Abolish the ATF Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
ID: B001316
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
January 7, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
(sigh) Oh joy, another bill from the geniuses in Congress. Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this... thing.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the "Abolish the ATF Act". How quaint. The main purpose of this bill is to abolish the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Wow, what a bold move. I'm sure it has nothing to do with the fact that some of these sponsors have received generous donations from the National Rifle Association (NRA) or other gun lobby groups.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill is a masterclass in simplicity: one section, two sentences. It's like they're trying to make it easy for their constituents to understand, bless their hearts. In essence, it abolishes the ATF and... that's it. No plan for what happens next, no consideration of the consequences. Just "poof", gone.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Oh boy, where do I even start? The ATF employees who will lose their jobs? The law enforcement agencies that rely on the ATF for support? The public, who might actually benefit from having a functional agency regulating firearms and explosives? Or maybe it's just the gun lobby, who get to further erode any semblance of responsible gun ownership?
**Potential Impact & Implications:** (chuckles) Well, this is where things get interesting. Without an ATF, we can expect a Wild West free-for-all on firearms regulation. Gun manufacturers and dealers will have even more freedom to operate without oversight, because that's worked out so well in the past. And let's not forget the potential for increased gun violence, but hey, who needs data when you have ideology?
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Gun Lobby-itis", a disease characterized by an overabundance of NRA donations and a complete disregard for public safety. The sponsors are merely symptoms of this larger problem – a Congress more interested in serving special interests than the people they're supposed to represent.
Treatment: (shrugs) I'm not sure there is one. This bill will likely die in committee, but the underlying disease will persist until we have a Congress willing to take on the gun lobby and prioritize public safety over campaign contributions. Until then, we'll just have to keep treating these symptoms with a healthy dose of skepticism and ridicule.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Boebert, Lauren [R-CO-4]
ID: B000825
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
ID: B001302
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Collins, Mike [R-GA-10]
ID: C001129
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Onder, Robert [R-MO-3]
ID: O000177
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]
ID: O000175
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Miller, Mary E. [R-IL-15]
ID: M001211
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
ID: S001224
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Gosar, Paul A. [R-AZ-9]
ID: G000565
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]
ID: M001212
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Massie, Thomas [R-KY-4]
ID: M001184
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 39 nodes and 36 connections
Total contributions: $163,319
Top Donors - Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It — 633 — Department of Transportation needs to hire people trained to oversee mechanics, engineers, and pilots. It is time to consider promoting the FAA’s top executive team from within and requiring strict professional requirements for its top appointees. Organizations such as the FAA whose sole responsibility is public safety should be fully auditable and led by experts in their field or industry with oversight from DOT leadership. For 60 years, the FAA was the global leader in aerospace, from general aviation to commercial space, but the U.S. lead has vanished. The FAA’s overly bureaucratic, legalistic, byzantine, and more recently hyperpoliticized way of processing regu- lations, adopting innovation, publishing rules, and procuring new technologies has been eclipsed by foreign CAAs and ANSPs that are eagerly certifying drones and creating environments in which new technologies and new entrants, such as air taxis, can thrive. To regain America’s global leadership in aviation, the next Administration should: l Separate the FAA from DOT or, at a minimum, separate the ATO from the FAA. l Completely restructure the FAA’s funding system so that the nation’s aviation system is not held prisoner to annual appropriations or used as a political football to solve nonaviation problems. l Require the FAA to operate more like a business. The FAA has not made good use of the unique authority it has been given in areas like personnel and acquisition. In Europe, conventional control towers are being replaced by digital/remote towers with high-resolution cameras and other sensors on tall structures and at points adjoining runways. In Germany and Scandinavia, as many as 15 small air- ports can be controlled from one remote tower center. The FAA has yet to certify a single digital/remote tower. Text messaging between controllers and pilots is widespread over the oceans. The ATO began to implement what is now called DataComm in 2002 but sus- pended the project in 2003. This was restarted at airport control towers in 2016, but as of October 2022, it was available in only seven of the 20 high-altitude control centers. Current technology enables flights to be managed “anywhere from anywhere,” but the ATO resists consolidating its 20 aging centers into a much smaller number—and lacks the funds to consolidate them. The FAA as regulator and the ATO as traffic manager have no plans in place to handle millions of drones and other emerging technologies such as electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft.
