The bill
Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act
HR. 1919, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Emmer, Tom [R-MN-6]
ID: E000294
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1919, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Reserve" section, p. 773-775 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
July 16, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater from the esteemed members of Congress. The Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act, a bill so cleverly crafted that it's almost as if they're trying to convince us they care about our privacy and financial freedom.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to pretend to address concerns about central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and their potential use for surveillance. The sponsors want you to believe they're protecting your rights, but in reality, they're just trying to appease the libertarian crowd while maintaining the status quo.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits Federal Reserve banks from offering financial products or services directly to individuals and restricts their ability to issue CBDCs. It also amends the Federal Reserve Act to prevent the use of CBDCs for monetary policy purposes. Oh, but don't worry, they've included a convenient exception for "dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, and private" – just in case they need to create a new form of digital money that's not actually a CBDC.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Federal Reserve, financial institutions, and individuals who might be foolish enough to think this bill will protect their financial privacy. Meanwhile, the real stakeholders – the politicians, lobbyists, and special interest groups – will continue to reap the benefits of a system that's designed to maintain their power and influence.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is nothing more than a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It won't stop the inevitable march towards a cashless society or prevent the government from monitoring your financial transactions. The real impact will be felt by those who think this bill is a genuine attempt to protect their rights – they'll be lulled into a false sense of security while the powers that be continue to erode their freedoms.
In conclusion, HR 1919 is a masterclass in legislative misdirection. It's a cleverly crafted illusion designed to make you believe your elected officials care about your financial freedom and privacy. Don't be fooled – this bill is just another symptom of a deeper disease: the insatiable desire for power and control that afflicts our politicians.
Diagnosis: **Terminal Naivety**
Prescription: **A healthy dose of skepticism**
Rep. Emmer, Tom [R-MN-6]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: H001072
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ID: M001194
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 84 nodes and 45 connections (85 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $1,231,750
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 4(C) provides an exception for dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, private, and preserves privacy protections of physical currency, which benefits decentralized cryptocurrencies and fintech platforms by protecting them from CBDC competition.
Sections 2 and 3 prohibit Federal Reserve banks from offering financial products/services directly to individuals, maintaining individual accounts, or issuing CBDCs directly or indirectly through intermediaries, limiting potential new services banks could offer via FedNow or similar systems.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Emmer, Tom [R-MN-6])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 1919 directly enacts the Project 2025 objective of preventing a central bank digital currency by prohibiting the Federal Reserve from issuing or using a CBDC, thereby addressing surveillance and control concerns."
— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"HR 1919 directly implements Project 2025's recommendation to limit the Federal Reserve's mandate and prevent overreach by prohibiting the issuance of a CBDC, which aligns with the goal of preserving monetary stability and preventing government abuse of money creation for surveillance or political ends."
— 731 — 24 FEDERAL RESERVE Paul Winfree Money is the essential unit of measure for the voluntary exchanges that constitute the market economy. Stable money allows people to work freely, helps businesses grow, facilitates investment, supports saving for retirement, and ultimately provides for economic growth. The federal govern- ment has long made policy regarding the nation’s money on behalf of the people through their elected representatives in Congress.1 Over time, however, Congress has delegated that responsibility first to the Department of the Treasury and now to the quasi-public Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve was created by Congress in 1913 when most Americans lived in rural areas and the largest industry was agriculture. The impetus was a series of financial crises caused both by irresponsible banks and other financial institutions that overextended credit and by poor regulations. The architects of the Federal Reserve believed that a quasi-public clearinghouse acting as lender of last resort would reduce financial instability and end severe recessions. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s was needlessly prolonged in part because of the Federal Reserve’s inept manage- ment of the money supply. More recessions followed in the post–World War II years. In the decades since the Federal Reserve was created, there has been a down- turn roughly every five years. This monetary dysfunction is related in part to the impossibility of fine-tuning the money supply in real time, as well as to the moral hazard inherent in a political system that has demonstrated a history of bailing out private firms when they engage in excess speculation. Public control of money creation through the Federal Reserve System has another major problem: Government can abuse this authority for its own advantage — 732 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise by printing money to finance its operations. This necessitated the original Federal Reserve’s decentralization and political independence. Not long after the central bank’s creation, however, monetary decision-making power was transferred away from regional member banks and consolidated in the Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve’s independence is presumably supported by its mandate to maintain stable prices. Yet central bank independence is challenged in two addi- tional ways. First, like any other public institution, the Federal Reserve responds to the potential for political oversight when faced with challenges.2 Consequently, its independence in conducting monetary policy is more assured when the economy is experiencing sustained growth and when there is low unemployment and price stabil- ity—but less so in a crisis.3 Additionally, political pressure has led the Federal Reserve to use its power to regulate banks as a way to promote politically favorable initiatives including those aligned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives.4 Even formal grants of power by Congress have not markedly improved Federal Reserve actions. Congress gave the Federal Reserve greater regulatory authority over banks after the stock market crash of 1929. During the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve was given the power to set reserve requirements on banks and to regulate loans for the purchase of securities. During the stagflation of the 1970s, Congress expanded the Federal Reserve’s mandate to include “maximum employ- ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”5 In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s banking and financial regulatory authorities were broadened even further. The Great Recession also led to innova- tions by the central bank such as additional large-scale asset purchases. Together, these expansions have created significant risks associated with “too big to fail” financial institutions and have facilitated government debt creation.6 Collec- tively, such developments have eroded the Federal Reserve’s economic neutrality. In essence, because of its vastly expanded discretionary powers with respect to monetary and regulatory policy, the Fed lacks both operational effectiveness and political independence. To protect the Federal Reserve’s independence and to improve monetary policy outcomes, Congress should limit its mandate to the sole objective of stable money. This chapter provides a number of options aimed at achieving these goals along with the costs and benefits of each policy recommendation. These recommended reforms are divided into two parts: broad institutional changes and changes involv- ing the Federal Reserve’s management of the money supply. BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS l Eliminate the “dual mandate.” The Federal Reserve was originally created to “furnish an elastic currency” and rediscount commercial paper so that the supply of credit could increase along with the demand for money
AI Analysis:
"Both HR 1919 and the Project 2025 Financial Regulatory Agencies section aim to curb perceived overreach of federal financial regulators and reinforce congressional oversight, though they target different agencies (the Federal Reserve vs. the CFPB). They share themes of limiting agency power, protecting individual privacy, and asserting congressional authority over financial regulation."
— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.