The bill
Protecting Privacy in Purchases Act
HR. 1181, 119th Congress — read as touching Firearms & Ammunition.
Sponsored by
Rep. Moore, Riley [R-WV-2]
ID: M001235
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1181, 119th Congress — read as touching Firearms & Ammunition.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 882-884 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
July 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Protecting Privacy in Purchases Act" (HR 1181) claims to prohibit payment card networks and covered entities from requiring or assigning merchant category codes that distinguish firearms retailers from other merchants. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to shield the gun industry from scrutiny and accountability.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits payment card networks and covered entities from using specific merchant category codes for firearms retailers, effectively making it more difficult to track suspicious transactions or identify potential illegal activities. It also establishes an enforcement mechanism, because, of course, we need more bureaucratic red tape. The Attorney General will investigate complaints, send written notices, and potentially seek injunctions – a veritable plethora of toothless measures designed to appease the gun lobby.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Firearms retailers, payment card networks, covered entities, and the Attorney General's office are all impacted by this bill. But let's be real, the true beneficiaries are the gun manufacturers and dealers who will continue to peddle their wares with impunity. The rest of us? We're just collateral damage in the never-ending battle to prioritize profits over public safety.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease – the corrupting influence of special interest groups on our legislative process. By obscuring transactions related to firearms, we're essentially allowing the gun industry to operate with greater secrecy and less accountability. The potential consequences? More guns on the streets, more lives lost, and more families torn apart by senseless violence. But hey, at least the gun lobby will be happy.
In conclusion, HR 1181 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, designed to protect the interests of the gun industry at the expense of public safety. It's a cynical ploy, crafted by politicians who are more concerned with appeasing their donors than with serving the greater good. So, let's call this bill what it truly is: a cowardly attempt to prioritize profits over people, wrapped in a thin veneer of "privacy protection." How delightful.
Rep. Moore, Riley [R-WV-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: B001282
Top Contributors
22
ID: H001067
Top Contributors
23
ID: B001314
Top Contributors
21
ID: C001118
Top Contributors
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ID: P000605
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ID: V000134
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ID: G000558
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ID: C001129
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ID: F000475
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ID: M001212
Top Contributors
45
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 29 nodes and 35 connections
Total contributions: $35
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(a) prohibits payment card networks and covered entities from requiring or assigning merchant category codes that distinguish firearms retailers from general-merchandise retailers or sporting-goods retailers, which prevents discrimination in payment processing and benefits firearms retailers by ensuring equal treatment in transaction systems.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the FCC section involve regulating private sector entities to achieve policy goals, but they address different subjects (firearms purchase privacy vs. universal service funding and national security)."
— 850 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrude— unlawfully in their view—on the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCC’s roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agency’s affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumers’ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal government’s universal service investments—using those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profits—these large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCC’s current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCC’s current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCC’s universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the program’s entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal government’s existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting America’s National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national — 851 — Federal Communications Commission security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During that time, the FCC eliminated federal subsidies for telecommunications equipment from Huawei and ZTE, thereby greatly reducing the chances of that equipment finding a way into our nation’s communications networks. The FCC also stood up a program to rip and replace insecure network gear to ensure that it did not remain a threat lurking inside our systems. The FCC revoked or denied the licenses of carriers like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, which presented unacceptable national security risks. There are, however, additional strong actions that the FCC can and should take to address the CCP’s malign campaign. Specifically: l Address TikTok’s threat to U.S. national security. As law enforcement officials have made clear, TikTok poses a serious and unacceptable risk to America’s national security.22 It also provides Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans. As of this writing, the Biden Administration’s Treasury Department has not announced a final decision concerning its long-pending review of TikTok. If that inaction persists, or if the Administration allows TikTok to continue to operate in the U.S., a new Administration should ban the application on national security grounds. l Expand the FCC’s Covered List. The FCC maintains a list of communications equipment and services that pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. It is known as the Covered List.23 Huawei is one of the companies on the Covered List, and its inclusion means that the FCC will no longer review or approve new applications from Huawei. Without FCC approval, new Huawei gear cannot be lawfully sold or used in the U.S. However, the FCC must do a better job of ensuring that its Covered List stays up to date and accounts for changes in corporate names and forms. Therefore, a new Administration should create a more regular and timely process for reviewing entities with ties to the CCP’s surveillance state. l End the unregulated end run. As noted above, China Telecom and similar entities have been banned from operating in the U.S. in a manner that would require an FCC license or authorization because of the national security risks that those entities pose. However, many of these same entities are still operating in the U.S. and offering services very similar to the ones that they are prohibited from providing. China Telecom, for instance, continues to provide services to data centers by offering the services on a private or “unregulated” basis. A new Administration should work with the FCC to close this loophole. One way to do so would be for the FCC to prohibit any regulated carrier from interconnecting with an insecure provider.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 intelligence community section address privacy concerns, but the bill focuses on consumer transaction privacy for firearms purchases while the policy emphasizes intelligence classification, declassification, and protecting undercover officers' identities, resulting only a tangential connection."
