Agricultural and Forestry Hauling Efficiency Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1487
Last Updated: October 10, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. McGuire, John [R-VA-5]

ID: M001239

Follow the money

The bill

Agricultural and Forestry Hauling Efficiency Act

HR. 1487, 119th Congress — read as touching Crop Producers.

The sponsor

Rep. McGuire, John [R-VA-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Agriculture" section, p. 344-346 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H845)

February 25, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, folks! The Agricultural and Forestry Hauling Efficiency Act (HR 1487) - a bill so innocuous-sounding, it's like a patient coming in with a " minor" case of Ebola.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose is to increase the maximum gross vehicle weight for certain agricultural vehicles operating on a segment of the Interstate System in Virginia. Oh, how noble! Because what America really needs is more 90,000-pound trucks barreling down our highways, spewing diesel fumes and crushing smaller vehicles like tin cans.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 127 of title 23, United States Code, by adding a new subsection that allows Virginia to issue special permits for covered agricultural vehicles (CAVs) to operate on the Interstate System at weights up to 90,000 pounds. Wow, what a coincidence! The exact same weight limit that benefits the trucking and agriculture lobbies.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

* Trucking companies and drivers who get to haul more cargo (and profits) * Agricultural interests in Virginia who'll enjoy reduced transportation costs * Lobbyists who've been greasing palms on Capitol Hill * And, of course, the poor souls driving smaller vehicles who'll have to dodge these behemoths

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's get real here. This bill is a classic case of "regulatory capture" - where special interests hijack policy for their own gain. The increased weight limit will lead to:

* More wear and tear on infrastructure (hello, taxpayer-funded repairs!) * Increased safety risks for other road users * Greater environmental impact from heavier trucks burning more fuel

The real disease here is the corruption of our legislative process by moneyed interests. This bill is a symptom of that disease - a cynical attempt to line the pockets of lobbyists and their clients at the expense of public safety and infrastructure.

Diagnosis: Terminal Stupidity, with complications of Greed and Corruption. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: None, because we're too busy treating the symptoms instead of the underlying illness.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

No campaign finance data available for Rep. McGuire, John [R-VA-5]

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Wittman, Robert J. [R-VA-1]

ID: W000804

Top Contributors

10

1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
PACADA, OK
$3,300
Jun 17, 2024
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
PACADA, OK
$3,300
Sep 30, 2024
3
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023
4
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Feb 8, 2024
5
KEHOE, MICHAEL PATRICK
IndividualRICHMOND, VA
$13,200
Jun 2, 2023
6
GIFFORD, BILLY
ALTRIA GROUP INC. • CEO
IndividualMIDLOTHIAN, VA
$6,600
Sep 26, 2023
7
PAYNE, DANIEL E.
PAYNE INC • CEO
IndividualFREDERICKSBURG, VA
$6,600
Nov 29, 2023
8
CASEY, ARTHUR S.
CASEY AUTO GROUP • PRESIDENT
IndividualNEWPORT NEWS, VA
$6,600
Mar 29, 2023
9
PAYNE, DANIEL E.
PAYNE INC • CEO
IndividualFREDERICKSBURG, VA
$6,600
Nov 29, 2023
10
KANTNER, CHRIS
UKROP'S FOOD GROUP • PRESIDENT
IndividualRICHMOND, VA
$6,600
Jan 12, 2024

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

10

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
IndividualROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELF • ACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATION • EXECUTIVE
IndividualTULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELF • MD
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELF • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Rep. Griffith, H. Morgan [R-VA-9]

ID: G000568

Top Contributors

10

1
BUNN, JAMES O.
CENTRAL COAL CO • MINING ENGINEER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Dec 18, 2024
2
CHARLES, DAVID
MOOD PRODUCTS GROUP LLC • EXECUTIVE
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Dec 4, 2023
3
HAMER, JONATHAN S.
MASTERY CONSULTING • BUSINESS CONSULTANT
IndividualRANCHO PALOS VERDES, CA
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023
4
JOURNAY, JUSTIN
3CHI • EXECUTIVE
IndividualFISHERS, IN
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023
5
PATEL, GOPESH
VLS PHARMACY INC • PHARMACIST
IndividualNEW HYDE PARK, NY
$3,300
Oct 26, 2023
6
RAY, RICHIE
RICHIE'S SPECIALTY PHARMACY • PHARMACIST
IndividualTHE WOODLANDS, TX
$3,300
Oct 27, 2023
7
RAY, RICHIE
RICHIE'S SPECIALTY PHARMACY • PHARMACIST
IndividualTHE WOODLANDS, TX
$3,300
Oct 27, 2023
8
WORLEY, JEFFREY
COLUMBIA CONSULTING • EXECUTIVE
IndividualARGYLE, TX
$3,300
Dec 6, 2023
9
BLUMENFELD, JACOB
QUEST MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC • REAL ESTATE
IndividualBALTIMORE, MD
$3,300
Feb 23, 2024
10
CRANE, DAVID
BOSE PUBLIC AFFAIRS GROUP • CONSULTANT
IndividualALEXANDRIA, VA
$3,300
Mar 6, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. McGuire, John [R-VA-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 11 nodes and 9 connections

Total contributions: $24,800

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Crop Producersconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(z)(1) allows Virginia to permit agricultural vehicles up to 90,000 lbs on Interstate System; Section 2(z)(2) defines covered agricultural vehicle as transporting unprocessed agricultural crops used for food, feed or fiber, benefiting crop producers via higher weight limits reducing transport costs.

