Reclaim Trade Powers Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Panetta, Jimmy [D-CA-19]
ID: P000613
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the noble goal of "reclaiming trade powers." How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to appease corporate interests and further erode what little remains of our nation's economic sovereignty.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The Reclaim Trade Powers Act (RTPA) seeks to repeal Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allowed the President to impose import surcharges in response to balance of payments deficits. Oh, how convenient! By eliminating this authority, Congress is essentially surrendering its ability to regulate trade and protect American industries.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: corporate lobbyists, multinational corporations, and their congressional lapdogs. The RTPA will undoubtedly benefit the likes of Boeing, Apple, and other behemoths that have mastered the art of exploiting cheap foreign labor and tax loopholes. Meanwhile, American workers and small businesses can expect to be further marginalized.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of " legislative myopia." By removing the President's authority to impose import surcharges, Congress is essentially creating a power vacuum that will be filled by corporate interests. The consequences? A continued hemorrhaging of American jobs, increased income inequality, and further erosion of our nation's economic competitiveness.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Corporate-itis," a disease characterized by an excessive reliance on special interest groups and a complete disregard for the well-being of ordinary citizens. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies and half-truths peddled by our esteemed lawmakers.
In conclusion, the Reclaim Trade Powers Act is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak, designed to further enrich corporate elites at the expense of American workers. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create another bill that's as useful as a placebo for a terminal patient.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Panetta, Jimmy [D-CA-19]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
Donor Network - Rep. Panetta, Jimmy [D-CA-19]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 26 nodes and 28 connections
Total contributions: $89,200
Top Donors - Rep. Panetta, Jimmy [D-CA-19]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that — 803 — Trade American manufacturing output is currently at an all-time high. The record was not set during World War II and not during the 1950s boom. Output did not peak when manufacturing employment peaked in 1979 or during the Reagan economic revival in the 1980s. It is actually higher now than it has ever been. American manufacturing is buoyant because each manufacturing worker’s pro- ductivity is also at an all-time high. The key to prosperity is doing more with less. The next President should ignore special interests and populist ideologues who want government to do the opposite through industrial policy, trade protectionism, and other failed progressive policies. It takes surprisingly few people to achieve America’s record-high manufac- turing output—currently about 13 million people out of a workforce of more than 160 million, compared to the 1979 peak of 19.5 million people out of a workforce of 104 million.56 Productivity growth has freed the time and talents of millions of people for other, additional uses. The belief that manufacturing has to shrink for services to grow is the zero- sum fallacy against which sensible economists often warn. It is anathema to the optimism, hope, and confidence that are the natural birthright of conservatives. Growing productivity enables more output of both manufacturing and services. That is why America continues to have sustained booms and record-setting real GDP despite the long-run decline in manufacturing employment. Economists distinguish between two types of growth: extensive and intensive. Extensive growth is the Soviet and Chinese model for manufacturing: If you have more people use more resources, they will create more output. Extensive growth is doing more with more; intensive growth is doing more with less. That is where America’s superpower lies. The story of American manufacturing is one of intensive growth dating back to our agricultural origins. Conservative leaders should draw on this history to position America for continued success. With intensive growth, it is not manufacturing or services; it is manufacturing and services. Retaliatory Tariffs. Raising tariffs on another country almost always invites retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. The latter tend to be directed at politically sen- sitive American exports. Retaliatory tariffs by both China and American allies in response to the 2018 steel tariffs were targeted primarily at American agriculture. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, those tariffs cost farmers $27 billion with losses concentrated particularly in heartland states.57 Retaliatory tariffs also targeted U.S. industries that were not protected by tar- iffs. Many imports become inputs into U.S. manufacturing. The motorcycle maker Harley-Davidson was already facing higher production costs as domestic steel producers raised their prices to accommodate the new steel tariff. A retaliatory tariff on its motorcycles imposed by the European Union further raised its prices and hurt its export business. Harm to such innocent bystanders was another unin- tended (though foreseen) consequence.