— 224 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Enhanced metrics for accuracy of classification. l A general simplification of the overall system for the benefit of users. On the back end, an ODNI-run declassification process that is faster, nimbler, default-to-automated, and larger-scale should be a priority. Additionally, investments in IT are required to deal with the growing volumes of CNSI collected and produced in the digital age, along with many years’ worth of existing analog and digital holdings that could provide valuable historical insights. An incoming Administration needs to explore options to prioritize funding for innovation in declassification management: for example, by establishing a budget line item specifically for the modernization of declassification or designating fund- ing for program classification management as a special-interest item. The Administration will also need to transition to using technology, including tools and services for managing Big Data (which provide a robust electronic record repository, making information within and across agencies easier to organize and locate and facilitating more rapid review and release capabilities for records of emerging interest); artificial intelligence/machine learning (which, when incor- porated into existing business practices, enables machine interpretation of unstructured text and data, applies decision support technology to enable more consistent classification decisions, and expedites reviews between agencies); and expansion of Commercial Cloud services (which facilitate the rapid testing and deployment of new tools and technologies). However, technology is not a panacea; human expertise in information holdings and routine validation of the technology will always be necessary. With or with- out machine assistance, agencies will require more people and more varied skill sets to improve their ability to meet the electronic records era’s classification and declassification demands and serve an incoming Administration’s goals. Broader U.S. Government and IC Intelligence Needs. Increasingly, con- flicts among U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are conducted in the realms of technology and finance.40 This challenge requires new tools, authorities, and technological expertise across the U.S. government, par- ticularly at the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is housed at the Treasury Department. An incoming conservative President should task his DNI and Secretary of Commerce with increasing coordination, the resources needed for BIS and SCIF capacity, and proper and necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of multifaceted adversaries such as China. This would include additional work with private-sector expertise, granting clearances to niche sector experts and United States citizen commercial and financial partners as needed. — 225 — Intelligence Community Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operat- ing under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help them succeed. In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets. Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S. companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its succes- sor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothet- ical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S., suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy regulations. In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-At- lantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges. Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activi- ties,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelli- gence programs. An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for
AI Analysis:
"The bill concerns prohibiting merchant category codes for firearms retailers to protect purchase privacy, whereas the Project 2025 HHS section addresses caregiver strategy, telehealth licensure, contraceptive mandate exemptions, and women's preventive services; there is no substantive policy overlap."
— 483 — Department of Health and Human Services l Readdress the National Strategy to Support Family Caregivers. While in theory the strategy aims to support family members with duties to care for older family members, the plan is overly focused on racial and “LGBTQ+ equity.” The strategy should be examined to establish an efficient plan to support caregivers and their families. There should also be a review of its COVID-19 policies. HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (HRSA) l Congress should allow CMS to use the 340B data that HRSA collects rather than having CMS conduct its own survey, especially in view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s American Hospital Association v. Becerra decision.69 The legislation should also create penalties for those who do not respond to HRSA’s data collection. l Legally define the locus of service as where the provider is located during the telehealth visit rather than where the patient is. With such a definition, states could continue to reserve their powers to establish the standards for licensure and scope of practice. The providers could ensure continuity and consistency of care no matter where their patients might move while maintaining the licenses that make the most sense for them. Americans are far more mobile and technologically advanced today than they were when most health care laws were written. Telehealth has become increasingly important, particularly during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also has great potential in rural and other areas where there are shortages of health care providers. HRSA’s Office for the Advancement of Telehealth includes a program known as the Licensure Portability Grant Program, which bolsters state efforts to reform licensing laws to maximize telehealth flexibility. HRSA does not have the authority through this office to dictate licensure laws; that power has typically been reserved to the states. However, telehealth across state lines, when permitted, is interstate commerce, which can be regulated by the federal government according to the Constitution. l Restore Trump religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate (also a CMS rule). HHS should rescind, if finalized, the regulation titled “Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,” proposed jointly by HHS, Treasury, and Labor.70 This rule proposes to amend Trump-era final rules regarding religious and moral exemptions and accommodations for coverage of certain preventive services under the ACA. Preventive services include contraception, and — 484 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise it appears the proposed rule would change the existing regulations for religious and moral exemptions to the ACA’s contraception mandate. There is no need for further rulemaking that curtails existing exemptions and accommodations. l Require HRSA to use rulemaking to update the women’s preventive services mandate. The contraceptive mandate issued under Obamacare has been the source of years of egregious attacks on many Americans’ religious and moral beliefs. The mandate was issued as part of the women’s preventive services guidelines, which were issued without any rulemaking that involved public notice and an opportunity to comment. Instead, HRSA issued and changed the mandate by simply posting changes to its website. HRSA also started off not requiring coverage of fertility awareness–based methods of family planning, then requiring them, and then removing the requirement without notifying the public. A federal judge recently ruled that this failure to undergo notice and comment in issuing the mandate is unlawful. HRSA should be required to repromulgate any women’s preventive services mandates through the notice and comment process that is compliant with the Administrative Procedures Act. Moreover, since the Obama Administration HRSA entered into long- term contracts with the pro-abortion American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and related entities to serve as an exclusive adviser with respect to the content of this mandate, HRSA has used this arrangement to ignore comments that members of the public were sometimes able to submit in the process, and ACOG has abused its position to attack HHS’s allowance of religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. HHS should rescind these contracts and establish an advisory committee that is compliant with the Federal Advisory Committee Act and has members that are committed to women’s preventive services and are not pro-abortion ideologues. l Expand inclusion of fertility awareness–based methods and supplies to family planning in the women’s preventive services mandate. The ACA requires coverage of and prevents insurance plans from imposing any cost-sharing requirements on women who obtain preventive care and screenings as defined by HRSA. In 2016, HHS included “instruction in fertility awareness-based methods” as part of this requirement. However, in December 2021, HHS removed that language from its list without using the notice-and-comment process or giving any rationale, both of which are mandated by the Administrative Procedures Act. In August
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.