Billion Dollar Boondoggle Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1722
Last Updated: August 4, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

ID: M001215

Follow the money

The bill

Billion Dollar Boondoggle Act

HR. 1722, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.

The sponsor

Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$166,100 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Executive Office of the President of the United States" section, p. 78-80 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate. Read twice. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 467.

July 22, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

HR 1722: The Billion Dollar Boondoggle Act – A Masterclass in Pointless Paperwork

Ah, HR 1722—appropriately named, because the only thing more bloated than the projects it aims to track is the sheer audacity of pretending this bill fixes anything. Let’s dissect this legislative placebo with the contempt it deserves.

**Total funding amounts and budget allocations?** Zero. Nada. Zilch. This isn’t an appropriations bill—it’s a *reporting requirement* bill. No funds are allocated, no programs are funded, no bridges are built. Instead, we get a mandate for the OMB to harass agencies into filling out yet another form about projects that are already catastrophically over budget and behind schedule. Think of it as a taxpayer-funded confession booth for fiscal sins we already know about.

**Key programs and agencies receiving funds?** Again—none. But if we’re being generous, the real “recipients” are the contractors and consultants who’ll make a killing helping agencies comply with this nonsense. The bill demands excruciating detail: original vs. current cost estimates (CPI-adjusted, because of course we’re pretending inflation explains a $2 billion overrun on a software system), contractor lists, scope changes, bonus rationales—all for projects that are *already* over $1B over budget *or* more than five years late. In other words, we’re auditing the Titanic *after* it hit the iceberg, and demanding a PowerPoint on why the band kept playing.

**Notable increases or decreases from previous years?** Not applicable—this bill creates a new bureaucratic ritual where none existed before. But let’s be clear: the *real* increase is in the workload of already overburdened program managers, who now must divert time from actually fixing problems to documenting why they failed. The decrease? In any semblance of efficiency or accountability. Because nothing says “reform” like adding a layer of paperwork to a system drowning in it.

**Riders or policy provisions?** None of note. No poison pills, no stealthy policy riders—just pure, uncut bureaucratic theater. The only “classified annex” allowance is a darkly comic touch, as if the real scandal isn’t the waste, but that we might need to hide *how* stupid we were.

**Fiscal impact and deficit implications?** Directly: negligible. The CBO would likely score this as rounding error. Indirectly? Potentially harmful. Every hour spent compiling this report is an hour not spent canceling the boondoggle, renegotiating the contract, or firing the incompetent bozos who let a $1B project slide into $3B territory. This bill doesn’t stop waste—it *memorializes* it. Like a tombstone that also requires quarterly maintenance reports.

**Diagnosis:** This isn’t oversight—it’s legislative voyeurism. Congress, unable or unwilling to actually kill failing projects, instead demands a yearly autopsy report on the corpse. The sponsors get to grandstand about “transparency” while doing nothing to stop the hemorrhage. The agencies get another compliance headache. The contractors keep getting paid. And the taxpayer? We get a shiny new PDF to ignore, while the same projects continue to suck money into a black hole labeled “optimism.”

In short: HR 1722 is a placebo for a broken system—bitter, ineffective, and prescribed by doctors who profit from the illness. Pathetic. But predictable.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsGovernment Operations & Accountability
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$166,100
24 donors
PACs
$500
Organizations
$3,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$160,200
1
POLITICAL COMMITTEE, NWF ACTION FUND
1 transaction
$500
1
US MARSHALS SERVICES
1 transaction
$2,900
2
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
SMITH, DYAN
2 transactions
$16,600
2
HOGAN, PATRICK F
1 transaction
$13,200
3
HOLDEN, RONALD
1 transaction
$13,200
4
VANDEWALLE, LOLA L
1 transaction
$13,200
5
GLEESON, JOHN W
1 transaction
$11,600
6
RICHARDS, DANIEL
1 transaction
$6,600
7
WILLOX, NORMAN
1 transaction
$6,600
8
PFAUTCH, ROY
1 transaction
$6,600
9
BRADLEY, JACQUELINE
1 transaction
$6,600
10
BROIN, JEFF MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
JAY, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$6,600
12
RICKETTS, J. JOE
1 transaction
$6,600
13
MCCOY, JUDITH
1 transaction
$6,600
14
SINGER, PAUL
1 transaction
$6,600
15
SABIN, ANDREW
1 transaction
$6,600
16
GILLIAM, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
17
BELTRAME, MARC
1 transaction
$6,600
18
WOLL, MARGO
1 transaction
$6,600
19
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Ansari, Yassamin [D-AZ-3]