Introduction
— 811 — Trade contains the Sections 201 and 301 tariff delegations. TPA, then called fast-track, has aided several trade agreements, including NAFTA and the USMCA, which took effect in 2020. TPA has lapsed before during slow periods in trade policy, most recently in July 2021, and remains lapsed today. The President should work with Congress to renew TPA to rationalize negoti- ations for upcoming trade agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. Both supporters and critics have questions regarding TPA’s implications for the constitutional separation of powers, and policymakers should take those questions seriously. As things currently stand, Congress has some oversight powers over the President’s negotiations under TPA, but they are limited. Congress can increase its oversight by passing new legislation superseding relevant provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. However, that is a double-edged sword. A Congress that largely favors free trade could exercise oversight to keep the President on the straight and narrow in trade negotiations. A progressive Congress would instead insist that the President negotiate for as many trade-unrelated provisions as possible to benefit labor and green constituencies while pushing progressive policies on the U.S. and its trading partners. On balance, a single voice at the negotiating table that is subject to congressional oversight is the best posture for American workers and consumers. A fractious Congress has yet to demonstrate the capacity to negotiate with other nations, but it can help to hold the Administration accountable. Trade Agreements with the United Kingdom, European Union, and Others. Even with a renewed TPA, trade agreement negotiations will likely take years. The Trump and Biden Administrations were not inclined to start the process, so that job may well fall to the next Administration. In that sense, the delays may end up being worth it. If there is one lodestar to follow, it is to restrict these agreements to trade issues only. Ever since NAFTA, trade-unrelated provisions have taken on a greater role in trade agreements. These create sticking points and are routinely hijacked by rent-seeking special interests and progressive ideologues who demand subsidies, carve-outs, and economically distorting labor and environmental standards that have nothing to do with trade. If governments are to negotiate these issues, they should do so in separate agreements so they do not torpedo efforts to liberalize and engage with allies. Trade agreements should lighten burdens, not create new ones by attempting to address non-trade issues. Policy leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, including experts from The Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Enterprise Insti- tute, have prepared a model trade agreement along these lines.73 Along with TPA renewal, this would greatly reduce negotiating costs. This template is also readily adaptable for agreements with Europe and any other allies that are willing to — 812 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liberalize their economies and build a stronger alliance with America. The draft U.S.–U.K. agreement includes an accession chapter to allow others to join on the same terms. Restoring or Replacing the WTO Dispute Resolution Process. The World Trade Organization as we know it may be mortally wounded. This deprives the U.S. of the WTO’s dispute resolution process, under which the U.S. it won 85 percent of the cases it brought. The WTO’s slow death began under the Obama Administra- tion, which refused to allow appointees to the WTO’s appellate board, which as a consequence is now nonfunctional. Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have continued the Obama Administration’s approach. That means that every case in the dispute resolution process will sputter to a halt as parties file appeals that cannot be heard. If the WTO is no longer fit for that purpose, it may be better to look in a different direction. More than 20 years ago, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow proposed that America and other free economies should form a Global Free Trade Alliance that is open to all countries that adhere to a truly free market system with appropriate safeguards such as property rights, lack of corruption, and enforcement of contracts.74 Alongside a general agreement on low to zero tariffs, the alliance would move to reduce the effect of nontariff barriers (such as the previously noted baby formula ingredient and labeling barriers) by basing trade around the principle of mutual recognition. Such an alliance could be started by a trade agreement between the United States and, for example, the United Kingdom with an accession chapter allowing others to join if they meet the criteria. It would be essential for a Global Free Trade Alliance to avoid the WTO’s most serious problem: the exemptions from its rules that are granted to developing countries. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was granted developing-na- tion status, which it continues to use to dodge rules that should apply to it. Other countries have used that status to delay needed reforms. Rule exemptions give some countries a perverse incentive to remain poor and autocratic. A Global Free Trade Alliance would allow the U.S. to enjoy the benefits of a rules- based international trading system without the WTO’s shortcomings. Negotiation costs would be lower because the countries would already be allied on many issues. In addition, there would be no separate tiers with different rules, and this would give developing countries an incentive to liberalize. In addition to being good for its own sake, liberalization would give them entry into a prestigious club that tilted toward America’s orbit and away from China’s. Closing the Export–Import Bank. The Export–Import Bank (EXIM) is an unusually clear example of how vulnerable trade protectionism is to being hijacked by special interests.75 In most years, about half of EXIM’s business benefits a single company, Boeing. Their relationship is so cozy that EXIM’s nickname around Washington is “the Bank of Boeing.”
