreciate the complexities of the legislative process and the challenges of creating effective policy.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

The Romance Scam Prevention Act - sounds innocent enough, but trust me, there's more to it than meets the eye. As I delve into the bill, I'll connect the dots and reveal the hidden agendas.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** On the surface, this bill aims to protect online dating service users from romance scams by requiring providers to notify members of potential fraud. But, if we look closer, it's clear that the government is using this as a Trojan horse to expand its surveillance capabilities. By mandating notifications, they're creating a backdoor for monitoring online interactions and gathering sensitive information.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces a new requirement for online dating service providers to send "fraud ban notifications" to members who have interacted with banned users. These notifications must include the username of the banned member, warnings about potential scams, and contact information for customer support. But what's really interesting is the provision that allows law enforcement officials to request delays in sending these notifications, giving them time to gather more intel on suspected scammers - or perhaps something more sinister.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Online dating service providers are clearly impacted, as they'll need to implement new systems for detecting and reporting potential scams. But what about the users themselves? Will they be aware of the data being collected on their online interactions? And what about law enforcement agencies - will they use this newfound power to monitor and control online activity?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has far-reaching implications for online freedom and privacy. By creating a framework for monitoring online interactions, the government is setting a precedent for future surveillance programs. It's also likely that this will lead to increased censorship and control over online content, as providers may feel pressured to remove any content deemed "suspicious" or "scam-like." And let's not forget the potential for abuse - what's to stop law enforcement from using these notifications as a pretext for monitoring innocent citizens?

In conclusion, the Romance Scam Prevention Act is just the tip of the iceberg. Beneath its innocuous surface lies a complex web of surveillance, control, and manipulation. As we celebrate Thanksgiving, let's not forget to be thankful for our dwindling online freedoms - while they still exist!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(With a healthy dose of sarcasm and a raised eyebrow) Oh, folks, gather 'round! We've got a real doozy of a bill on our hands here - the Romance Scam Prevention Act. (chuckles) Because, you know, the elites in Washington are just so concerned about your love life... and your freedom to not get scammed online, of course!

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to require online dating service providers to notify their members when they've interacted with a banned member who may have been trying to scam them. (smirking) Because, clearly, the free market can't be trusted to regulate itself, and we need Big Brother... err, I mean, the government to step in and protect us from those pesky romance scammers.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill mandates that online dating service providers send out "fraud ban notifications" to members who've received messages from banned users. These notifications must include information about the banned user, warnings about potential scams, and best practices for avoiding online fraud. (winking) And, of course, the providers get a nice safe harbor provision, so they can't be sued for trying to comply with these new regulations.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties here are online dating service providers, their members, and (of course) the scammers themselves. (smiling slyly) I mean, who doesn't love a good romance scam, am I right? But seriously, this bill could impact the online dating industry as a whole, potentially leading to increased costs and regulatory burdens for providers.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is... (dramatic pause) ...well, it's not exactly earth-shattering. But hey, who knows? Maybe it'll actually help prevent some romance scams and protect people's freedom to online date without getting swindled. (smirking) On the other hand, it could also lead to more government overreach and regulation of the internet, because that's always a good thing... said no one ever.

In conclusion, folks, the Romance Scam Prevention Act is just another example of our benevolent government trying to protect us from ourselves. (winking) Because, clearly, we can't be trusted to make our own decisions about online dating and financial transactions. But hey, at least they're looking out for our freedom... to not get scammed, that is!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another brilliant example of legislative theater, designed to make the ignorant masses feel like something is being done about online romance scams. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Romance Scam Prevention Act (HR 2481) claims to aim at protecting online dating service users from scammers by requiring providers to notify members when they've interacted with a banned user. How noble. In reality, it's just a PR stunt to make politicians look like they care about their constituents' well-being.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill mandates that online dating services provide "fraud ban notifications" to users who have messaged a banned member within 24 hours (or up to 3 days, if the provider deems it necessary). These notifications must include the banned user's username, a warning about potential scams, and contact information for the service's customer support. Oh, and there's a lovely "safe harbor" provision that shields providers from liability for complying with these requirements. How convenient.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill affects online dating services, their users, and (of course) the scammers themselves. But let's be real, the only ones who will truly benefit from this legislation are the politicians who sponsored it, as they'll get to tout their "consumer protection" credentials during election season.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It won't actually prevent romance scams, which will continue to thrive as long as humans are stupid enough to send money to strangers online. The real impact will be on the online dating services, which will have to waste resources implementing these notification systems and dealing with the inevitable false positives. Meanwhile, scammers will simply adapt and find new ways to exploit their victims.