ID: A000381

Top Contributors

23

1
GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationSACATON, AZ
$3,300
Oct 16, 2024
2
ADIBA JURAYEVA LLC
OrganizationPHOENIX, AZ
$1,000
Jan 17, 2024
3
SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationSCOTTSDALE, AZ
$1,000
Oct 8, 2024
4
JACOBS, IRWIN
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
IndividualLA JOLLA, CA
$3,300
Dec 5, 2024
5
ABBASPOUR, SHAHIN
VITESSE WORLDWIDE • PRESIDENT & CEO
IndividualSCOTTSDALE, AZ
$3,300
Nov 13, 2023
6
ALEREZA, TAGHI
ADM ASSOCIATES • CEO
IndividualEL DORADO HILLS, CA
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023
7
ALEREZA, TAGHI
ADM ASSOCIATES • CEO
IndividualEL DORADO HILLS, CA
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023
8
AMERI, GOLI
STARTITUP • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023
9
BAKHTIARY, NIMA
ARGANO • ENGINEERING
IndividualLAGUNA BEACH, CA
$3,300
Dec 10, 2023
10
BAKHTIARY, NIMA
ARGANO • ENGINEERING
IndividualLAGUNA BEACH, CA
$3,300
Dec 10, 2023

Rep. Brecheen, Josh [R-OK-2]

ID: B001317

Top Contributors

22

1
COMMUNITY BANCSHARES OF MS PAC
OrganizationFOREST, MS
$1,000
Apr 18, 2023
2
NILKNOC LLC
OrganizationSTIGLER, OK
$300
Apr 8, 2024
3
GREEMAN, WALTER M MRS.
SELF EMPLOYED • RANCHER
IndividualTISHOMINGO, OK
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
4
HINMAN, ROY H
FLAGLER HOSPITAL • FAMILY MEDICINE DOCTOR
IndividualST AUGUSTINE, FL
$6,600
Jan 23, 2024
5
LOMANGINO, ANTHONY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$6,600
Feb 27, 2024
6
LOMANGINO, LYNDA
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$6,600
Feb 27, 2024
7
ASBJORNSON, SCOTT
SELF EMPLOYED • PRIVATE INVESTOR
IndividualTULSA, OK
$6,600
Jun 5, 2023
8
JAQUISH, GAIL
JURIX INC • PSYCHOLOGIST
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Sep 26, 2023
9
KENNINGER, STEVEN
QMO LLC • INVESTOR
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
10
LOMANGINO, ANTHONY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$6,600
Jul 24, 2023

Rep. Fong, Vince [R-CA-20]

ID: F000480

Top Contributors

21

1
TULE RIVER TRIBAL COUNCIL
OrganizationPORTERVILLE, CA
$3,300
Aug 9, 2024
2
ANDERSON, DARIUS
PLATINUM ADVISORS • LOBBYIST
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
3
LEPRINO, TERRY
LEPRINO FOODS • BOARD DIRECTOR
IndividualDENVER, CO
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
4
HUNTER, KEN
VAQUERO ENERGY • EXECUTIVE
IndividualSANTA YNEZ, CA
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
5
BAND MIWOK INDIANS, SHINGLE SPRINGS
N/A • N/A
IndividualPLACERVILLE, CA
$3,300
Nov 6, 2024
6
ROJEWSKI, COLE
RBW GROUP • PARTNER
IndividualCLOVIS, CA
$3,300
Dec 11, 2023
7
ROJEWSKI, COLE
RBW GROUP • PARTNER
IndividualCLOVIS, CA
$3,300
Dec 11, 2023
8
EKEGREN, JONATHAN
BARBER HONDA • GENERAL MANAGER
IndividualBAKERSFIELD, CA
$3,300
Dec 12, 2023
9
EKEGREN, JONATHAN
BARBER HONDA • GENERAL MANAGER
IndividualBAKERSFIELD, CA
$3,300
Dec 12, 2023
10
MOJIBI, AMANDA
IndividualBAKERSFIELD, CA
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 64 nodes and 57 connections

Total contributions: $57

Top Donors - Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC2 Orgs2 Committees19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • Section 2(b)(1)(H) requires reporting on awards, incentive fees, or bonuses for covered projects, which may impact private equity or hedge funds invested in companies involved in these projects.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 78-80AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1722 aligns strongly with Project 2025’s emphasis on OMB’s role in enhancing fiscal accountability, oversight of agency spending, and ensuring consistency with presidential agenda through improved transparency and reporting mechanisms. The bill’s focus on tracking cost overruns and schedule delays supports OMB’s statutory tools to combat waste and inefficiency."

