STABLE Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2392
Last Updated: April 5, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

ID: S001213

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Bill Summary

The STABLE Act of 2025 - because what the world really needs is more regulatory theater to prop up a dying fiat currency system.

Let's dissect this legislative abomination, shall we?

**New regulations being created or modified:** The bill introduces a slew of new definitions and regulations for payment stablecoins, which are essentially digital assets designed to maintain a stable value relative to a national currency. Because, you know, the free market can't be trusted to innovate without the benevolent guidance of our esteemed lawmakers.

**Affected industries and sectors:** This regulatory monstrosity will primarily impact the fintech industry, particularly companies involved in issuing payment stablecoins. But don't worry, it's not like they'll actually understand what's happening - after all, who needs clarity when you have 15 pages of obtuse legalese?

**Compliance requirements and timelines:** The bill requires "Federal qualified nonbank payment stablecoin issuers" to obtain approval from the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator (because that's not a mouthful). They'll also need to maintain minimum capital requirements, implement anti-money laundering protocols, and submit regular reports. Oh, and they have 12 months to comply - plenty of time for them to hire an army of lawyers and accountants to navigate this regulatory quagmire.

**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ah, the fun part! The bill authorizes the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC to impose fines of up to $1 million per day for non-compliance. Because what's a little regulatory extortion between friends?

**Economic and operational impacts:** This bill will likely stifle innovation in the fintech space, as companies will need to divert resources away from actual product development and toward compliance with these Byzantine regulations. It'll also create new barriers to entry, ensuring that only the largest players can afford to participate in the stablecoin market.

In conclusion, the STABLE Act of 2025 is a textbook example of regulatory capture - a bill written by and for the benefit of established financial interests, designed to strangle competition and maintain the status quo. It's a legislative disease, and we're all just along for the ride.

Related Topics

Civil Rights & Liberties State & Local Government Affairs Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Government Operations & Accountability National Security & Intelligence Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Federal Budget & Appropriations Congressional Rules & Procedures
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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$154,506
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$26,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$127,906

No PAC contributions found

1
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$6,600
2
HO CHUNK NATION
2 transactions
$6,200
3
ONEIDA NATION
3 transactions
$4,000
4
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$3,300
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$3,000
6
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$2,500
7
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
MAYER, SCOTT A.
3 transactions
$33,000
2
ADAMANY, KIMBERLY K.
2 transactions
$13,636
3
MAYER, SUSANNE
2 transactions
$13,200
4
G, DAVID
1 transaction
$6,870
5
WHITE, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
6
ADAMANY, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
7
BUHOLZER, GLENDA
1 transaction
$6,600
8
WILEY, LADD
1 transaction
$6,600
9
MOORE, NOEL G.
1 transaction
$6,600
10
BUSH, KATHLEEN M.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
BUSH, MARK F.
1 transaction
$6,600
12
MURESIANU, ANDREI
1 transaction
$5,000
13
BARRETT, BRAD
1 transaction
$5,000
14
SUZMAN, ANDREW
1 transaction
$5,000

Donor Network - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

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Total contributions: $154,506

Top Donors - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 55.5%
Pages: 773-775

— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).