In conclusion, HR 2481 is a textbook example of legislative placebo effect: it looks like something is being done, but in reality, it's just a meaningless gesture designed to placate the gullible public. The only disease this bill treats is the politicians' fear of being seen as ineffective – and even that's just a symptom of their own incompetence.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Comprehensive Summary of HR 2481: Romance Scam Prevention Act**

### 1. Main Purpose & Objectives

The main purpose of the Romance Scam Prevention Act (HR 2481) is to protect users of online dating services from romance scams by requiring these service providers to notify their members when they have interacted with a user who has been banned for fraudulent activities. The objective is to prevent financial and emotional harm to individuals by providing them with timely and clear information about potential scams.

### 2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law

Key provisions of the bill include: - **Fraud Ban Notification**: Online dating service providers must notify members if they have received a message from a banned member. - **Required Contents**: Notifications must include the banned member's username, the time of the last interaction, a warning about potential fraud, advice on avoiding scams, and contact information for the service provider's customer service department. - **Timing and Manner**: Notifications must be provided within 24 hours (with exceptions for delays based on the provider's judgment or law enforcement requests) and must be clear and conspicuous, sent via email, text message, or other appropriate means with member consent. - **Enforcement**: The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is responsible for enforcing this section, treating violations as unfair or deceptive acts. States also have the authority to enforce this act on behalf of their residents.

### 3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders

Affected parties and stakeholders include: - **Online Dating Service Providers**: Required to implement fraud ban notification systems. - **Users of Online Dating Services**: Beneficiaries of the protection against romance scams. - **Federal Trade Commission (FTC)**: Responsible for enforcement at the federal level. - **State Attorneys General**: Have the authority to enforce the act on behalf of state residents.

### 4. Potential Impact & Implications

The potential impact and implications of HR 2481 include: - **Enhanced Protection for Consumers**: By providing clear and timely notifications, the bill aims to reduce the incidence of romance scams and protect individuals from financial loss and emotional distress. - **Compliance Burden on Service Providers**: Online dating services will need to invest in systems and processes to identify banned members and send notifications, potentially increasing their operational costs. - **Legal Implications**: The act may lead to legal challenges regarding privacy, the definition of fraudulent activities, and the balance between protecting users and respecting the rights of service providers and their members. - **Potential for Reduced Scam Success Rates**: By educating users about the risks of romance scams through required notifications, there could be a decrease in the success rate of such scams, making online dating platforms safer.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down this gnarly bill, bro! The Romance Scam Prevention Act (HR 2481) is all about keepin' online daters safe from scammers, man. Here's the lowdown:

**Main Purpose & Objectives**: This bill aims to prevent romance scams by requiring online dating service providers to notify users when they've interacted with a banned member who might be tryin' to scam 'em. It's all about protectin' people from gettin' taken advantage of, bro.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**: The bill requires online dating services to send out "fraud ban notifications" within 24 hours (or up to 3 days in some cases) when a banned member is identified. These notifications gotta be clear and conspicuous, and include info like the banned member's username, why they were banned, and tips on how to avoid gettin' scammed. It also gives online dating services a "safe harbor" from liability if they're just tryin' to comply with these new rules, man.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**: This bill affects online dating service providers, their users, and law enforcement agencies. Online dating services gotta implement these new notification requirements, while users get more protection from scammers. Law enforcement can also request delays in notifications if they're investigatin' a scammer, bro.

