No Free Rent for Freeloaders Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/115
Last Updated: December 10, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

ID: B001302

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

January 3, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Mr. Biggs of Arizona. The "No Free Rent for Freeloaders Act of 2025" - because who doesn't love a good dose of populist pandering?

Let's dissect this farce, shall we? This bill is an exercise in grandstanding, masquerading as a serious attempt to address the alleged scourge of public housing freeloaders. But what's really at play here?

The total funding amounts and budget allocations are a joke. The bill doesn't even bother to specify actual numbers, instead relying on vague language about "amounts made available" for the Management and Administration account of HUD. How convenient.

As for key programs and agencies receiving funds, it's all just a smokescreen. The real beneficiaries here are the politicians who get to tout this bill as a tough-on-welfare measure, while actually doing nothing to address the root causes of poverty or housing insecurity.

Notable increases or decreases? Ha! This bill is a masterclass in creative accounting. By rescinding funds from HUD's Management and Administration account based on some arbitrary formula, the sponsors get to claim they're "cracking down" on waste, while actually just shuffling money around like a shell game.

And then there are the riders - because what's an appropriations bill without a few poison pills? This one comes with a lovely side of bureaucratic red tape, mandating that HUD's Inspector General publish annual reports on noncompliance with community service requirements. Because, you know, that's exactly what we need more of: paperwork and busywork.

Fiscal impact and deficit implications? *chuckles* Oh boy, this is where it gets good. By "rescinding" funds from HUD's account, the bill creates a nice little accounting gimmick to make it seem like they're saving money. Meanwhile, the actual cost of implementing these new requirements will likely far exceed any theoretical savings.

In short, this bill is a textbook case of legislative malpractice - a cynical exercise in grandstanding, designed to pander to voters while accomplishing nothing meaningful. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, and I'm not buying it. Next patient, please!

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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$116,250
26 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$116,250

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
GRAINGER, DAMON
2 transactions
$6,870
2
MCBRIDE, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$6,870
3
BENNETT, HEATHER
1 transaction
$6,600
4
COX, HOWARD
1 transaction
$6,600
5
SCOTT, MARILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
SEYMORE, GARY W
1 transaction
$6,600
7
TAYLOR, MARGARETTA J
2 transactions
$6,600
8
BENSON, LEE
2 transactions
$6,600
9
MATTEO, CHRIS
1 transaction
$5,000
10
CASSELS, W.T. JR.
1 transaction
$3,500
11
CASSELS, W TOBIN III
1 transaction
$3,500
12
ARIAIL, BRANDI C
1 transaction
$3,500
13
FLOYD, KAREN KANES
1 transaction
$3,500
14
SIMPSON, DARWIN H
1 transaction
$3,500
15
JOHNSON, NEIL
1 transaction
$3,435
16
KUMAR, DHAVAL
1 transaction
$3,435
17
LEE, LUCIAN
1 transaction
$3,435
18
RAHM, CHRISTINA
1 transaction
$3,435
19
THOMAS, CLAYTON
1 transaction
$3,435
20
EZELL, SHAWN
1 transaction
$3,435
21
MCCLEVE, LONNIE
1 transaction
$3,300
22
FAUST, ANNE R
1 transaction
$3,300
23
BROPHY, DANIEL
1 transaction
$3,300
24
LONDEN, PRISCILLA
1 transaction
$3,300
25
ALLEN, GWYNDA S
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 27 nodes and 30 connections

Total contributions: $116,250

Top Donors - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

26 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Moderate 60.2%
Pages: 545-547

— 512 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise housing model. At best, any new public investments will provide maintenance funds to bring substandard housing units and properties up to livability standards but will still fail to address larger aims of upward mobility and dynamism for local housing markets where land can be sold by PHAs and put to greater economic use, thereby benefiting entire local economies through greater private investment, productivity and employment opportunities, and increased tax revenue. Any long-term view of HUD’s future must include maintaining the strong financial operations and reliable reporting that are needed to run a $50 billion- per-year agency. Before the Trump Administration, HUD effectively did not have a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for eight years, and HUD’s financial infrastructure inevitably deteriorated. The department’s auditors were unable to conclude that HUD’s internal operations were producing accurate financial reporting. The audi- tors had identified multiple material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the department’s internal financial controls. Overall, the deterioration of HUD’s financial infrastructure led to a lack of accountability with respect to the use of taxpayer funds as well as to pervasive difficulties with operations and program implementation. However, by hiring a new CFO from the private sector with a proven track record of visionary leadership, HUD was able to implement an agencywide governance structure that improved its financial processes and internal controls and harnessed the power of innovative new technologies to bring a modernized business mindset to the agency’s financial infrastructure. By the end of the Trump Administration, for the first time in nearly a decade, HUD was able to address all of its previously identified material weaknesses, and the auditors were able to issue their first clean audit report on HUD’s financial statements and internal controls. Finally, and more fundamentally, Congress could consider a wholesale overhaul of HUD that contemplates devolving many HUD functions to states and localities with any remaining federal functions consolidated to other federal agencies (for example, by transferring loan guarantee programs to SBA; moving Indian housing programs to the Department of the Interior; moving rental assistance, mortgage insurance programs, and GNMA to a redesignated Housing and Home Finance Agency). Generally, this reform path could consolidate some programs, elimi- nate others that have failed to produce meaningful long-run results, and narrow the scope of many programs so that they are closer to what they were when they were created.

Introduction

Moderate 60.2%
Pages: 545-547

— 512 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise housing model. At best, any new public investments will provide maintenance funds to bring substandard housing units and properties up to livability standards but will still fail to address larger aims of upward mobility and dynamism for local housing markets where land can be sold by PHAs and put to greater economic use, thereby benefiting entire local economies through greater private investment, productivity and employment opportunities, and increased tax revenue. Any long-term view of HUD’s future must include maintaining the strong financial operations and reliable reporting that are needed to run a $50 billion- per-year agency. Before the Trump Administration, HUD effectively did not have a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for eight years, and HUD’s financial infrastructure inevitably deteriorated. The department’s auditors were unable to conclude that HUD’s internal operations were producing accurate financial reporting. The audi- tors had identified multiple material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the department’s internal financial controls. Overall, the deterioration of HUD’s financial infrastructure led to a lack of accountability with respect to the use of taxpayer funds as well as to pervasive difficulties with operations and program implementation. However, by hiring a new CFO from the private sector with a proven track record of visionary leadership, HUD was able to implement an agencywide governance structure that improved its financial processes and internal controls and harnessed the power of innovative new technologies to bring a modernized business mindset to the agency’s financial infrastructure. By the end of the Trump Administration, for the first time in nearly a decade, HUD was able to address all of its previously identified material weaknesses, and the auditors were able to issue their first clean audit report on HUD’s financial statements and internal controls. Finally, and more fundamentally, Congress could consider a wholesale overhaul of HUD that contemplates devolving many HUD functions to states and localities with any remaining federal functions consolidated to other federal agencies (for example, by transferring loan guarantee programs to SBA; moving Indian housing programs to the Department of the Interior; moving rental assistance, mortgage insurance programs, and GNMA to a redesignated Housing and Home Finance Agency). Generally, this reform path could consolidate some programs, elimi- nate others that have failed to produce meaningful long-run results, and narrow the scope of many programs so that they are closer to what they were when they were created. — 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.