Let America Vote Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/155
Last Updated: January 12, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]

ID: F000466

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Referred to the Committee on House Administration, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

January 3, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Let America Vote Act" (HR 155) is a cleverly crafted bill that masquerades as a champion of voter rights while actually serving the interests of its sponsors and their donors. The main objective is to create the illusion of expanding voting access while maintaining the status quo.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires states to permit unaffiliated voters (those not registered with a party) to vote in primary elections for federal office, but only if they don't vote in multiple parties' primaries. It also restricts sharing information about these voters and prohibits treating them as affiliated with a party solely based on their voting history.

The bill's authors cleverly included provisions that:

* Allow states to opt-out of using federal funds for election administration purposes if they don't comply with the new requirements. * Provide "transition assistance grants" (read: bribes) to states that certify compliance, totaling 2% of the total amount of Help America Vote Act payments.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

* Unaffiliated voters: The supposed beneficiaries of this bill, who will now have slightly more access to primary elections. * States: Forced to comply with new regulations or risk losing federal funding for election administration. * Political parties: Will still maintain control over their primaries and can continue to manipulate the system to their advantage. * Lobbyists and donors: The real winners, as they'll continue to influence policy behind the scenes.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a masterclass in legislative misdirection. By creating the illusion of expanding voting access, its sponsors aim to:

* Maintain the status quo and protect the interests of their donors. * Create new avenues for corruption through "transition assistance grants." * Further erode trust in the electoral system by perpetuating the myth that this bill will somehow increase voter participation.

In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It doesn't address the root causes of voter suppression or disenfranchisement. Instead, it reinforces the existing power structures and ensures that the interests of those in power remain protected.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Disease" (LLSD), characterized by grandiose promises, empty rhetoric, and a complete lack of meaningful reform. Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a rigorous examination of the actual policy implications. Prognosis: The disease will likely spread, infecting future legislation with its insidious influence.

Related Topics

National Security & Intelligence State & Local Government Affairs Federal Budget & Appropriations Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Congressional Rules & Procedures Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Government Operations & Accountability Civil Rights & Liberties
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$136,000
12 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$2,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$134,000

No PAC contributions found

1
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,500
2
STATA FAMILY OFFICE
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
EVANS, ROGER
4 transactions
$26,400
2
ASHER, ROBERT B.
2 transactions
$20,000
3
LEVY, EDWARD JR
2 transactions
$13,200
4
CROTTY, THOMAS
2 transactions
$13,200
5
LEACH, RONALD
2 transactions
$13,200
6
MCCLAIN, MARK
2 transactions
$13,200
7
MERINOFF, CHARLES
2 transactions
$13,200
8
MCKNIGHT, AMY
2 transactions
$10,000
9
ROSE, DEEDIE
1 transaction
$6,600
10
BORCHERT, TRICIA
1 transaction
$5,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Perez, Marie Gluesenkamp [D-WA-3]

ID: G000600

Top Contributors

10

1
SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY
Organization LA CONNER, WA
$3,300
Dec 31, 2023
2
SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY
Organization LA CONNER, WA
$3,300
Dec 31, 2023
3
COWLITZ INDIAN TRIBE
Organization LONGVIEW, WA
$3,300
Mar 21, 2023
4
COWLITZ INDIAN TRIBE
Organization LONGVIEW, WA
$3,300
Feb 22, 2024
5
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
Organization CHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Feb 12, 2024
6
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
Organization ROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Mar 13, 2024
7
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
Organization ROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Mar 13, 2024
8
PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS
Organization TACOMA, WA
$3,300
Jun 30, 2024
9
TULALIP TRIBES OF WASHINGTON
Organization TULALIP, WA
$3,300
May 2, 2023
10
COWLITZ INDIAN TRIBE
Organization LONGVIEW, WA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2024

Rep. Golden, Jared F. [D-ME-2]

ID: G000592

Top Contributors

10

1
PENOBSCOT INDIAN NATION
Organization INDIAN ISLAND, ME
$3,300
Oct 19, 2024
2
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
Organization CHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Feb 8, 2024
3
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
Organization ROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Mar 13, 2024
4
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
Organization LOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Sep 28, 2023
5
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
Organization FULTON, MI
$2,000
Oct 15, 2024
6
PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE AT INDIAN TOWNSHIP
Organization PERRY, ME
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
7
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
Organization SANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,000
Oct 31, 2024
8
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
Organization BANNING, CA
$1,000
Jun 27, 2024
9
ONEIDA NATION
Organization ONEIDA, WI
$1,000
Sep 26, 2024
10
KIRK, GARRETT JR
SELF EMPLOYED • INVESTOR
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Nov 2, 2024

Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

ID: G000597

Top Contributors

10

1
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
Organization PEARL, MS
$1,000
Nov 5, 2024
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
Organization ADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 20, 2023
3
DUIT, JAMES
CONCEPTION LLC • PARTNER
Individual EDMOND, OK
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
4
DUIT, PAMELA
CONCEPTION LLC • PARTNER
Individual EDMOND, OK
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
5
ROCKEFELLER, LISENNE
WINROCK ENT • PRESIDENT
Individual LITTLE ROCK, AR
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
6
RICKETTS, MARLENE
RETIRED • RETIRED
Individual OMAHA, NE
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
7
LEACH, HOWARD
SELF EMPLOYED • PRIVATE INVESTOR
Individual PALM BEACH, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
FEINSTEIN, LEONARD
BED BATH AND BEYOND • CHAIRMAN
Individual JERICHO, NY
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
9
BANKE, BARBARA R.
JACKSON FAMILY WINES • OWNER
Individual GEYSERVILLE, CA
$3,300
Nov 15, 2023
10
SMITH, HOLLY
SHOOK HARDY BACON LLP • ATTORNEY
Individual SAINT LOUIS, MO
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023

Rep. Suozzi, Thomas R. [D-NY-3]

ID: S001201

Top Contributors

10

1
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
Organization ROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Aug 3, 2024
2
SCOTTO LLC
Organization WOODBURY, NY
$1,650
Aug 30, 2024
3
PATROON OPERATING CO. LLC
Organization NEW YORK, NY
$1,000
May 13, 2024
4
THE KLAR ORGANIZATION
Organization EAST MEADOW, NY
$1,000
Aug 8, 2024
5
TERIAN, OLIVIA
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$9,400
May 2, 2024
6
TERIAN, OLIVIA
OLIVIA TERIAN ART & DESIGN • BUSINESS OWNER
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Mar 8, 2024
7
MORAN, MARY
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
Individual GREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Mar 28, 2024
8
MORAN, MARY
Individual GREENWICH, CT
$6,600
May 2, 2024
9
FAIVUS, HARRY E.
MOUNT SINAI • PHYSICIAN
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$5,000
Oct 31, 2024
10
SOSNICK, AARON
Individual RENO, NV
$3,392
Jun 25, 2024

Rep. Gonzalez, Vicente [D-TX-34]

ID: G000581

Top Contributors

10

1
COMITE AMIGOS CHRISTOPHER - RIOS APONTE
Organization SAN JUAN, PR
$750
Aug 14, 2023
2
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
Organization CHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
3
TIGUA INDIAN RESERVATION - YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO
Organization EL PASO, TX
$3,000
May 21, 2024
4
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
Organization LIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 25, 2024
5
RODRIGUEZ FERRER, GERMAINE
Individual MIAMI BEACH, FL
$4,000
Nov 24, 2023
6
SORIA RIVERA, EDUARDO
Individual SAN JUAN, PR
$3,700
Nov 24, 2023
7
COLON EMERIC, LOURDES
PHMO LLC • PHYSICIAN
Individual SAN JUAN, PR
$3,300
Feb 28, 2023
8
DE LA CRUZ, ALBERTO
COCA COLA PR BOTTLERS • PRESIDENTE
Individual SAN JUAN, PR
$3,300
Feb 24, 2023
9
DE LA CRUZ, MARIA
HOME MAKER • HOME MAKER
Individual SAN JUAN, PR
$3,300
Feb 24, 2023
10
GONZALEZ, SOHAIRA
N/A • HOUSE WIFE
Individual AGUADA, PR
$3,300
Mar 17, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 30 nodes and 37 connections

Total contributions: $174,100

Top Donors - Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]

Showing top 12 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs10 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 50.8%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Introduction

Low 50.8%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Low 49.4%
Pages: 898-900

— 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner. — 867 — Federal Election Commission ENDNOTES 1. 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. 2. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). 3. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(c) and (d). 4. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, “A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,” 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 162. 5. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2). 6. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1). 7. Former Commissioner Steven Walther (2006–2022) was listed nominally as an independent but he was recommended to President George W. Bush for nomination by former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid (D) and almost always voted in line with the Democrat commissioners on the FEC. 8. Hans von Spakovsky served as a commissioner from 2006 to 2007 in a recess appointment. While no other nominee has been rejected by the Senate, the tradition of bipartisan voice vote confirmation has largely ended. Two Republican nominees—Allen Dickerson and Sean Cooksey—were confirmed on party-line votes in 2020. And one Democrat—Dara Lindenbaum—was confirmed with the support of only six Republican senators in 2022. 9. The term of the 6th Commissioner, Dara Lindenbaum (D), will expire on April 30, 2027. 10. 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(6). 11. “Statement of Chairman Allen J. Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. ‘Trey’ Trainor, III Regarding Concluded Enforcement Matters,” Federal Election Commission (May 13, 2022), https://www. fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/Redacted_Statement_Regarding_Concluded_Matters_13_ May_2022_Redacted.pdf. 12. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 13. It should be noted, however, that the constitutional authority of a President to, among other things, remove appointees and direct the actions of independent agencies is a hotly contested and increasingly litigated issue. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); and Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021). 14. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021–2022). 15. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, “A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,” 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 171. 16. Id.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.