International Nuclear Energy Financing Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]
ID: H001072
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real motivations behind HR 1474.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to promote nuclear energy globally by establishing a trust fund at international financial institutions like the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The stated goal is to support countries in developing their nuclear energy capabilities, while also countering China's and Russia's influence in this sector.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the International Financial Institutions Act to instruct the US Treasury Secretary to advocate for the removal of prohibitions on financial and technical assistance for nuclear energy projects that meet certain quality standards. It also establishes a trust fund at these institutions to provide financial and technical support for nuclear energy development.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the nuclear industry, international financial institutions, and governments seeking to expand their nuclear energy capabilities. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the ones who will ultimately foot the bill: taxpayers.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. It's not about promoting clean energy or reducing carbon emissions; it's about securing US influence and interests in the global nuclear market. The trust fund is essentially a slush fund for the nuclear industry, allowing them to peddle their wares to developing countries under the guise of "energy assistance."
The real disease here is corruption – the corrupting influence of money and power on our politicians. They're more concerned with lining the pockets of their donors than with addressing the actual energy needs of these countries.
This bill is a symptom of a larger problem: the US government's addiction to nuclear energy as a solution to its foreign policy woes. It's a Band-Aid approach, ignoring the underlying issues and instead opting for a quick fix that benefits only a select few.
In short, HR 1474 is a cynical attempt to prop up the nuclear industry while pretending to address global energy needs. It's a classic case of "follow the money" – and in this case, the money leads straight to the pockets of politicians and their corporate donors.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
No campaign finance data available for Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 375 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE) Mission/Overview The Office of Nuclear Energy’s “mission is to advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” It has five stated goals: “Enable continued operation of existing U.S. nuclear reactors,” “Enable deployment of advanced nuclear reactors,” “Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycles,” “Maintain U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology,” and “Enable a high-performing organization.”29 Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,30 the Office of Nuclear Energy “has also been responsible for the DOE’s statutory requirements to collect and dispose of spent nuclear fuel…since the Obama Administration’s dissolution of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.”31 Needed Reforms NE is too influential in driving the business decisions of commercial nuclear energy firms. Instead of focusing on a limited set of basic research and devel- opment activities that solve foundational technical issues that apply broadly to energy production, NE intervenes in nearly all aspects of the commercial nuclear energy industry. Absent wholesale reforms that restructure the federal energy and science bureaucracy to eliminate such functional energy offices, the next Admin- istration should: l Substantially limit NE’s size and scope. l Adopt broader regulatory and energy policy reforms that reduce regulatory obstacles, allow all energy sources to compete fairly in the marketplace, and establish a predictable policy environment. This will avoid unfair bias against the nuclear industry. New Policies NE should transition to a more limited scope of responsibilities that focuses on basic research, solving broadly applicable technology challenges, and solving the nuclear waste management issue as it relates to the development and deployment of advanced next-generation reactors, which can include small modular reactors (SMR). While respecting existing contractual obligations, NE should not initi- ate any new civilian reactor demonstration and commercialization projects. NE also should: l Focus on overcoming technical barriers that are preventing commercial reactor demonstration projects from moving forward. Any activities in support of existing nuclear plants and any other projects — 376 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise directed toward commercialization, including licensing support, should be shouldered by the private sector. l Reorganize its remaining activities into three basic lines of responsibility: nuclear fuels across the fuel cycle, reactor technology, and civilian radioactive waste. Budget The above reforms would cost substantially less than the $1,675,060,000 requested for FY 2023.32 Legislation such as the IIJA placed additional funding for new reactor demonstration projects outside of NE. These responsibilities and their associated funds should be moved to NE as appropriate. NE should not simply add or subtract programs, as some programs may help to support NE’s new priorities. The better approach would be to build a new budget and program strategy that accounts for related DOE programs and submit a new budget request reflecting NE’s new priorities. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT (FECM) Mission/Overview DOE is authorized by law to increase the conversion efficiency of all forms of fossil energy, reduce costs, improve environmental performance, and increase the energy security of the United States.33 In recent years, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) has been transformed from its statutory role of improving fossil energy pro- duction to one that is focused primarily on reducing the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel extraction, transport, and combustion. This change is reflected in the office’s new name, the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM), effective as of July 2021, and FECM’s mission: “to minimize the environmental impacts of fossil fuels while working towards net-zero emissions.”34 Needed Reforms l Eliminate carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) programs. Despite the recent expansion of the 45Q tax credit for carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) to $87 per ton, most carbon capture technology remains economically unviable, although private-sector innovations are on the horizon. CCUS programs should be left to the private sector to develop.35 If the office continues any CCUS research, that research should be focused more on innovative utilization. l Pursue the processing of critical minerals. Development of domestic critical material sources is important for national security, as the vast
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.