TICKET Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1402
Last Updated: July 12, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Bilirakis, Gus M. [R-FL-12]

ID: B001257

Follow the money

The bill

TICKET Act

HR. 1402, 119th Congress — read as touching Entertainment & Streaming.

The sponsor

Rep. Bilirakis, Gus M. [R-FL-12]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$74,300 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 859-862 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Read twice. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 163.

September 15, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of congressional theater, designed to distract the masses while lining the pockets of special interests. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The TICKET Act claims to promote transparency in event ticketing by requiring sellers to disclose comprehensive information about ticket prices and related fees. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, attempting to address the symptoms of a much larger disease: the stranglehold of corporate interests on the ticketing industry.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill's main provisions include:

1. All-inclusive ticket price disclosure (because who doesn't love surprise fees?) 2. A ban on speculative ticketing (except for those with "actual or constructive possession" – wink, wink) 3. Disclosures about secondary market ticket sales and refund policies 4. Refund requirements for canceled or postponed events

These provisions are nothing more than a weak attempt to regulate an industry that has been allowed to run amok. The real issue is the lack of competition and the dominance of a few large players, which this bill does nothing to address.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

1. Ticketing companies (e.g., Live Nation, Ticketmaster) 2. Secondary market ticket sellers 3. Event promoters and venues 4. Consumers (who will likely see little to no actual benefit from these changes)

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

* This bill will do nothing to address the root causes of high ticket prices and fees. * The "transparency" provisions will be easily circumvented by clever marketing and fine print. * The speculative ticketing ban is a joke, as it only applies to those without "actual or constructive possession" – a loophole big enough to drive a truck through. * Consumers will still be gouged by exorbitant fees and prices, but now with the added "benefit" of knowing exactly how much they're being ripped off.

In conclusion, the TICKET Act is a classic example of legislative theater, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo. It's a symptom of a larger disease: the corrupting influence of special interests on our government and the willingness of politicians to prioritize profits over people.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Bilirakis, Gus M. [R-FL-12]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$74,300
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$6,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$67,700

No PAC contributions found

1
COOL MASTER PRO LLC
1 transaction
$6,600

No committee contributions found

1
OF FLORIDA, SEMINOLE TRIBE
2 transactions
$6,600
2
MENG, BEN
2 transactions
$6,600
3
ARTECHE, LEON
1 transaction
$5,000
4
LAGOS, JAMES H.
1 transaction
$3,300
5
RICE, WILLIAM LLOYD
1 transaction
$3,300
6
WANEK, RON
1 transaction
$3,300
7
WANEK, TODD
1 transaction
$3,300
8
WANEK, JOYCE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
WANEK, KAREN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
HEPSCHER, WILLIAM S
1 transaction
$3,300
11
YOUNG, JENNIFER
1 transaction
$3,300
12
REAL, JUAN C
1 transaction
$3,300
13
MALONE, KEVIN P
1 transaction
$3,300
14
HUENINK, JEFF
1 transaction
$3,300
15
KAVOUKLIS, EDIE
1 transaction
$3,300
16
KAVOUKLIS, NICHOLAS
1 transaction
$3,300
17
ARISON, MICKY
1 transaction
$3,300
18
ARISON, MADELEINE
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Schakowsky, Janice D. [D-IL-9]

ID: S001145

Top Contributors

10

1
MILLS, MARTHA
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,500
Jan 18, 2024
2
STASCH, JULIA
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,500
Jan 4, 2024
3
PARETSKY, SARA
SELF-EMPLOYED • AUTHOR
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,500
May 3, 2024
4
CHIA, STAN
VIVID SEATS • CEO
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Oct 18, 2023
5
CLIFFORD, ROBERT
SELF • ATTORNEY
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2023
6
CONWAY, KEVIN
COONEY & CONWAY • ATTORNEY
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Dec 10, 2023
7
COONEY, ROBERT
COONEY AND CONWAY • ATTORNEY
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Dec 10, 2023
8
CORBOY, PHILIP H. JR.
CORBOY & DEMETRIO • ATTORNEY
IndividualWINNETKA, IL
$3,300
Dec 24, 2023
9
FAHEY, WILLIAM
COONEY AND CONWAY • ATTORNEY
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Dec 18, 2023
10
HEBEISEN, KEITH
CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES • ATTORNEY
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Dec 10, 2023

Rep. Goldman, Craig [R-TX-12]

ID: G000601

Top Contributors

10

1
ALLEN BOONE HUMPHRIES ROBINSON LLP
OrganizationHOUSTON, TX
$3,300
Dec 21, 2023
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$3,300
May 23, 2024
3
BENDA, ROBERT D.
WESTWOOD CONTRACTORS INC. • CEO
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Nov 9, 2023
4
BENDA, ROBERT D.
WESTWOOD CONTRACTORS INC. • CEO
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Nov 9, 2023
5
CAMPBELL, CODY
DOUBLE EAGLE ENERGY • FOUNDER AND CO-CEO
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Dec 31, 2023
6
CAMPBELL, CODY
DOUBLE EAGLE ENERGY • FOUNDER AND CO-CEO
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Dec 31, 2023
7
HOLM, NELSON
RENEGADE SWISH • PARTNER
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Nov 13, 2023
8
HOLM, NELSON
RENEGADE SWISH • PARTNER
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Nov 13, 2023
9
KLEINHEINZ, BURKE
WELLTOWER • INVESTMENTS
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Dec 21, 2023
10
KLEINHEINZ, BURKE
WELLTOWER • INVESTMENTS
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Dec 21, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Bilirakis, Gus M. [R-FL-12]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 39 nodes and 27 connections (31 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $98,000

Top Donors - Rep. Bilirakis, Gus M. [R-FL-12]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

1 Org18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.

  • The bill imposes disclosure and refund requirements on ticket issuers, secondary market ticket issuers, and exchanges, which includes platforms that sell tickets for concerts, theatrical performances, sporting events, and similar live activities—core to the entertainment and streaming industry's live event ticketing operations (e.g., Ticketmaster, Live Nation, and resale platforms like StubHub). Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 mandate price transparency, ban speculative ticketing, require affiliation di

  • Broadcast and print media companies often promote and advertise live events (concerts, sports, theater) and may operate or partner with ticketing platforms. The bill's restrictions on using terms like 'official' without partnership agreements (Sec. 4(2)) and prohibiting venue names in URLs without authorization (Sec. 4(3)) directly affect how media entities can promote events, potentially limiting promotional practices and increasing legal review burdens.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Weak
Vector: 61%
Pages: 859-862AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The TICKET Act focuses on consumer protection and transparency in event ticketing, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses FTC reform, state AG cooperation, and opposition to ESG-related antitrust strategies—there is minimal thematic overlap beyond both involving the FTC."

Key themes:FTCconsumer protectionstate AG cooperation

— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 59%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The TICKET Act imposes new transparency and disclosure requirements on ticket sellers, whereas the Project 2025 financial regulatory agenda generally seeks to reduce disclosure burdens and limit agency overreach in financial markets. Both touch on transparency and consumer protection, but the sectors and policy directions differ significantly."

Key themes:transparencydisclosure requirementsconsumer protectionfederal oversight

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 59%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the TICKET Act and the Project 2025 financial regulatory agenda emphasize consumer protection through transparency and disclosure requirements, but the TICKET Act targets event ticket sales (enforced by the FTC) rather than financial products or the specific agencies (SEC, CFTC, CFPB, OCC) highlighted in Project 2025."

Key themes:consumer protectiontransparency/disclosurefederal enforcementanti-deceptive practices

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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