Key themes:OMB oversightfiscal accountabilityagency spending transparencycost overrun monitoringpresidential agenda alignment

— 45 — Executive Office of the President of the United States l Coordinating and clearing agency communications with Congress, including testimonies and views on draft legislation. OMB cannot perform its role on behalf of the President effectively if it is not inti- mately involved in all aspects of the White House policy process and lacks knowledge of what the agencies are doing. Internally to the EOP, ensuring that the policy-for- mulation procedures developed by the White House to serve the President include OMB is one of any OMB Director’s major responsibilities. A common meme of those who intend to evade OMB review is to argue that where “resources” are not being discussed, OMB’s participation is optional. This ignores both OMB’s role in all down- stream execution and the reality that it has the only statutory tools in the White House that are powerful enough to override implementing agencies’ bureaucracies. The Director must view his job as the best, most comprehensive approxima- tion of the President’s mind as it pertains to the policy agenda while always being ready with actual options to effect that agenda within existing legal authorities and resources. This role cannot be performed adequately if the Director acts instead as the ambassador of the institutional interests of OMB and the wider bureaucracy to the White House. Once its reputation as the keeper of “commander’s intent” is established, then and only then does OMB have the ability to shape the most efficient way to pursue an objective. Externally, the Director must ensure that OMB has sufficient visibility into the deep caverns of agency decision-making. One indispensable statutory tool to that end is to ensure that policy officials—the Program Associate Directors (PADs) managing the vast Resource Management Offices (RMOs)—personally sign what are known as the apportionments. In 1870, Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Act3 to prevent the common agency practice of spending down all appropriated funding, creating artificial funding shortfalls that Congress would have to fill. The law mandated that all funding be allotted or “apportioned” in installments. This process, whereby agencies come to OMB for allotments of appropriated funding, is essential to the effective financial stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OMB can then direct on behalf of a President the amount, duration, and purpose of any appor- tioned funding to ensure against waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure consistency with the President’s agenda and applicable laws. The vast majority of these apportionments were signed by career officials—the Deputy Associate Directors (DADs)—until the Trump Administration placed this responsibility in the hands of the PADs and thereby opened wide vistas of oversight that had escaped the attention of policy officials. The Biden Administration sub- sequently reversed this decision. No Director should be chosen who is unwilling to restore apportionment decision-making to the PADs’ personal review, who is not aggressive in wielding the tool on behalf of the President’s agenda, or who is unable to defend the power against attacks from Congress. — 46 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted that each of OMB’s primary functions, along with other executive and statutory roles, is carried out with the help of many essential OMB support offices. The two most important offices for moving OMB at the will of a Director are the Budget Review Division (BRD) and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The Director should have a direct and effective relationship with the head of the BRD (considered the top career official within OMB) and transmit most instructions through that office because the rest of the agency is institution- ally inclined toward its direction and responds accordingly. The BRD inevitably will translate the directions from policy officials to the career staff, and at every stage, it is obviously vital that the Director ensure that this translation is an accurate one. In addition, many key considerations involved in enacting a President’s agenda hinge on existing legal authorities. The Director must ensure the appointment of a General Counsel who is respected yet creative and fearless in his or her abil- ity to challenge legal precedents that serve to protect the status quo. This is vital within OMB not only with respect to the adequate development of policy options for the President’s review, but also with respect to agencies that attempt to protect their own institutional interests and foreclose certain avenues based on the mere assertion (and not proof) that the law disallows it or that, conversely, attempt to disregard the clear statutory commands of Congress. In general, the Director should empower a strong Deputy Director with author- ity over the Deputy for Management, the PADs, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to work diligently to break down barriers within OMB and not allow turf disputes or a lack of visibility to undermine the agency’s prin- cipal budget, management, and regulatory functions. OMB should work toward a “One OMB” position on behalf of the President and represent that view during the various policymaking processes. Budget. The United States today faces an untenable fiscal situation and owes $31 trillion on a debt that is steadily increasing. The OMB Director should present a fiscal goal to the President early in the budget development process to address the federal government’s fiscal irresponsibility. This goal would help to align the months-long process of developing the actual proposals for inclusion in the budget. Though some mistakenly regard it as a mere paper-pushing exercise, the Pres- ident’s budget is in fact a powerful mechanism for setting and enforcing public policy at federal agencies. The budget team includes six Resource Management Offices that, together with the BRD and other components, help the Director of OMB to develop and execute detailed agency spending plans that bear on every major aspect of policy formation and execution at federal agencies. Through initial priority-setting and ongoing supervision of agency spending, OMB’s budget team plays a key role in executing policy across the executive branch, including at many agencies wrongly regarded as “independent.”

