The bill
China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025
HR. 1549, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/1549
Last Updated: July 17, 2026
Sponsored by
Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
ID: W000816
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$98,700 raised
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
71% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
July 23, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted exercise in bureaucratic hand-wringing. The bill's primary objective is to create the illusion of action against perceived Chinese financial threats while doing absolutely nothing to address them. It's a classic case of "study-itis," where lawmakers commission a report to avoid actual decision-making.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a study and issue a report on the exposure of the United States to China's financial sector within one year. This report will include an assessment of risks, policies to mitigate those risks, and recommendations for international cooperation. Oh, and it'll be unclassified, except for a classified annex that will likely contain the only interesting information.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Treasury Secretary, Federal Reserve Chairman, SEC Chairman, CFTC Chairman, and the Secretary of State. These individuals will engage in a delightful game of bureaucratic musical chairs, each trying to shift responsibility while appearing concerned about Chinese financial threats. Meanwhile, voters will be treated to a soothing narrative of "we're doing something" without any actual substance.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of legislative placebo effect. It's designed to make lawmakers and their constituents feel like they're addressing a pressing issue while accomplishing nothing tangible. The report will likely gather dust on some shelf, and the classified annex will be used as a convenient excuse for inaction.
In reality, this bill serves several purposes:
1. **Election-year posturing**: Lawmakers can now claim they're "tough on China" without actually doing anything. 2. **Bureaucratic CYA**: The report will provide a convenient shield against criticism, allowing lawmakers to say, "We studied the issue and took action." 3. **Lobbyist appeasement**: This bill will likely satisfy various special interest groups who want to appear concerned about Chinese financial threats without actually disrupting their lucrative relationships.
In conclusion, HR 1549 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo. It's a testament to the boundless creativity of lawmakers in crafting bills that accomplish nothing while making everyone feel good. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than analyze this drivel.
Related Topics
Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$98,700
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$3,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$95,400
No PAC contributions found
1
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
$3,300
No committee contributions found
1
FORD, GERALD J. MR.
$9,900
2
ZELTER, JAMES
$7,800
3
PRINCE, ZAN MRS.
$6,600
4
WOODARD, DONALD M. MR. JR.
$6,600
5
CARVALHO, ANNE MARIE MRS.
$6,600
6
ROWAN, CAROLYN
$6,600
7
ROWAN, MARC
$6,600
8
DUNIGAN, MIKE MR.
$6,000
9
LOWRANCE, DAN E. MR.
$5,000
10
NICHOLS, THOMAS B. MR.
$5,000
11
KLEINHEINZ, JOHN B. MR.
$5,000
12
KLEINMAN, SCOTT
$3,900
13
PATTERSON, DAN
$3,300
14
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W. MR.
$3,300
15
RODMAN, LANCE MR.
$3,300
16
REILLY, BEVERLY MRS.
$3,300
17
MCCLELLAND, MARK
$3,300
18
VINSON, JOHNNY H. MR. II
$3,300
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]
ID: G000583
Top Contributors
10
1
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$22,941
Apr 12, 2024
2
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$10,621
May 10, 2024
3
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
May 15, 2024
4
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 15, 2024
5
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 30, 2024
6
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$5,751
Apr 1, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SEKAS LAW GROUP LLC
OrganizationENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NJ
$1,500
Apr 12, 2024
9
SANDOR F. GENET & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
OrganizationNORTH MIAMI BEACH, FL
$250
Apr 12, 2024
10
FIRESTONE MILKEN, SARAH
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Jul 2, 2024
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024
Donor Network - Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 45 nodes and 27 connections (39 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $152,799
Top Donors - Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
1 Org18 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
- +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a) requires the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a study on exposure to China's financial sector, which could inform policies affecting commercial banks' operations and risk management, potentially benefiting them through enhanced regulatory clarity.
- +Investment Banking & Securitiesconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a) mandates a study on China's financial sector exposure, which may lead to policy recommendations impacting investment banks' cross-border activities and risk assessments, possibly benefiting them via improved market stability.