**Potential Impact & Implications**: This bill could have some serious implications, dude. By requirin' online dating services to be more transparent about banned members, it could help prevent romance scams and protect users from financial losses. It's also gonna make online dating services more accountable for keepin' their platforms safe, man. On the other hand, it might create some new challenges for online dating services in terms of implementin' these notification requirements and balancin' user safety with freedom of expression, bro.

Overall, this bill is a solid step towards keepin' online daters safe from scammers, dude. It's all about findin' that balance between protectin' users and allowin' online dating services to operate freely, man. Now, if you'll excuse me, I'm gonna grab my board and catch some waves – this bill's got me feelin' like the surf's up for online safety, bro!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Comprehensive Summary of HR 2481: Romance Scam Prevention Act**

### 1. Main Purpose & Objectives

The primary objective of the Romance Scam Prevention Act (HR 2481) is to protect users of online dating services from romance scams by requiring these platforms to provide fraud ban notifications to their members. This aims to enhance user safety and reduce financial losses due to such scams.

### 2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law

- **Fraud Ban Notifications**: Online dating service providers must notify members if they have interacted with a banned member, providing details about the banned individual and guidance on avoiding fraud. - **Required Contents of Notifications**: These include the username or profile identifier of the banned member, the timing of the last interaction, warnings about potential false identities or fraudulent activities, advice against sending financial information, best practices for avoiding online fraud, and contact information for the service's customer support. - **Timing and Manner of Notifications**: Notifications must be clear, conspicuous, and provided within 24 hours (with exceptions for delays based on provider judgment or law enforcement requests). - **Enforcement**: The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will enforce this section, treating violations as unfair or deceptive acts. States also have the authority to enforce this act when their residents' interests are threatened.

### 3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders

- **Online Dating Service Providers**: Must comply with the new requirements for fraud ban notifications. - **Users of Online Dating Services**: The primary beneficiaries, as they will receive more information and protection against potential scams. - **Law Enforcement**: Involved in requesting delays in notification to facilitate ongoing investigations. - **State Attorneys General**: Have the authority to enforce this act on behalf of their residents.

### 4. Potential Impact & Implications

The Romance Scam Prevention Act could significantly reduce the incidence of romance scams by increasing transparency and user awareness. However, its effectiveness will depend on the diligence of online dating service providers in implementing these measures and the vigilance of users in heeding the warnings provided. The act also underscores the growing role of government regulation in digital spaces to protect consumer rights and safety.

From a financial perspective, while the bill does not directly mention funding or donations from specific PACs (Political Action Committees) or industry lobby groups, its passage could influence future lobbying efforts by online dating services and related industries. These entities may seek to shape regulations to their advantage or mitigate potential losses due to increased regulatory compliance costs. The act's emphasis on consumer protection suggests that public interest groups advocating for stronger consumer safeguards may have supported its development. Nonetheless, the direct financial backers or opponents of this specific legislation are not explicitly identified within the bill itself.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Valadao, David G. [R-CA-22]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$79,400

18 donors

PACs

Organizations

$59,600

Committees

Individuals

$19,800

No PAC contributions found

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$6,600

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$6,600

PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS

2 transactions

$6,600

BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

5 transactions

$6,500

AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY

2 transactions

$5,300

SANTA ROSA RANCHERIA

2 transactions

$5,000

SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND MIWOK INDIANS

2 transactions

$4,000

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

THE CHICKASAW NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

MOORETOWN RANCHERIA

1 transaction

$3,300

SAN MANUEL BAND/MISSION INDIAN

3 transactions

$3,300

SYCUAN BAND OF KUMEYAAY NATION

1 transaction

$1,000

UNION VILLAGE

1 transaction

$1,000

RON CLARK FARMS

1 transaction

$500

No committee contributions found

EMMET, RICHARD

1 transaction

$6,600

GILLIAM, RICHARD

1 transaction

$6,600

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

1 transaction

$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 9 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Pettersen, Brittany [D-CO-7]