Introduction
— 634 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise These shortcomings have been documented over many decades by the Govern- ment Accountability Office and DOT Inspector General. One peer-reviewed study for the Hudson Institute by scholar Robert Poole identified the ATO’s underlying problems as including an overly cautious culture, a growing lack of technological and managerial expertise, the inability to finance major capital projects with rev- enue bonds, and overdependence on aerospace/defense contractors.12 All of these problems are interrelated. Because of the ATO’s lack of top-notch engineers and program managers, it has become dependent on aerospace contrac- tors, unlike counterparts in Canada and the United Kingdom. Operating within the constraints imposed by the annual congressional appropriations process—and with no bonding authority—the ATO is forced to implement major projects piecemeal over many years. The ATO’s overly cautious culture appears to stem from its being embedded in a safety regulatory agency rather than being regulated at arm’s length (as are airlines and airports). Three organizational changes, all requiring legislation, offer the likelihood of dealing with these problems based on the experiences of air traffic providers in Canada and Europe. They could be implemented one at a time or together. l Separate the ATO from the FAA and relocate it to separate headquarters outside the District of Columbia. l Shift from aviation user taxes to fees for air traffic services paid directly to the ATO. l Allow the ATO to issue long-term revenue bonds for major projects. Shorter-term reforms could include implementing user fees for unconventional airspace users (for example, advanced air mobility, space launch, and recovery) and giving the ATO a deadline after which it could not authorize or fund any more nondigital/remote control towers. These reforms would also require legislation. FEDERAL TRANSIT POLICY The definition of “mobility” continues to evolve dramatically with the rise of new multimodal concepts, traveler needs, and emerging capabilities. These fun- damental changes in the way transportation services are offered also influence the form of our communities. New micromobility solutions, ridesharing, and a possible future that includes autonomous vehicles mean that mobility options—particularly in urban areas— can alter the nature of public transit, making it more affordable and flexible for Americans. Unfortunately, DOT now defines public transit only as transit pro- vided by municipal governments. This means that when individuals change their
Introduction
— 634 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise These shortcomings have been documented over many decades by the Govern- ment Accountability Office and DOT Inspector General. One peer-reviewed study for the Hudson Institute by scholar Robert Poole identified the ATO’s underlying problems as including an overly cautious culture, a growing lack of technological and managerial expertise, the inability to finance major capital projects with rev- enue bonds, and overdependence on aerospace/defense contractors.12 All of these problems are interrelated. Because of the ATO’s lack of top-notch engineers and program managers, it has become dependent on aerospace contrac- tors, unlike counterparts in Canada and the United Kingdom. Operating within the constraints imposed by the annual congressional appropriations process—and with no bonding authority—the ATO is forced to implement major projects piecemeal over many years. The ATO’s overly cautious culture appears to stem from its being embedded in a safety regulatory agency rather than being regulated at arm’s length (as are airlines and airports). Three organizational changes, all requiring legislation, offer the likelihood of dealing with these problems based on the experiences of air traffic providers in Canada and Europe. They could be implemented one at a time or together. l Separate the ATO from the FAA and relocate it to separate headquarters outside the District of Columbia. l Shift from aviation user taxes to fees for air traffic services paid directly to the ATO. l Allow the ATO to issue long-term revenue bonds for major projects. Shorter-term reforms could include implementing user fees for unconventional airspace users (for example, advanced air mobility, space launch, and recovery) and giving the ATO a deadline after which it could not authorize or fund any more nondigital/remote control towers. These reforms would also require legislation. FEDERAL TRANSIT POLICY The definition of “mobility” continues to evolve dramatically with the rise of new multimodal concepts, traveler needs, and emerging capabilities. These fun- damental changes in the way transportation services are offered also influence the form of our communities. New micromobility solutions, ridesharing, and a possible future that includes autonomous vehicles mean that mobility options—particularly in urban areas— can alter the nature of public transit, making it more affordable and flexible for Americans. Unfortunately, DOT now defines public transit only as transit pro- vided by municipal governments. This means that when individuals change their — 635 — Department of Transportation commutes from urban buses to rideshare or electric scooter, the use of public transit decreases. A better definition for public transit (which also would require congressional legislation) would be transit provided for the public rather than transit provided by a public municipality. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a substantial decline in usage for all forms of transportation. Mass transit has been the slowest mode to recover, with October 2022 ridership reaching only 64 percent of the level seen in October 2019. The sustained increase in remote work has caused changes in commuting patterns. Since facilitating travel for workers is one of the core functions of mass transit systems, a permanent reduction in commuting raises questions about the viability of fixed-route mass transit, especially considering that transit systems required substantial subsidization before the pandemic. Regrettably, the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act13 authorized tens of billions of dollars for the expansion of transit systems even as Americans were moving away from them and into personal vehicles. Lower revenue from reduced ridership is already driving transit agencies to a budgetary breaking point, and added operational costs from system expansions will make this problem worse. The Capital Investment Grants (CIG) program is another example of Washing- ton’s tendency to fund transit expansion rather than maintaining or improving current facilities. The CIG program, which began in 1991, funds only novel transit projects. These can include new rail lines (regardless of the demand for preexisting rail in the area) and costly operations such as streetcars. Because Americans have demonstrated a strong preference for alternative means of transportation, rather than throwing good money after bad by continuing federal subsidies for transit expansion, there should be a focus on reducing costs that make transit uneconomical. The Trump Administration urged Congress to eliminate the CIG program, but the program has strong support on Capitol Hill. At a minimum, a new conservative Administration should ensure that each CIG project meets sound economic standards and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The largest expense in transit operational budgets is labor. Compensation costs for transit workers exceed both regional and sector compensation averages. This is driven by generous pension and health benefits rather than by exorbitant wages. Since workers value wages more than they value fringe benefits, this has led to a perverse situation in which transit agencies have high compensation costs yet are struggling to attract workers. The next Administration can remove the largest obstacle to reforming labor costs. Section 10(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 196414 was initially intended to protect bargaining rights for workers in privately owned transit sys- tems that were being absorbed by government-operated agencies. The provision has mutated into a requirement that any transit agency receiving federal funds cannot reduce compensation, an interpretation that far exceeds the original statute.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.