  • +Agribusinessconfidence 0.85

    Same provisions benefit agribusiness involved in transporting unprocessed agricultural crops; increased weight limits improve logistics efficiency for large processors like ADM, Cargill, Bunge.

  • Increased weight limits for agricultural vehicles affect trucking and freight logistics; carriers may see demand changes for hauling agricultural products, though effect is niche to Virginia Interstate segment.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Agriculture

Strong
Vector: 60%
Pages: 344-346AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1487 aims to improve hauling efficiency and reduce transportation costs for Virginia farmers and forestry operators, which directly supports USDA objectives of strengthening the agricultural supply chain, boosting farm profitability, and enhancing rural economic resilience outlined in Project 2025’s Department of Agriculture section."

Key themes:agricultural efficiencyfarmer supportsupply chain resiliencetransportation cost reductionrural economic development

— 311 — Department of Agriculture ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 2. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System,” https://www.usda. gov/fst (accessed December 14, 2022). 3. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1. 4. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150 Years,” https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/ history (accessed December 16, 2022). 5. The law stated, “[T]here is hereby established at the seat of government of the United States a Department of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” Gladys L. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13, https://babel. hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33 (accessed December 16, 2022). 6. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p. 2. 7. Ibid., p. 2. 8. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, p. 3, https://www.usda.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 9. News release, “USDA Announces Framework for Shoring Up the Food Supply Chain and Transforming the Food System to Be Fairer, More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supply- chain-and-transforming (accessed December 14, 2022). 10. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System.” 11. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, pp. 1–2. 12. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Background on the U.S. Approach to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit,” August 4, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UN- Food-Systems-Summit.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 13. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,” https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/un- summit (accessed December 14, 2022). 14. Mark Bittman et al., “How a National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could- save-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html (accessed December 14, 2022); Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, “No, We Don’t Need to Transform the American Food System,” The Daily Signal, February 26, 2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/ no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/ (accessed December 14, 2022); and Daren Bakst, “Biden’s Food Conference Should Put People First, Not Environmental Extremism,” The Daily Signal, September 22, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-people- first-not-environmental-extremism/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 15. News release, “USDA to Invest Up to $300 Million in New Organic Transition Initiative,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 22, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300- million-new-organic-transition-initiative (accessed December 14, 2022). 16. Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s Green New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures, November 14, 2022, https://www. farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster (accessed December 16, 2022). 17. See, for example, Catherine Greene et al., “Growing Organic Demand Provides High-Value Opportunities for Many Types of Producers,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6, 2017, https://www. ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunities- for-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20 by%20the%20consumer (accessed December 14, 2022), and Andrea Carlson, “Investigating Retail Price Premiums for Organic Foods,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016, https://www.ers. usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/ (accessed December 16, 2022). Further, there are many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit of organic food. One — 312 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise meta study found that “[t]he published literature lacks strong evidence that organic foods are significantly more nutritious than conventional foods.” Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., “Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 5 (September 4, 2012), pp. 348–366, https:// www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007 (accessed December 16, 2022). 18. Steve Savage, “USDA Data Confirm Organic Yields Significantly Lower Than With Conventional Farming,” Genetic Literacy Project, February 16, 2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirm- organic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 19. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021, https://www.regulations. gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001 (accessed December 16, 2022). 20. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117–169. 21. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture (1948–2019),” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivity- growth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4 Percent of Disposable Income to 10.3 Percent in 2021,” July 15, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967 (accessed December 14, 2022). 23. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021, Table 1101, https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu- income-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No.176, April 5, 2017, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf. 24. Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA Slush Fund,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6052, February 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/ budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda. 25. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, Public Law 80–806. 26. Bakst and Sewall, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power.” 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021,” November 1, 2021, https://www. regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst (accessed December 16, 2022). 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program.” 30. Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606 (accessed December 16, 2022). 31. “Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall, 14 percent of U.S. farms participated in Federal crop insurance programs.” Christine Whitt, Noah Miller, and Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, pp. 24 and 26, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247. pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which apparently does not cover crop insurance, included payments beyond just commodity payments, such as conservation payments. 32. Randy Schnepf, “Farm Safety-Net Payments Under the 2014 Farm Bill: Comparison by Program Crop,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 11, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 33. Although livestock and specialty crop producers do receive some subsidies, former American Farm Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman captured the subsidy issue well. He “dismisse[d] outright the claim that farmers couldn’t survive without subsidy money. ‘Why does the livestock industry survive without subsidies?’ he ask[ed]. ‘Why does the specialty crop [fruit and vegetable] industry survive?’” Tamar Haspel, “Why Do Taxpayers Subsidize Rich Farmers?” The Washington Post, March 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d- f3d931db7f68_story.html (accessed March 18, 2023).

