Transparency in CFPB Cost-Benefit Analysis Act
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Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]
ID: L000583
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Bill Summary
(sigh) Oh joy, another "transparency" bill from the geniuses in Congress. Let me put on my surprised face.
HR 2331, the "Transparency in CFPB Cost-Benefit Analysis Act", is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. This bill claims to enhance rulemaking requirements for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), but what it really does is create more bureaucratic red tape and provide a fig leaf of accountability.
New regulations? Oh boy, do we get some new ones! The CFPB will now have to publish its proposed rules in their entirety, complete with a laundry list of justifications, cost-benefit analyses, and impact assessments. Because, you know, the previous lack of transparency was totally not a problem. (eyeroll)
Affected industries? Well, it's not like the financial sector wasn't already drowning in regulations. This bill will further burden small businesses, banks, and other financial institutions with more paperwork and compliance costs.
Compliance requirements? Timelines? Ha! Good luck with that. The CFPB will have to consult with various stakeholders, including the Small Business Administration, to minimize the impact on small businesses. Yeah, because that's always worked out well in the past.
Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? Oh, don't worry, there are plenty of those too. If the CFPB determines that a regulation would increase costs for small businesses, they'll have to justify it. And if the quantified benefits don't outweigh the costs... well, I'm sure the bureaucrats will just magically make it work.
Economic and operational impacts? (chuckles) Let's just say this bill is a job creation program for lawyers, accountants, and compliance officers. The financial sector will love spending more money on regulatory overhead, and small businesses will be thrilled to spend their limited resources on paperwork instead of actual innovation.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a bad case of "Regulatory Fever", where the symptoms include an overabundance of bureaucratic zeal, a complete disregard for the law of unintended consequences, and a healthy dose of congressional hubris. Treatment? A strong dose of skepticism, a dash of common sense, and a willingness to actually listen to the people affected by these regulations.
Prognosis: This bill will likely pass with flying colors, because who doesn't love more regulations? The financial sector will grumble, small businesses will suffer, and the CFPB will get to justify its existence. Just another day in the sausage factory that is Congress.
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 837 â Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHORâS NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the DoddâFrank Act.32 Since the Bureauâs inception, its status as an âinde- pendentâ agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investorâs Business Daily accused the CFPB of âdiverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Partyâ and plan- ning âto create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutionsâ that would use âramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigationsâ to âbankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.â34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as âa victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.â39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of DoddâFrank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and â 838 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite âconsumer educationâ and âfinancial literacyâ programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what âconsumer educationâ or âfinancial literacy programsâ to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPBâs leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because â[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.â46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPBâs âperpetual insulation from Congressâs appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau âno longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountableâ to Congress and, ultimately, to the peopleâ48 and that â[b]y abandoning its âmost complete and effectualâ check on âthe overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the governmentââindeed, by enabling them in the Bureauâs caseâCongress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.â49 The Court further remarked that the CFPBâs âcapacious portfolio of authority acts âas a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.ââ50
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16. â 843 â Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, âCivil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âBureau Structure,â last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âConsumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,â https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âCivil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB âshall not exceedâ 12 percent âof the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve SystemâŚin fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.â Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31â32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, âOrder List: 598 U.S.,â February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22â448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, âConsumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,â testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, â7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to DoddâFrank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See âSection 1071 of the DoddâFrank Actâ in David R. Burton, âImproving Small Business Access to Capital,â Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the DoddâFrank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAdministrative Adjudication Proceedings,â https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081âRules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16.
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.