Disapproving the rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to "Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions".

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/hjres/59
Last Updated: November 29, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]

ID: H001072

Follow the money

The bill

Disapproving the rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to "Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions".

HJRES. 59, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$133,000 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 869-871 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 16.

March 20, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

HJRES 59 is a joint resolution that disapproves of a rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP) regarding overdraft lending for very large financial institutions. Wow, what a mouthful. In plain English, this bill is trying to undo a regulation that would have forced big banks to be more transparent about their overdraft fees.

The "disease" behind this bill? A bad case of Regulatory Capture-itis. The symptoms are clear: the banking industry has its tentacles deep in Congress, and our esteemed lawmakers are doing their bidding. The BCFP's original rule was a weak attempt to rein in the banks' predatory practices, but now Congress is trying to kill it altogether.

The "treatment" proposed by this bill? A healthy dose of deregulation, courtesy of the banking lobby. By disapproving the BCFP's rule, Congress is essentially giving big banks a free pass to continue gouging consumers with exorbitant overdraft fees. The affected industries and sectors? The usual suspects: big banks, financial institutions, and their lobbyists.

Compliance requirements and timelines? Ha! This bill doesn't even pretend to care about consumer protection. It's all about giving the banking industry a get-out-of-jail-free card. Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? Don't make me laugh. This bill is designed to ensure that big banks can continue to operate with impunity.

Economic and operational impacts? Let's just say that consumers will be the ones feeling the pain – in their wallets. The banking industry will reap the benefits of this deregulation, while ordinary people will be left to deal with the consequences of unchecked greed.

In conclusion, HJRES 59 is a textbook case of Regulatory Capture-itis, where Congress does the bidding of special interests at the expense of the public good. It's a disease that's been plaguing our system for far too long, and this bill is just another symptom of a deeper illness: the corruption and cowardice that infects our legislative process.

Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of greed and corruption. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: None, because who needs actual governance when you have campaign contributions and lobbying dollars?

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$133,000
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$132,000

No PAC contributions found

1
THE ROYER LAW FIRM PLLC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
BRADBURY, CHARLOTTE S. MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
2
BRADBURY, CURT MR. JR.
1 transaction
$6,600
3
KEITH, STEVEN M. MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
4
KNAPPLE, WHITFIELD L. DR.
1 transaction
$6,600
5
PFAUTCH, ROY MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
6
QUINTILIAN, DENNIS
1 transaction
$6,600
7
QUINTILIAN, DORIS
1 transaction
$6,600
8
RUTLEDGE, REYNIE MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
9
SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN A. MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
10
DORRELL, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
11
SCHUECK, PATRICK T. MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
12
FISHER, KENNETH MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
13
FISHER, SHERRILYN MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
14
ALLEN, MARY
1 transaction
$6,600
15
DALY, JUSTIN MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
16
ROWAN, CAROLYN MS.
1 transaction
$6,600
17
ROWAN, MARC MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
18
SNIDER, TED MR. JR.
1 transaction
$6,600
19
SCHWAB, CHARLES MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
20
ANTHONY, JOHN E. MR.
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

ID: M001204

Top Contributors

10

1
PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORP
OrganizationDURYEA, PA
$2,500
Sep 18, 2024
2
COTLER, YUDACUFSKI, HUEBNER
OrganizationSAINT CLAIR, PA
$1,000
Apr 23, 2024
3
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Mar 25, 2024
4
PEYKOFF, ANDY
NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC • CEO
IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV
$6,600
Mar 22, 2024
5
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Sep 18, 2024
6
ROWAN, MARC J
APOLLO MANAGEMENT • MANAGEMENT
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
7
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
8
RICH, BRIAN R MR. JR
GILBERTON COAL CO. • EXECUTIVE SALES
IndividualCONSHOHOCKEN, PA
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
9
VOLPE, ELLEN M
SELF • HOMEMAKER
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023
10
VOLPE, CHARLES J
EXCALIBUR INSURANCE MGMT • PRESIDENT
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