Introduction
— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023). — 820 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. “From China with Love: AI, Robotics, AR/VR Are Hot Areas for Chinese Investment In US,” CB Insights, August 1, 2017, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/chinese-investment-us-tech-expert-research/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 31. “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People's Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, September 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- pressffice/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint (accessed February 25, 2023). 32. Ankit Panda, “It’s Official: Xi Jinping Breaks His Non-Militarization Pledge in the Spratlys,” The Diplomat, December 16, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/its-official-xi-jinping-breaks-his-non-militarization- pledge-in-the-spratlys/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 33. Press release, “USTR Issues Tariffs on Chinese Products in Response to Unfair Trade Practices,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, June 15, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press- releases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-products (accessed February 25, 2023). 34. Yen Nee Lee, “‘New Consensus’ Reached on US–China Trade, Says Chinese Vice Premier Liu He,” CNBC, updated April 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/05/us-china-trade-new-consensus-reached-says- chinas-liu-he.html (accessed February 25, 2023). 35. Reuters, “China Backtracked on Nearly All Aspects of US Trade Deal: Sources,” CNBC, May 8, 2019, https:// www.cnbc.com/2019/05/08/china-backtracked-on-nearly-all-aspects-of-us-trade-deal-sources.html (accessed February 25, 2023). 36. Fact Sheet, “Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, January 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/US_China_Agreement_Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 37. Warren Buffett, “Warren Buffett: Here’s How I Would Solve the Trade Problem,” Fortune, April 29, 2016, http:// fortune.com/2016/04/29/warren-buffett-foreign-trade/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 38. See, for example, Jeffrey Miron, “Forget the Wall Already, It’s Time for the U.S. to Have Open Borders,” Cato Institute Commentary, July 31, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/forget-wall-already- its-time-us-have-open-borders (accessed February 25, 2023); Scott Lincicome and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, “The (Updated) Case for Free Trade,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 925, April 19, 2022, https://www.cato. org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-04/PA-925_2.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023); Katheryn Russ, “Yes, US Trade Agreements Led to Economic Gains, Especially in Services, New Report Says,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade and Investment Policy Watch Blog, July 20, 2021, https://www.piie.com/blogs/ trade-and-investment-policy-watch/yes-us-trade-agreements-led-economic-gains-especially (accessed February 25, 2023); Monica de Bolle, “Why Remittance Taxes to Finance a Border Wall Are a Bad Idea…for the US,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Realtime Economics Blog, January 10, 2017, https://www. piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/why-remittance-taxes-finance-border-wall-are-bad-idea-us (accessed February 25, 2023). 39. This is a key theme of the author’s White House memoir Taking Back Trump’s America: Why We Lost the White House and How We’ll Win It Back (New York and Nashville: Bombardier Books, 2022). 40. 19 U.S.C. § 1862, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1862 (accessed February 27, 2023). 41. For a historical example, see Douglas A. Irwin, “Did Late-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Tariffs Promote Infant Industries? Evidence from the Tinplate Industry,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 336–360, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2566374 (accessed February 21, 2023). For a recent example, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Eujin Jung, “The High Taxpayer Cost of ‘Saving’ US Jobs Through ‘Made in America,’” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade and Investment Policy Watch, August 5, 2020, https:// www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/high-taxpayer-cost-saving-us-jobs-through-made- america (accessed February 21, 2023). 42. Stephen J. Dubner, “Were Colonial Americans More Literate than Americans Today?” Freakonomics, September 1, 2011, https://freakonomics.com/2011/09/were-colonial-americans-more-literate-than- americans-today/ (accessed February 21, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.