Prohibition on IOER Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/146
Last Updated: September 5, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

ID: D000626

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.

January 3, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant move by the geniuses in Congress. Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this masterpiece.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the title says it all - "Prohibition on IOER Act of 2025". How quaint. The main purpose is to prohibit Federal Reserve banks from paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). Wow, I bet the authors spent hours crafting that title. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to manipulate monetary policy and appease certain special interests.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Section 2 of the bill amends the Federal Reserve Act by inserting a few carefully crafted sentences that essentially prohibit Federal Reserve banks from paying interest on excess reserves. Oh, what a bold move! It's not like this will have any unintended consequences or create new problems. I mean, who needs interest on excess reserves when you can just magically make money appear? The changes to existing law are nothing more than a cleverly disguised attempt to restrict the Federal Reserve's ability to manage monetary policy.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Ah, the usual suspects - banks, financial institutions, and of course, the Federal Reserve itself. But let's not forget the real stakeholders: the politicians who will benefit from this bill, either directly or indirectly. I'm sure it's just a coincidence that certain lawmakers have received generous campaign contributions from banking interests.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Where do I even begin? This bill has all the hallmarks of a legislative trainwreck. By restricting the Federal Reserve's ability to pay interest on excess reserves, Congress is essentially tying its hands behind its back. This will lead to reduced liquidity in the financial system, potentially causing credit markets to freeze and economic growth to slow. But hey, who needs economic growth when you can score cheap political points?

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a bad case of " Politician-itis" - a disease characterized by short-sightedness, special interest pandering, and a complete disregard for the long-term consequences of one's actions.

Treatment: I'd prescribe a healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong injection of reality. Unfortunately, this bill is likely to pass, and we'll all get to enjoy the thrilling ride of watching our economy suffer as a result.

Prognosis: Poor. Very poor.

Related Topics

Civil Rights & Liberties Transportation & Infrastructure National Security & Intelligence Congressional Rules & Procedures Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Small Business & Entrepreneurship State & Local Government Affairs Government Operations & Accountability Federal Budget & Appropriations
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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$105,400
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$105,400

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
PHELAN, BRENT J
2 transactions
$11,600
2
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
1 transaction
$6,600
3
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
1 transaction
$6,600
4
FISHER, KENNETH
1 transaction
$6,600
5
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
GROW, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
7
ROBINSON, ROBERT S
1 transaction
$6,600
8
BEAMAN, LEE
1 transaction
$6,600
9
RICKETTS, J. PETER
1 transaction
$6,600
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
1 transaction
$5,800
11
BECKETT, JOHN
1 transaction
$5,000
12
BECKHAM, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$5,000
13
WEAVER, TIMOTHY J
1 transaction
$5,000
14
BROPHY, DAN
1 transaction
$3,500
15
BROPHY, CARLEEN
1 transaction
$3,500
16
PETRELLI, JOSEPH L.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
GREWAL, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
18
JOHN, POWELL
1 transaction
$3,300
19
SMITH, KRISTIN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

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Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 20 nodes and 20 connections

Total contributions: $105,400

Top Donors - Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

19 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Moderate 62.4%
Pages: 773-775

— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).

Introduction

Moderate 61.0%
Pages: 767-769

— 734 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to influence monetary policy.12 Since then, these assets have exploded, and the Federal Reserve now owns nearly $9 trillion of mainly federal debt ($5.5 trillion)13 and mortgage-backed securities ($2.6 trillion).14 There is currently no government oversight of the types of assets that the Federal Reserve purchases. These purchases have two main effects: They encourage federal deficits and support politically favored markets, which include housing and even corporate debt. Over half of COVID-era deficits were monetized in this way by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of Treasuries, and housing costs were driven to historic highs by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage securities. Together, this policy subsidizes government debt, starving business borrowing, while rewarding those who buy homes and certain corporations at the expense of the wider public. Federal Reserve balance sheet purchases should be limited by Congress, and the Federal Reserve’s existing balance sheet should be wound down as quickly as is prudent to levels similar to what existed historically before the 2008 global financial crisis.15 l Limit future balance sheet expansions to U.S. Treasuries. The Federal Reserve should be prohibited from picking winners and losers among asset classes. Above all, this means limiting Federal Reserve interventions in the mortgage-backed securities market. It also means eliminating Fed interventions in corporate and municipal debt markets. Restricting the Fed’s open market operations to Treasuries has strong economic support. The goal of monetary policy is to provide markets with needed liquidity without inducing resource misallocations caused by interfering with relative prices, including rates of return to securities. However, Fed intervention in longer-term government debt, mortgage- backed securities, and corporate and municipal debt can distort the pricing process. This more closely resembles credit allocation than liquidity provision. The Fed’s mortgage-related activities are a paradigmatic case of what monetary policy should not do. Consider the effects of monetary policy on the housing market. Between February 2020 and August 2022, home prices increased 42 percent.16 Residential property prices in the United States adjusted for inflation are now 5.8 percent above the prior all-time record levels of 2006.17 The home-price-to-median-income ratio is now 7.68, far