ID: O000175

Top Contributors

10

1
WINTERSTEEN, JAMES
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualMILL VALLEY, CA
$13,200
Jun 27, 2024
2
FISHER, KENNETH L.
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 23, 2024
3
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 23, 2024
4
RAMSEY, DAVE
RAMSEY • CEO
IndividualCOLLEGE GROVE, TN
$6,600
Jul 27, 2024
5
MOSING, GREG
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBROUSSARD, LA
$6,600
Jul 24, 2024
6
SHOCKLEY, QIANG
QIANG SHOCKLEY • TECHNICIAN
IndividualIRVINE, CA
$6,600
Jun 8, 2023
7
BEAMAN, LEE MR.
BEAMAN VENTURES • INVESTOR
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Apr 13, 2023
8
GUO, MING
INTEL INC • MANAGER
IndividualCUPERTINO, CA
$6,600
Jun 2, 2023
9
KENNINGER, STEVEN
QMO LLC • INVESTOR
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Sep 25, 2023
10
JAQUISH, GAIL
JURIX, INC. • PSYCHOLOGIST
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Sep 26, 2023

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

ID: W000812

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Aug 23, 2023
2
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2,000
Jul 14, 2023
3
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Mar 15, 2023
4
WINRED
OrganizationARLINGTON, VA
$9
May 9, 2024
5
WILHELM, MARK A MR.
SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP. • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Dec 18, 2023
6
DRURY, TIM M.
DRURY DEVELOPMENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Feb 27, 2023
7
DANFORTH, JOHN C
DOWD BENNETT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Feb 17, 2023
8
TRACY, RICHARD L. MR.
DOT FOODS, INC. • PRESIDENT
IndividualDES PERES, MO
$13,200
Feb 17, 2023
9
RINEY, RODGER O. MR.
T.D. AMERITRADE • ADVISOR TO CEO
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 23, 2023
10
O'CONNELL, JOHN T.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 15, 2023

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

ID: H001058

Top Contributors

10

1
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationDOWAGIAC, MI
$3,300
Dec 11, 2023
2
THALOP LLC
OrganizationINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$1,000
Aug 29, 2024
3
BARREL DOG, LLC
OrganizationHOLLAND, MI
$1,000
Sep 1, 2024
4
NOAH HOMES LLC
OrganizationINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
5
THALOP LLC
OrganizationINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
6
B&B DAIRY
OrganizationPLAINVIEW, TX
$500
Jul 28, 2024
7
B&B DAIRY
OrganizationPLAINVIEW, TX
$500
Sep 5, 2024
8
STRAIGHT LINE RED ANGUS
OrganizationBANGOR, MI
$250
Jul 23, 2024
9
VAN ANDEL, AMY
THE STEVE AND AMY VAN ANDEL FOUNDATION • EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
IndividualADA, MI
$75,000
Mar 29, 2024
10
VAN ANDEL, STEPHEN
AMWAY • CHAIRMAN
IndividualADA, MI
$75,000
Mar 29, 2024

Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

ID: T000480

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Sep 17, 2024
2
CATAWBA INDIAN NATION
OrganizationROCK HILL, SC
$2,000
May 7, 2024
3
CHEVES, WALLACE
SELF • DEVELOPER
IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV
$3,300
Sep 7, 2023
4
BURGAMY, LARRY G. JR.
LINCOLN ENERGY • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualGREENVILLE, SC
$3,300
Oct 31, 2023
5
HODGES, MICHAEL LYNN
ADVANCE FINANCIAL • PRESIDENT
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$3,300
Feb 13, 2024
6
CARROLL, WILLIAM
IPS PACKING • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualGREER, SC
$3,300
Mar 31, 2024
7
FLOYD, KAREN K
SELF • CEO/PUBLISHER
IndividualSPARTANBURG, SC
$3,300
Mar 31, 2024
8
ADAMS, C. DAN
CAPITAL CORP • INVESTMENT BANKER
IndividualGREENVILLE, SC
$3,300
Feb 13, 2024
9
RODRIGUEZ, RAUL
CREI HOLDINGS • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Mar 26, 2024
10
MILLEGAN, BRANTLY
SELF EMPLOYED • TECHNOLOGY
IndividualSIMPSONVILLE, SC
$3,300
Mar 13, 2024

Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]

ID: M001236

Top Contributors

10

1
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
SOUTHLAND • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Apr 26, 2024
2
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Jun 26, 2024
3
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
CPFRM • EXECUTIVE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
4
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
5
KELLER, OSCAR A III
SELF EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Apr 23, 2024
6
KELLER, OSCAR A III
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Jun 23, 2024
7
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
SUMMIT HOSPITALITY • PRESIDENT
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
8
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
9
BELL, III, JAMES
BELLLEGAL GROUP • ATTORNEY
IndividualGEORGETOWN, SC
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
10
BEAM, DREW
BROAD RIVER HOLDINGS • REAL ESTATE
IndividualSHELBY, NC
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024

Rep. Haridopolos, Mike [R-FL-8]

