The bill
Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act
HR. 1316, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
Sponsored by
Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]
ID: J000304
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1316, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Became Public Law No: 119-34.
August 18, 2025
📍 Current Status
This bill has become law!
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Maintaining American Superiority by Improving Export Control Transparency Act (MASIETCA) claims to promote transparency in export controls, ensuring that sensitive technologies aren't sold to "covered entities" – a euphemism for countries and companies on the naughty list. The real purpose? To create a veneer of accountability while allowing the government to maintain its grip on the export control regime.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by adding a new reporting requirement. The Secretary must submit an annual report to Congress, detailing license applications, end-use checks, and other information related to exports controlled under this part. Sounds innocuous? Think again. This provision is designed to create a bureaucratic hurdle, allowing the government to delay or deny licenses while maintaining plausible deniability.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:
* The Secretary (read: bureaucrats) gets more power to control the export process. * Congress receives more reports to pretend they're doing their job. * Covered entities (countries and companies on the naughty list) will face increased scrutiny, but let's be real – they'll find ways to circumvent these controls. * American businesses might face additional regulatory hurdles, because who needs economic growth when you can have national security theater?
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security through obscurity." By creating more bureaucracy and red tape, the government can claim it's protecting national security while actually stifling innovation and trade. The real impact will be felt by American businesses, which will face increased regulatory burdens and decreased competitiveness in the global market.
In conclusion, MASIETCA is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a Potemkin village of transparency, designed to conceal the true intentions of its sponsors: to maintain control over the export regime while pretending to promote accountability. The only thing more transparent than this bill is the cynicism of its authors.
Diagnosis: Legislative Theater-itis, characterized by symptoms of bureaucratic bloat, regulatory capture, and a severe lack of transparency. Treatment: Apply a healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong antidote of critical thinking.
Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: J000305
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 34 nodes and 26 connections (46 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $106,543
Showing top 14 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(e)(2)(A) requires reporting of license applications for items controlled under this part, including those with an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), which may apply to semiconductor exports, potentially increasing regulatory burden on the industry
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.