ID: P000620

Top Contributors

HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA

OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA

$3,300

Mar 31, 2023

HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA

OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA

$3,300

Mar 31, 2023

OTOE-MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA

OrganizationRED ROCK, OK

$3,300

Mar 31, 2023

OTOE-MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA

OrganizationRED ROCK, OK

$3,300

Mar 31, 2023

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF NORTH DAKOTA

OrganizationBELCOURT, ND

$3,300

Mar 31, 2023

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF NORTH DAKOTA

OrganizationBELCOURT, ND

$3,300

Jun 10, 2024

EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS

OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC

$3,300

Oct 16, 2024

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$2,300

Dec 21, 2023

BGR GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, LLC

OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC

$1,000

Oct 12, 2023

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$1,000

May 22, 2023

Rep. Goldman, Craig [R-TX-12]

ID: G000601

Top Contributors

ALLEN BOONE HUMPHRIES ROBINSON LLP

OrganizationHOUSTON, TX

$3,300

Dec 21, 2023

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$3,300

May 23, 2024

BENDA, ROBERT D.

WESTWOOD CONTRACTORS INC. • CEO

IndividualFORT WORTH, TX

$6,600

Nov 9, 2023

BENDA, ROBERT D.

WESTWOOD CONTRACTORS INC. • CEO

IndividualFORT WORTH, TX

$6,600

Nov 9, 2023

CAMPBELL, CODY

DOUBLE EAGLE ENERGY • FOUNDER AND CO-CEO

IndividualFORT WORTH, TX

$6,600

Dec 31, 2023

CAMPBELL, CODY

DOUBLE EAGLE ENERGY • FOUNDER AND CO-CEO

IndividualFORT WORTH, TX

$6,600

Dec 31, 2023

HOLM, NELSON

RENEGADE SWISH • PARTNER

IndividualFORT WORTH, TX

$6,600

Nov 13, 2023

HOLM, NELSON

RENEGADE SWISH • PARTNER

IndividualFORT WORTH, TX

$6,600

Nov 13, 2023

KLEINHEINZ, BURKE

WELLTOWER • INVESTMENTS

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Dec 21, 2023

KLEINHEINZ, BURKE

WELLTOWER • INVESTMENTS

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Dec 21, 2023

Rep. Suozzi, Thomas R. [D-NY-3]

ID: S001201

Top Contributors

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$3,300

Aug 3, 2024

SCOTTO LLC

OrganizationWOODBURY, NY

$1,650

Aug 30, 2024

PATROON OPERATING CO. LLC

OrganizationNEW YORK, NY

$1,000

May 13, 2024

THE KLAR ORGANIZATION

OrganizationEAST MEADOW, NY

$1,000

Aug 8, 2024

TERIAN, OLIVIA

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$9,400

May 2, 2024

TERIAN, OLIVIA

OLIVIA TERIAN ART & DESIGN • BUSINESS OWNER

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$6,600

Mar 8, 2024

MORAN, MARY

NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED

IndividualGREENWICH, CT

$6,600

Mar 28, 2024

MORAN, MARY

IndividualGREENWICH, CT

$6,600

May 2, 2024

FAIVUS, HARRY E.

MOUNT SINAI • PHYSICIAN

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$5,000

Oct 31, 2024

SOSNICK, AARON

IndividualRENO, NV

$3,392

Jun 25, 2024

Rep. Harder, Josh [D-CA-9]

ID: H001090

Top Contributors

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

Jun 26, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

Jun 18, 2024

CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$1,000

Sep 30, 2023

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA

$1,000

Oct 31, 2024

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA

$1,000

Nov 7, 2024

MIRANDA, LAUREL

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualATHERTON, CA

$6,600

Feb 7, 2023

ELSON, DAVID

UNITED STAFFING ASSOCIATES • CEO

IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV

$6,600

Aug 16, 2023

GOODMAN, COREY

VENBIO PARTNERS LLC • LIFE SCIENCES VENTURE CAPITAL MANAGING

IndividualMARSHALL, CA

$6,600

Aug 29, 2023

SCHMIDT, ERIC

HILLSPIRE LLC • MANAGER

IndividualPALO ALTO, CA

$6,600

Aug 16, 2023

BROWN, SHELLEY

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualLOS ALTOS HILLS, CA

$6,600

Aug 19, 2023

Rep. Ciscomani, Juan [R-AZ-6]