Introduction

Low 49.0%
Pages: 770-772

— 737 — Federal Reserve by ensuring that cash earns a positive (inflation-adjusted) rate of return, it can pre- vent households and businesses from holding inefficiently small money balances. Further benefits of free banking include dramatic reduction of economic cycles, an end to indirect financing of federal spending, removal of the “lender of last resort” permanent bailout function of central banks, and promotion of currency competition.26 This allows Americans many more ways to protect their savings. Because free banking implies that financial services and banking would be gov- erned by general business laws against, for example, fraud or misrepresentation, crony regulatory burdens that hurt customers would be dramatically eased, and innovation would be encouraged. Potential downsides of free banking stem from its greatest benefit: It has mas- sive political hurdles to clear. Economic theory predicts and economic history confirms that free banking is both stable and productive, but it is radically different from the system we have now. Transitioning to free banking would require polit- ical authorities, including Congress and the President, to coordinate on multiple reforms simultaneously. Getting any of them wrong could imbalance an otherwise functional system. Ironically, it is the very strength of a true free banking system that makes transitioning to one so difficult. Commodity-Backed Money. For most of U.S. history, the dollar was defined in terms of both gold and silver. The problem was that when the legal price differed from the market price, the artificially undervalued currency would disappear from circulation. There were times, for instance, when this mechanism put the U.S. on a de facto silver standard. However, as a result, inflation was limited. Given this track record, restoring a gold standard retains some appeal among monetary reformers who do not wish to go so far as abolishing the Federal Reserve. Both the 2012 and 2016 GOP platforms urged the establishment of a commis- sion to consider the feasibility of a return to the gold standard,27 and in October 2022, Representative Alexander Mooney (R–WV) introduced a bill to restore the gold standard.28 In economic effect, commodity-backing the dollar differs from free banking in that the government (via the Fed) maintains both regulatory and bailout functions. However, manipulation of money and credit is limited because new dollars are not costless to the federal government: They must be backed by some hard asset like gold. Compared to free banking, then, the benefits of commodity-backed money are reduced, but transition disruptions are also smaller. The process of commodity backing is very straightforward: Treasury could set the price of a dollar at today’s market price of $2,000 per ounce of gold. This means that each Federal Reserve note could be redeemed at the Federal Reserve and exchanged for 1/2000 ounce of gold—about $80, for example, for a gold coin the weight of a dime. Private bank liabilities would be redeemable upon their issuers. Banks could send those traded-in dollars to the Treasury for gold to replenish their — 738 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise vaults. This creates a powerful self-policing mechanism: If the federal govern- ment creates dollars too quickly, more people will doubt the peg and turn in their gold to banks, which then will turn in their gold and drain the government’s gold. This forces governments to rein in spending and inflation lest their gold reserves become depleted. One concern raised against commodity backing is that there is not enough gold in the federal government for all the dollars in existence. This is solved by making sure that the initial peg on gold is correct. Also, in reality, a very small number of users trade for gold as long as they believe the government will stick to the price peg. The mere fact that people could exchange dollars for gold is what acts as the enforcer. After all, if one is confident that a dollar will still be worth 1/2000 ounce of gold in a year, it is much easier to walk about with paper dollars and use credit cards than it is to mail tiny $80 coins. People would redeem en masse only if they feared the government would not be able control itself, for which the only solution is for the government to control itself. Beyond full backing, alternate paths to gold backing might involve gold-con- vertible Treasury instruments29 or allowing a parallel gold standard to operate temporarily alongside the current fiat dollar.30 These could ease adoption while minimizing disruption, but they should be temporary so that we can quickly enjoy the benefits of gold’s ability to police government spending. In addition, Congress could simply allow individuals to use commodity-backed money without fully replacing the current system. Among downsides to a commodity standard, there is no guarantee that the gov- ernment will stick to the price peg. Also, allowing a commodity standard to operate along with a fiat dollar opens both up for a speculative attack. Another downside is that even under a commodity standard, the Federal Reserve can still influence the economy via interest rate or other interventions. Therefore, at best, a commodity standard is not a full solution to returning to free banking. We have good reasons to worry that central banks and the gold standard are fundamentally incompati- ble—as the disastrous experience of the Western nations on their “managed gold standards” between World War I and World War II showed. K-Percent Rule. Under this rule, proposed by Milton Friedman in 1960,31 the Federal Reserve would create money at a fixed rate—say 3 percent per year. By offering the inflation benefits of gold without the potential disruption to the finan- cial system, a K-Percent Rule could be a more politically viable alternative to gold. The principal flaw is that unlike commodities, a K-Percent Rule is not fixed by physical costs: It could change according to political pressures or random economic fluctuations. Importantly, financial innovation could destabilize the market’s demand for liquidity, as happened with changes in consumer credit pat- terns in the 1970s. When this happens, a given K-Percent Rule that previously delivered stability could become destabilizing. In addition, monetary policy when

Introduction

Low 49.0%
Pages: 770-772

— 737 — Federal Reserve by ensuring that cash earns a positive (inflation-adjusted) rate of return, it can pre- vent households and businesses from holding inefficiently small money balances. Further benefits of free banking include dramatic reduction of economic cycles, an end to indirect financing of federal spending, removal of the “lender of last resort” permanent bailout function of central banks, and promotion of currency competition.26 This allows Americans many more ways to protect their savings. Because free banking implies that financial services and banking would be gov- erned by general business laws against, for example, fraud or misrepresentation, crony regulatory burdens that hurt customers would be dramatically eased, and innovation would be encouraged. Potential downsides of free banking stem from its greatest benefit: It has mas- sive political hurdles to clear. Economic theory predicts and economic history confirms that free banking is both stable and productive, but it is radically different from the system we have now. Transitioning to free banking would require polit- ical authorities, including Congress and the President, to coordinate on multiple reforms simultaneously. Getting any of them wrong could imbalance an otherwise functional system. Ironically, it is the very strength of a true free banking system that makes transitioning to one so difficult. Commodity-Backed Money. For most of U.S. history, the dollar was defined in terms of both gold and silver. The problem was that when the legal price differed from the market price, the artificially undervalued currency would disappear from circulation. There were times, for instance, when this mechanism put the U.S. on a de facto silver standard. However, as a result, inflation was limited. Given this track record, restoring a gold standard retains some appeal among monetary reformers who do not wish to go so far as abolishing the Federal Reserve. Both the 2012 and 2016 GOP platforms urged the establishment of a commis- sion to consider the feasibility of a return to the gold standard,27 and in October 2022, Representative Alexander Mooney (R–WV) introduced a bill to restore the gold standard.28 In economic effect, commodity-backing the dollar differs from free banking in that the government (via the Fed) maintains both regulatory and bailout functions. However, manipulation of money and credit is limited because new dollars are not costless to the federal government: They must be backed by some hard asset like gold. Compared to free banking, then, the benefits of commodity-backed money are reduced, but transition disruptions are also smaller. The process of commodity backing is very straightforward: Treasury could set the price of a dollar at today’s market price of $2,000 per ounce of gold. This means that each Federal Reserve note could be redeemed at the Federal Reserve and exchanged for 1/2000 ounce of gold—about $80, for example, for a gold coin the weight of a dime. Private bank liabilities would be redeemable upon their issuers. Banks could send those traded-in dollars to the Treasury for gold to replenish their

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.