- +Insurance (P&C and Life)confidence 0.70
Section 2(a) includes assessment of risks to global financial systems, which could affect insurers' investment portfolios and underwriting risks; the resulting report may inform protective measures benefiting the industry.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
Introduction
High71.4%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
Introduction
High71.4%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Introduction
Moderate63.7%
Pages: 846-848
— 814 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Its beneficiaries have proven they can get adequate financing from private banks. EXIM’s charter expires at the end of 2026. The agency will close automatically unless Congress and the President decide to extend it. Closing EXIM should be one of the next Administration’s easiest decisions. Adopting a Multi-Pronged China Strategy. An effective American policy toward China needs to take a realistic view of the country, its leaders, their strengths, and the serious challenges they face. It should be comprehensive and flexible. A threatened CCP is dangerous, perhaps now more than at any time since Mao Tse-Tung, as Xi Jinping continues to use strong-arm tactics to consolidate his power and saber-rattling to challenge the international order. At the same time, recent revelations about China’s official statistics overstating its GDP by 30 percent track well with other problems that were already known.77 These include one of the world’s worst demographic aging curves thanks to China’s one-child policy; a population that may already be declining; an unsustainable debt load that is already causing problems; countless failed boondoggles, from empty cities to its underwhelming Belt-and-Road Initiative, that are wasting significant resources; Xi Jinping’s authoritarian turn; increasing state control of the economy; and a zero-COVID policy that has sabotaged the economy and driven away foreign investment.78 America has its problems, but it is in better shape than China on nearly every measure, especially in the long run. While the facts on the ground should inoculate the next Administration against the most strident China fearmongering circulating in the media and in Washington, that does not mean that the government in Beijing is no threat to American interests. The question is: What should we do about it? A serious China policy will require American policymakers to integrate doc- trines, institutional prerogatives, expertise, and realistic objectives. Traditional Cabinet-level bureaucracies like those at the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce will need to work together to pursue a comprehensive American strat- egy. Scores of incremental, narrowly targeted policies are necessary. They will not make for good soundbites on cable news, and many will operate slowly and out of sight from most news cycles even as progress is made. An effective China policy must also allow for adaptation because the CCP will not sit idly by. As people react to developments, America needs flexible options. Trade isolationism is inherently inflexible because it reduces the number of con- tact points with China. This is a tougher political sell than loud, simplistic jeremiads, but going the extra mile to solve these difficult coordination problems is vital to America’s interests. Trade and engagement with China are necessary if we are to contain the threats that China poses to its neighbors and to the U.S. The next Administration should: — 815 — Trade l End China’s developing-nation status in the WTO and other international organizations. China is an advanced manufacturing economy and should be treated as such, even if its political and legal institutions remain those of a developing nation, to prevent it from exploiting its status to gain special privileges. l Use a target, not a blanket. There should be actions against Chinese firms that are known to have engaged in unfair trade practices such as intellectual property theft. Rather than blanket tariffs or non-tariff barriers aimed at entire Chinese industry sectors, firms that act in bad faith should be targeted individually. This policy was employed to good effect early in the Trump Administration but was abandoned in favor of a less effective blanket tariff policy. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement might have been the Trump Administration’s biggest trade policy mistake. The TPP was already negotiated and would have strengthened an alliance against China, including most of its biggest trading partners in East Asia and the Americas. America’s departure created tensions and infighting, distracting the U.S. and its allies from the goal at hand: countering China. The other 11 TPP countries continue, without American input or influence, under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP) to develop a modern institutional framework to contain Chinese commercial imperialism. Rejoining this alliance should be a top priority in the next conservative Administration’s China policy. Accession negotiations are likely to be difficult, given that the CPATPP suspended several clauses that were important to the United States (such as provisions relating to patents and aspects of investor-state dispute resolution) when the U.S. pulled out of the TPP agreement in 2017. Diplomatic and economic pressure against Beijing will be more effective when its largest trading partners work in concert. Beijing’s diplomats will have a hard time employing a divide-and-conquer policy against a united front of the sort that the TPP offers. l Refocus the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity on trade. President Biden began the process to create IPEF in 2022, but any agreement will likely still be under negotiation when the next Administration takes office. IPEF is similar to the TPP, but its member
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.