ID: C001133

Top Contributors

SALT RIVER PIMA MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY

PACSCOTTSDALE, AZ

$1,000

Jun 14, 2024

CHEROKEE NATION

OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK

$3,300

Oct 31, 2024

EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS

OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

OrganizationATMORE, AL

$3,300

Jun 30, 2024

DELTA AIRLINES

OrganizationATLANTA, GA

$2,500

Jul 30, 2024

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$2,000

Oct 8, 2024

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

OrganizationATMORE, AL

$1,834

Jun 30, 2024

MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS

OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS

$1,000

Nov 5, 2024

COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES

OrganizationPARKER, AZ

$1,000

Jun 30, 2023

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$1,000

Jun 30, 2023

Rep. Lee, Susie [D-NV-3]

ID: L000590

Top Contributors

EMILY'S LIST

CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD

PACWASHINGTON, DC

$250

Feb 13, 2024

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$3,300

Jun 27, 2023

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$3,300

Jun 27, 2023

TIGUA INDIAN RESERVATION YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO

OrganizationEL PASO, TX

$3,000

Dec 31, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

Jun 5, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

May 9, 2024

BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationLAS VEGAS, NV

$1,500

Jun 30, 2024

CHEROKEE NATION

OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK

$1,000

Dec 28, 2023

RENO SPARKS INDIAN COLONY

OrganizationRENO, NV

$1,000

Jun 21, 2024

BRONZE CAFE

OrganizationLAS VEGAS, NV

$550

Mar 30, 2023

Rep. Joyce, David P. [R-OH-14]

ID: J000295

Top Contributors

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND

PACBANNING, CA

$3,300

Jun 7, 2024

PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS

PACTEMECULA, CA

$3,300

May 15, 2024

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

PACATMORE, AL

$3,300

Apr 17, 2024

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON TRIBE

PACPRIOR LAKE, MN

$3,300

Jun 19, 2024

THE CHICKASAW NATION

PACADA, OK

$3,300

Jun 7, 2024

CHEROKEE NATION

PACTAHLEQUAH, OK

$3,300

Nov 1, 2024

SAN PABLO LYTTON CASINO

PACSAN PABLO, CA

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS

PACTEMECULA, CA

$3,300

Oct 20, 2023

AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY

COMMARICOPA, AZ

$3,300

Mar 31, 2023

AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS

PACPALM SPRINGS, CA

$3,300

Apr 6, 2023

Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]

ID: S001229

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SASSO, APRIL

HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER

IndividualCARMEL, IN

$6,600

Oct 30, 2024

PONDER, JACQUELINE

BOWMAN FAMILY HOLDINGS • LAWYER

IndividualGREENWOOD, IN

$3,437

Oct 29, 2024

KING, CHRISTOPHER M.

RUNNEBOHM CONSTRUCTION, INC. • OWNER

IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN

$3,300

Jun 7, 2024

CALDWELL, JORDAN

CALDWELL'S INC. • EXECUTIVE

IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN

$3,300

Oct 20, 2024

DOPPELT, BRIAN

BAINBRIDGE COMPANIES • EXECUTIVE

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

KING, KYLIE A.

HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER

IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN

$3,300

Oct 20, 2024

SASSO, RICK C.

INDIANA SPINE GROUP • PHYSICIAN

IndividualCARMEL, IN

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

SCHUMACHER, AMY MAE

THE HERITAGE GROUP • CEO

IndividualCARMEL, IN

$3,300

Oct 22, 2024

MCALLISTER, CHRIS

TARBERT PROPERTIES LP • PARTNER

IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

ZINK, JAMES C.