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 78-80AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1722 enhances transparency and oversight of major federal projects through mandatory reporting, which aligns with Project 2025’s emphasis on OMB’s role in enforcing fiscal discipline and improving executive branch management, though it does not directly implement structural OMB reforms or PAYGO mechanisms."

Key themes:OMB oversightfiscal responsibilityexecutive branch managementbudget accountabilitytransparency in spending

— 46 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted that each of OMB’s primary functions, along with other executive and statutory roles, is carried out with the help of many essential OMB support offices. The two most important offices for moving OMB at the will of a Director are the Budget Review Division (BRD) and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The Director should have a direct and effective relationship with the head of the BRD (considered the top career official within OMB) and transmit most instructions through that office because the rest of the agency is institution- ally inclined toward its direction and responds accordingly. The BRD inevitably will translate the directions from policy officials to the career staff, and at every stage, it is obviously vital that the Director ensure that this translation is an accurate one. In addition, many key considerations involved in enacting a President’s agenda hinge on existing legal authorities. The Director must ensure the appointment of a General Counsel who is respected yet creative and fearless in his or her abil- ity to challenge legal precedents that serve to protect the status quo. This is vital within OMB not only with respect to the adequate development of policy options for the President’s review, but also with respect to agencies that attempt to protect their own institutional interests and foreclose certain avenues based on the mere assertion (and not proof) that the law disallows it or that, conversely, attempt to disregard the clear statutory commands of Congress. In general, the Director should empower a strong Deputy Director with author- ity over the Deputy for Management, the PADs, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to work diligently to break down barriers within OMB and not allow turf disputes or a lack of visibility to undermine the agency’s prin- cipal budget, management, and regulatory functions. OMB should work toward a “One OMB” position on behalf of the President and represent that view during the various policymaking processes. Budget. The United States today faces an untenable fiscal situation and owes $31 trillion on a debt that is steadily increasing. The OMB Director should present a fiscal goal to the President early in the budget development process to address the federal government’s fiscal irresponsibility. This goal would help to align the months-long process of developing the actual proposals for inclusion in the budget. Though some mistakenly regard it as a mere paper-pushing exercise, the Pres- ident’s budget is in fact a powerful mechanism for setting and enforcing public policy at federal agencies. The budget team includes six Resource Management Offices that, together with the BRD and other components, help the Director of OMB to develop and execute detailed agency spending plans that bear on every major aspect of policy formation and execution at federal agencies. Through initial priority-setting and ongoing supervision of agency spending, OMB’s budget team plays a key role in executing policy across the executive branch, including at many agencies wrongly regarded as “independent.” — 47 — Executive Office of the President of the United States The RMOs, each of which is led by a political appointee known as the PAD and a career DAD, are separated into six functional units: l National Security. l Natural Resources, Energy, and Science. l Health. l Education, Income Maintenance, and Labor. l Transportation, Justice, and Homeland Security. l Treasury, Commerce, and Housing. Because the RMOs are institutionally ingrained in nearly all policymaking and implementation across the executive branch, they play a critical role in helping the Director to implement the President’s public policy agenda. However, because each RMO is responsible for formulating and supervising such a wide range of policy details, many granular but critical policy decisions are effectively left to the career professionals who serve across Administrations. To enhance the OMB Director’s ability to help the President drive policy at the agencies, the existing six RMOs should be divided into smaller subject-matter areas, allowing for more PADs, and each of these PADs should have a Deputy PAD. This expanded pool of RMOs with additional political leadership would enable more comprehensive direction and oversight of policy development and implementation. Regardless of whether Congress adopts the President’s full set of budget rec- ommendations, the President should reintroduce the concept of administrative pay-as-you-go, or administrative PAYGO. This simple procedural requirement imposes budget neutrality on the discretionary choices of federal agencies, of which there are many in nearly all areas of policymaking. This simple step forces the executive branch to control what it can control. The principle may occasionally yield to other overarching requirements, such as a presidential regulatory budget, but in nearly all cases, administrative PAYGO plays a unique and indispensable role in enforcing fiscal responsibility at federal departments and agencies. The President should use every possible tool to propose and impose fiscal disci- pline on the federal government. Anything short of that would constitute abject failure. Management. The Management Office of OMB (the “M-Side” as it is often called) is responsible for carrying out several important agency oversight functions, many of which are statutory. The Management team includes the following offices led by presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed individuals:

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 443-445AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1722 enhances transparency and oversight of major federal projects, including those within the Department of Energy, which aligns with Project 2025's focus on accountability and reform in energy-related agencies. While the bill does not directly implement specific Project 2025 energy policies, its reporting requirements could support oversight of DOE programs and projects referenced in the policy section."

Key themes:Department of Energy oversightproject accountabilitytransparency in federal spending

— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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