Introduction

Moderate 61.0%
Pages: 767-769

— 734 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to influence monetary policy.12 Since then, these assets have exploded, and the Federal Reserve now owns nearly $9 trillion of mainly federal debt ($5.5 trillion)13 and mortgage-backed securities ($2.6 trillion).14 There is currently no government oversight of the types of assets that the Federal Reserve purchases. These purchases have two main effects: They encourage federal deficits and support politically favored markets, which include housing and even corporate debt. Over half of COVID-era deficits were monetized in this way by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of Treasuries, and housing costs were driven to historic highs by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage securities. Together, this policy subsidizes government debt, starving business borrowing, while rewarding those who buy homes and certain corporations at the expense of the wider public. Federal Reserve balance sheet purchases should be limited by Congress, and the Federal Reserve’s existing balance sheet should be wound down as quickly as is prudent to levels similar to what existed historically before the 2008 global financial crisis.15 l Limit future balance sheet expansions to U.S. Treasuries. The Federal Reserve should be prohibited from picking winners and losers among asset classes. Above all, this means limiting Federal Reserve interventions in the mortgage-backed securities market. It also means eliminating Fed interventions in corporate and municipal debt markets. Restricting the Fed’s open market operations to Treasuries has strong economic support. The goal of monetary policy is to provide markets with needed liquidity without inducing resource misallocations caused by interfering with relative prices, including rates of return to securities. However, Fed intervention in longer-term government debt, mortgage- backed securities, and corporate and municipal debt can distort the pricing process. This more closely resembles credit allocation than liquidity provision. The Fed’s mortgage-related activities are a paradigmatic case of what monetary policy should not do. Consider the effects of monetary policy on the housing market. Between February 2020 and August 2022, home prices increased 42 percent.16 Residential property prices in the United States adjusted for inflation are now 5.8 percent above the prior all-time record levels of 2006.17 The home-price-to-median-income ratio is now 7.68, far — 735 — Federal Reserve above the prior record high of 7.0 set in 2005.18 The mortgage-payment-to- income ratio hit 43.3 percent in August 2022—breaking the highs of the prior housing bubble in 2008.19 Mortgage payment on a median-priced home (with a 20 percent down payment) jumped to $2,408 in the autumn of 2022 vs. $1,404 just one year earlier as home prices continued to rise even as mortgage rates more than doubled. Renters have not been spared: Median apartment rental costs have jumped more than 24 percent since the start of 2021.20 Numerous cities experienced rent increases well in excess of 30 percent. A primary driver of higher costs during the past three years has been the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Since March 2020, the Federal Reserve has driven down mortgage interest rates and fueled a rise in housing costs by purchasing $1.3 trillion of MBSs from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The $2.7 trillion now owned by the Federal Reserve is nearly double the levels of March 2020. The flood of capital from the Federal Reserve into MBSs increased the amount of capital available for real estate purchases while lower interest rates on mortgage borrowing—driven down in part by the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases— induced and enabled borrowers to take on even larger loans.21 The Federal Reserve should be precluded from any future purchases of MBSs and should wind down its holdings either by selling off the assets or by allowing them to mature without replacement. l Stop paying interest on excess reserves. Under this policy, also started during the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve effectively prints money and then “borrows” it back from banks rather than those banks’ lending money to the public. This amounts to a transfer to Wall Street at the expense of the American public and has driven such excess reserves to $3.1 trillion, up seventyfold since 2007.22 The Federal Reserve should immediately end this practice and either sell off its balance sheet or simply stop paying interest so that banks instead lend the money. Congress should bring back the pre-2008 system, founded on open-market operations. This minimizes the Fed’s power to engage in preferential credit allocation. MONETARY RULE REFORM OPTIONS While the above recommendations would reduce Federal Reserve manipulation and subsidies, none would limit the inflationary and recessionary cycles caused by the Federal Reserve. For that, major reform of the Federal Reserve’s core activity of manipulating interest rates and money would be needed. A core problem with government control of monetary policy is its exposure to two unavoidable political pressures: pressure to print money to subsidize

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.