ZINK DISTRIBUTING • CHAIRMAN / CEO

IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN

$3,300

Nov 2, 2024

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

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MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP

OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY

$1,000

Feb 24, 2024

BATMASIAN, JAMES

INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 27, 2023

BATMASIAN, JAMES

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 29, 2023

AUSTIN, ROBERT

UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Jul 18, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 15, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 22, 2024

SCALA, MARY ELLEN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY

$5,300

Aug 27, 2023

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

SELF • PRESIDENT

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 24, 2024

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 25, 2024

PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL

GOLDEN TASTE • CEO

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,400

Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Valadao, David G. [R-CA-22]

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Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a) imposes a requirement on online dating service providers to provide fraud ban notifications, which may increase their operational costs and regulatory burden.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Romance Scam Prevention Act focuses on consumer protection via fraud notifications for online dating services, while the Project 2025 FCC section addresses broadband policy, spectrum auctions, Section 230 interpretation, and FCC leadership; there is only a tangential connection through general digital communications oversight."

Key themes:consumer protectiononline platformsdigital communicationsfraud prevention

— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). — 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 58%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on preventing romance scams through notification requirements for online dating services, while the Project 2025 excerpt concerns financial regulatory agencies (CFPB, FCC) and their internal operations. Both share a consumer‑protection and fraud‑prevention theme, but the substantive policy areas differ significantly."

Key themes:consumer protectionfraud preventionagency enforcement

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Department of Health and Human Services

Minimal

Vector: 60%

Pages: 515-517AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Romance Scam Prevention Act focuses on online dating fraud notifications, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 HHS policies concerning family caregivers, telehealth licensure, contraceptive mandates, and HRSA data collection."

— 483 — Department of Health and Human Services l Readdress the National Strategy to Support Family Caregivers. While in theory the strategy aims to support family members with duties to care for older family members, the plan is overly focused on racial and “LGBTQ+ equity.” The strategy should be examined to establish an efficient plan to support caregivers and their families. There should also be a review of its COVID-19 policies. HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (HRSA) l Congress should allow CMS to use the 340B data that HRSA collects rather than having CMS conduct its own survey, especially in view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s American Hospital Association v. Becerra decision.69 The legislation should also create penalties for those who do not respond to HRSA’s data collection. l Legally define the locus of service as where the provider is located during the telehealth visit rather than where the patient is. With such a definition, states could continue to reserve their powers to establish the standards for licensure and scope of practice. The providers could ensure continuity and consistency of care no matter where their patients might move while maintaining the licenses that make the most sense for them. Americans are far more mobile and technologically advanced today than they were when most health care laws were written. Telehealth has become increasingly important, particularly during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also has great potential in rural and other areas where there are shortages of health care providers. HRSA’s Office for the Advancement of Telehealth includes a program known as the Licensure Portability Grant Program, which bolsters state efforts to reform licensing laws to maximize telehealth flexibility. HRSA does not have the authority through this office to dictate licensure laws; that power has typically been reserved to the states. However, telehealth across state lines, when permitted, is interstate commerce, which can be regulated by the federal government according to the Constitution. l Restore Trump religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate (also a CMS rule). HHS should rescind, if finalized, the regulation titled “Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,” proposed jointly by HHS, Treasury, and Labor.70 This rule proposes to amend Trump-era final rules regarding religious and moral exemptions and accommodations for coverage of certain preventive services under the ACA. Preventive services include contraception, and — 484 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise it appears the proposed rule would change the existing regulations for religious and moral exemptions to the ACA’s contraception mandate. There is no need for further rulemaking that curtails existing exemptions and accommodations. l Require HRSA to use rulemaking to update the women’s preventive services mandate. The contraceptive mandate issued under Obamacare has been the source of years of egregious attacks on many Americans’ religious and moral beliefs. The mandate was issued as part of the women’s preventive services guidelines, which were issued without any rulemaking that involved public notice and an opportunity to comment. Instead, HRSA issued and changed the mandate by simply posting changes to its website. HRSA also started off not requiring coverage of fertility awareness–based methods of family planning, then requiring them, and then removing the requirement without notifying the public. A federal judge recently ruled that this failure to undergo notice and comment in issuing the mandate is unlawful. HRSA should be required to repromulgate any women’s preventive services mandates through the notice and comment process that is compliant with the Administrative Procedures Act. Moreover, since the Obama Administration HRSA entered into long- term contracts with the pro-abortion American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and related entities to serve as an exclusive adviser with respect to the content of this mandate, HRSA has used this arrangement to ignore comments that members of the public were sometimes able to submit in the process, and ACOG has abused its position to attack HHS’s allowance of religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. HHS should rescind these contracts and establish an advisory committee that is compliant with the Federal Advisory Committee Act and has members that are committed to women’s preventive services and are not pro-abortion ideologues. l Expand inclusion of fertility awareness–based methods and supplies to family planning in the women’s preventive services mandate. The ACA requires coverage of and prevents insurance plans from imposing any cost-sharing requirements on women who obtain preventive care and screenings as defined by HRSA. In 2016, HHS included “instruction in fertility awareness-based methods” as part of this requirement. However, in December 2021, HHS removed that language from its list without using the notice-and-comment process or giving any rationale, both of which are mandated by the Administrative Procedures Act. In August

