Guidance Clarity Act
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Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
ID: B001316
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Guidance Clarity Act (GCA) is a cleverly crafted bill that claims to promote transparency and clarity in agency guidance documents. How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to shield agencies from accountability and provide cover for their arbitrary decision-making processes.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The GCA requires agencies to include a "guidance clarity statement" on certain documents, which essentially says that the contents of the document don't have the force of law. Wow, what a revolutionary concept. This provision is nothing more than a CYA (Cover Your Agency) clause, designed to protect bureaucrats from lawsuits and criticism.
The bill also tasks the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with issuing guidance on implementing this act within 90 days. Because, you know, the OMB doesn't have better things to do than create more red tape.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this charade:
* Agencies: They get to maintain their flexibility and discretion while pretending to be transparent. * Lobbyists: They'll use this bill as a Trojan horse to influence agency guidance and further their clients' interests. * Voters: They'll be fed the usual platitudes about "transparency" and "accountability," while being none the wiser.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The GCA will have several consequences, all of which are predictable and undesirable:
* Agencies will continue to issue guidance documents that are intentionally vague or misleading, knowing they can't be held accountable. * The OMB will create more bureaucratic hurdles, further slowing down an already glacial regulatory process. * Lobbyists will exploit this bill to push their agendas, while the public remains in the dark.
In conclusion, the Guidance Clarity Act is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to obfuscate agency actions, protect bureaucrats from scrutiny, and maintain the status quo of corruption and incompetence. Bravo, Congress. You've managed to create another masterpiece of bureaucratic doublespeak. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
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Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Introduction
— 700 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Deputy Commissioner should be replaced. A thorough review of IT contracts should be conducted. The Integrated Modernization Business Plan41 should be systematically reviewed and a version of it cost-effectively implemented. An over- sight board composed of private sector IT experts should be established and given the authority to conduct meaningful, contemporaneous oversight. TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND PRIVACY Legal protections for taxpayer rights and privacy have improved during the past three decades, but they remain inadequate.42 Congress should do more. For exam- ple, interest on overpayments should be the same as interest on underpayments rather than the government receiving a higher rate, the time limit for taxpayers to sue for damages for improper collection actions should be extended, the juris- diction of the Tax Court should be expanded, and the tax penalty system should be reformed by rationalizing the penalty structure and reducing some of the most punitive penalties.43 The Office of the Taxpayer Advocate was created by Congress to assist taxpay- ers when the IRS bureaucracy is unresponsive or negligent. About 1.7 percent of the IRS budget goes to this function.44 Each year, the Office handles more than 250,000 cases, helping taxpayers to deal with the IRS. Each year, it issues nearly 2000 taxpayer assistance orders, a form of administrative injunction, forcing the rest of the IRS to stop taking unwarranted actions.45 Congress should provide the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate with greater resources so that it may better assist taxpayers suffering from wrongful IRS actions. The office should also be strengthened by, among other things: l Ensuring that the National Taxpayer Advocate can make his or her own personnel decisions to protect its independence; l Ensuring NTA access to files, meetings, and other information needed to assist taxpayers or investigate IRS administrative practices; l Requiring the IRS to address the NTA’s comments in final rules and including the NTA in deliberations prior to the release of a proposed rule; and l Authorizing the NTA to file amicus briefs independently. Administrative Burden. In 2021, Americans filed 261 million tax returns and an astounding 4.7 billion information returns (such as Form W-2s, Form 1098s and Form 1099s).46 Complying with tax law costs Americans more than $400 bil- lion annually, or about 2 percent of gross domestic product.47 Although the IRS
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.