Department of Transportation

Strong
Vector: 56%
Pages: 661-663AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1487 grants Virginia authority to set higher weight limits for agricultural vehicles on interstates, reflecting the Project 2025 goal of reducing federal overreach and giving states more flexibility in highway management. This aligns with the emphasis on refocusing FHWA on core highway improvements and limiting federal involvement in local/state transportation decisions."

Key themes:state flexibilityreducing federal overreachhighway efficiencypractical infrastructure focusagricultural/forestry transportation

— 629 — Department of Transportation l Revoke the special waiver granted to California by the Biden Administration. California has no valid basis under the Clean Air Act to claim an extraordinary or unique air quality impact from carbon dioxide emissions, and EPCA is clear that under no circumstances may a state agency regulate fuel economy in place of DOT. The federal government should therefore exercise its preemptive authority over CARB and take all steps necessary to invalidate any inconsistent fuel economy requirements imposed by CARB, including its ban on sales of internal combustion engines. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has jurisdiction over the inter- state highway system, which is vital for the transportation of goods and people throughout the country. The FHWA, in conjunction with state DOTs, works to ensure the quality and safety of highways and bridges. However, over the course of decades, presidential Administrations and Con- gress have caused the FHWA to go beyond its original mission. The variety of infrastructure projects now eligible for funding through the FHWA include fer- ryboat terminals, hiking trails, bicycle lanes, and local sidewalks. In many cases, such projects should be the sole responsibility of local or state governments, not dependent on FHWA funding. For local projects, federal involvement adds red tape and bureaucratic delays rather than value. The Biden Administration has broadened the FHWA’s scope by emphasizing the priorities of progressive activists instead of pursuing practical goals. These policies include a focus on “equity,” a nebulous concept that in practice means awarding grants to favored identity groups, as well as imposing obligations on states concern- ing carbon dioxide emissions from highway traffic—areas not encompassed within FHWA’s statutory authorities. Furthermore, the Biden Administration’s embrace of the “Vision Zero” approach to safety often means actively seeking congestion for automobiles to reduce speeds. Finally, the Administration has sought to use a “guidance memo” to impose policies not enacted by Congress, most notably to make it harder for growing states to expand highway capacity. Instead, the next Administration should: l Seek to refocus the FHWA on maintaining and improving the highway system. l Remove or reform rules and regulations that hamper state governments. l Reduce the amount of federal involvement in local infrastructure decisions. — 630 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise AVIATION Americans value the ability to travel safely and inexpensively by air. In the United States, the private sector has developed the world’s safest, most effective passenger and cargo air transport networks. Current policies threaten to undo that legacy and to strangle the development of new technologies such as drones and “advanced air mobility,” including small aircraft to serve as air taxis or to conduct quiet vertical flights. Starting in the 1970s, deregulation and increased competition turned air travel from a luxury to an affordable travel option enjoyed by most Americans. The United States has four major airlines, each with roughly 20 percent of the domestic market. They compete with each other over the vast majority of routes. Several smaller carriers provide additional competition and other options for travelers. The current Administration’s policies are self-contradictory. In order to pla- cate specific labor groups, the Biden Administration not only opposes the growth of the major airlines, which would reduce the price of air travel, but also opposes measures—such as low-fare foreign competition and joint ventures of smaller U.S. carriers—that would increase competition. Another problematic area is aviation consumer protection. Congress has autho- rized DOT to prohibit specific “unfair and deceptive practices” in the airline industry after undertaking a hearing process—authority exercised by the Office of Aviation Consumer Protection within the General Counsel’s Office. Beginning with the Obama Administration, this authority has been used to justify broad new regulations—in the name of achieving “fair” competition—that would impose burdensome disclosure mandates and other costly requirements without a sufficient process for gathering supporting evidence. The Trump Administration reformed the process for issuing such “unfair and deceptive practices” rules,9 but the Biden Administration promptly reversed those reforms.10 A new Administration should restore them. In general, the next Administration should focus its efforts on making air travel more affordable and abundant, increasing safety, increasing competition to benefit the flying public, and removing obstacles to the rapid deployment of emerging aviation technologies that hold the promise of improved safety, compe- tition, opportunity, and growth. To achieve a more level playing field and increase options for the traveling public, the next Administration should: l Publicly indicate that a new Administration would support joint- venture efforts by smaller carriers (for example, Jet Blue and Spirit) to achieve scale necessary to reduce costs and compete more effectively with the larger carriers. l Review foreign ownership and control limitations and, if necessary, work with Congress to change existing statutes. Worldwide investors

Department of Transportation

Moderate
Vector: 58%
Pages: 661-663AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1487 and the Project 2025 DOT section both emphasize giving states greater flexibility over highway regulations and improving the efficiency of freight movement, aligning with the goal to refocus the FHWA on core highway functions and reduce federal overreach."