Department of Justice

Minimal

Vector: 60%

Pages: 596-598AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Romance Scam Prevention Act focuses on protecting online dating users from fraud, whereas the Project 2025 excerpt discusses DOJ authority over voter fraud and 18 U.S.C. § 241 prosecutions; the two policies address unrelated topics with no substantive overlap."

— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the

Department of Health and Human Services

Minimal

Vector: 57%

Pages: 518-520AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on preventing romance scams through notification requirements for online dating services, whereas the Project 2025 HHS section deals with reproductive health coverage, gender transition guidance, and abortion training restrictions; there is no substantive policy overlap."

Key themes:none

— 485 — Department of Health and Human Services 2022, a federal court blocked this attempt to eliminate health insurance coverage for fertility awareness–based methods of family planning from requirements that cover at least 58 million women, and the judge made his ruling permanent in December 2022. HRSA should promulgate regulations consistent with this order. HHS should more thoroughly ensure that fertility awareness–based methods of family planning are part of women’s preventive services under the ACA. FABMs often involve costs for materials and supplies, and HHS should make clear that coverage of those items is also required. FABMs are highly effective and allow women to make family planning choices in a manner that meets their needs and reflects their values. l Eliminate men’s preventive services from the women’s preventive services mandate. In December 2021, HRSA updated its women’s preventive services guidelines to include male condoms after claiming for years that it had no authority to do so because Congress explicitly limited the mandate to “women’s” preventive care and screenings. HRSA should not incorporate exclusively male contraceptive methods into guidelines that specify they encompass only women’s services. l Eliminate the week-after-pill from the contraceptive mandate as a potential abortifacient. One of the emergency contraceptives covered under the HRSA preventive services guidelines is Ella (ulipristal acetate). Like its close cousin, the abortion pill mifepristone, Ella is a progesterone blocker and can prevent a recently fertilized embryo from implanting in a woman’s uterus. HRSA should eliminate this potential abortifacient from the contraceptive mandate. l Withdraw Ryan White guidance allowing funds to pay for cross-sex transition support. HRSA should withdraw all guidance encouraging Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program service providers to provide controversial “gender transition” procedures or “gender-affirming care,” which cause irreversible physical and mental harm to those who receive them. l Ensure that training for medical professionals (doctors, nurses, etc.) and doulas is not being used for abortion training. HHS should ensure that training programs for medical professionals—including doctors, nurses, and doulas—are in full compliance with restrictions on abortion funding and conscience-protection laws. In addition, HHS should:

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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