Key themes:state authorityhighway efficiencyreducing federal oversightfreight transportation

— 628 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise translate into a loss of auto industry jobs for American workers: It will also mean a significant increase in traffic deaths and injuries. As fewer new cars are purchased, the price of used cars will rise, and more Americans will be left driving older cars, which traffic statistics show are much less safe than newer vehicles. NHTSA itself has acknowledged that the Biden Administration’s fuel economy standards will generate hundreds of additional fatalities and thousands of additional injuries on U.S. highways. Because older cars also produce more harmful air pollution, the aging of America’s fleet will also have negative consequences for air quality. In addition, the Biden Administration’s efforts to accelerate EV sales by reg- ulatory fiat work against the national security interests of the United States in contravention of Congress’s goals under EPCA. Increasing the production of EVs will make the U.S. more dependent on China and other foreign countries that control the supply and processing of rare earth minerals that are needed for EV batteries. And the faster deployment of EVs will put a major strain on America’s vulnerable power grid, requiring large investments in critical infrastructure and a big boost in the nation’s electricity production, including from gas-fired and oil- fired power plants. In exchange for all of these harmful effects—on traffic safety, consumer choice, American jobs, the nation’s air quality, and U.S. national security—the Biden fuel economy regulations are predicted to have no meaningful effect on global tem- perature trends over the long term.8 The next Administration must return the federal fuel economy program to the limits established by Congress. The standards issued by NHTSA must be reset at reasonable levels that are technologically feasible for ICE automobiles and con- sistent with an increase in domestic auto production and healthy growth in the sale of safer and more affordable new vehicles. To achieve these goals, the next Administration should: l Reduce proposed fuel economy levels. The Administration should consider returning to the minimum average fuel economy levels specified by Congress for model year 2020 vehicles: levels aimed at achieving a fleet-wide average of 35 miles per gallon. Consideration should be given to maintaining the standards at those levels for the near term in order to promote the objectives laid out by Congress. l Ensure that DOT again exercises priority in the setting of fuel economy standards. Any EPA limits on carbon dioxide emissions, even if authorized under the Clean Air Act, must support and work in harmony with DOT standards and must not override them or usurp DOT’s regulatory role under EPCA. For example, EPA could regulate air conditioning systems and leave engine standards to DOT. — 629 — Department of Transportation l Revoke the special waiver granted to California by the Biden Administration. California has no valid basis under the Clean Air Act to claim an extraordinary or unique air quality impact from carbon dioxide emissions, and EPCA is clear that under no circumstances may a state agency regulate fuel economy in place of DOT. The federal government should therefore exercise its preemptive authority over CARB and take all steps necessary to invalidate any inconsistent fuel economy requirements imposed by CARB, including its ban on sales of internal combustion engines. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has jurisdiction over the inter- state highway system, which is vital for the transportation of goods and people throughout the country. The FHWA, in conjunction with state DOTs, works to ensure the quality and safety of highways and bridges. However, over the course of decades, presidential Administrations and Con- gress have caused the FHWA to go beyond its original mission. The variety of infrastructure projects now eligible for funding through the FHWA include fer- ryboat terminals, hiking trails, bicycle lanes, and local sidewalks. In many cases, such projects should be the sole responsibility of local or state governments, not dependent on FHWA funding. For local projects, federal involvement adds red tape and bureaucratic delays rather than value. The Biden Administration has broadened the FHWA’s scope by emphasizing the priorities of progressive activists instead of pursuing practical goals. These policies include a focus on “equity,” a nebulous concept that in practice means awarding grants to favored identity groups, as well as imposing obligations on states concern- ing carbon dioxide emissions from highway traffic—areas not encompassed within FHWA’s statutory authorities. Furthermore, the Biden Administration’s embrace of the “Vision Zero” approach to safety often means actively seeking congestion for automobiles to reduce speeds. Finally, the Administration has sought to use a “guidance memo” to impose policies not enacted by Congress, most notably to make it harder for growing states to expand highway capacity. Instead, the next Administration should: l Seek to refocus the FHWA on maintaining and improving the highway system. l Remove or reform rules and regulations that hamper state governments. l Reduce the amount of federal involvement in local infrastructure decisions.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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