ID: H001099

Top Contributors

10

1
JARNES, LARRY
NORTHBORO BUILDERS INC • BUILDER
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$9,900
May 20, 2024
2
FARINELLA, NICK
SELF-EMPLOYED • REALTOR
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$3,518
May 6, 2024
3
HILL, KEVIN
RE/MAX ALTERNATIVE • REALTOR
IndividualINDIAN HARBOUR BEA, FL
$3,518
May 6, 2024
4
MOLLEN, JACK
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$3,518
May 17, 2024
5
SHOULDERS, KATHY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualINDIAN HARBOUR BEA, FL
$3,518
May 21, 2024
6
SHOULDERS, WILLIAM
HANDEX CONSULTING REMEDIATION • EXECUTIVE
IndividualINDIAN HARBOUR BEA, FL
$3,518
Apr 30, 2024
7
BERRY, JAMES
DELTA AIR LINES • PILOT
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$3,435
Sep 10, 2024
8
DANDRIDGE, STEPHANIE
SOTHEBYS • REALTOR
IndividualINDIALANTIC, FL
$3,435
Sep 19, 2024
9
FLACHS, BRUCE
PRESCIENT NATIONAL • INSURANCE
IndividualVERO BEACH, FL
$3,435
Sep 4, 2024
10
MARUMOTO, ALAN K.
UNIVERSITY CENTER IMAGING • PHYSICIAN
IndividualINDIALANTIC, FL
$3,435
Sep 13, 2024

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

ID: B001282

Top Contributors

10

1
TED J. BALESTRERI ENTERPRISES
OrganizationMONTEREY, CA
$1,000
Dec 6, 2023
2
QUEENSLAKE
OrganizationGEORGETOWN, KY
$300
Feb 12, 2024
3
VESTER, NANCY
NONE • RETIRED
IndividualCENTERVILLE, MA
$6,600
Sep 15, 2024
4
KOLLAR, CLINT WILLIAM
SIXTH STREET PARTNERS • INVESTOR
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$6,600
Mar 22, 2023
5
FIELD, CHESTER JACK
NONE • RETIRED
IndividualSUMMERTON, SC
$6,600
Jun 4, 2024
6
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 21, 2024
7
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 21, 2024
8
BROWN, CHRIS
MINDSET • PARTNER
IndividualCHEVY CHASE, MD
$5,600
Mar 7, 2023
9
DARWISH, SAM
SINGULARITY INVESTMENTS LLC • CEO
IndividualMCKINNEY, TX
$5,000
Oct 28, 2024
10
CORRELL, JESS T.
FIRST SOUTHERN BANK • BANKER
IndividualSTANFORD, KY
$5,000
May 7, 2024

Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]

ID: W000816

Top Contributors

10

1
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Dec 2, 2024
2
FORD, GERALD J. MR.
DIAMOND-A CORPORATION • BANKER
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jan 10, 2024
3
PRINCE, ZAN MRS.
SELF EMPLOYED • INSURANCE AGENT
IndividualWEATHERFORD, TX
$6,600
Mar 30, 2023
4
WOODARD, DONALD M. MR. JR.
WESTERN COMMERCE GROUP • FINANCE
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
Mar 5, 2024
5
CARVALHO, ANNE MARIE MRS.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,600
May 5, 2023
6
ROWAN, CAROLYN
SELF EMPLOYED • FASHION DESIGNER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Apr 19, 2023
7
ROWAN, MARC
APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT • CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Apr 19, 2023
8
DUNIGAN, MIKE MR.
MIKE DUNIGAN RARE COINS • OWNER
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$6,000
Mar 5, 2024
9
LOWRANCE, DAN E. MR.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$5,000
Oct 31, 2023
10
NICHOLS, THOMAS B. MR.
U.S. POLYCO • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPARKS, NV
$5,000
Feb 10, 2023

Rep. Donalds, Byron [R-FL-19]

ID: D000032

Top Contributors

10

1
SHANNON GREEN COLLECTION
OrganizationNAPLES, FL
$500
Dec 28, 2023
2
NAPLES SMART, LLC
OrganizationNAPLES, FL
$250
Jun 4, 2024
3
COX, JOE B
NELSON MULLINS • ATTORNEY
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Dec 30, 2023
4
STALLINGS, KYLE
DESERT ROYALTY COMPANY • FOUNDER/CEO
IndividualMIDLAND, TX
$6,600
Mar 9, 2023
5
ZALIK, DAVID
GOLDMAN SACHS • EXECUTIVE
IndividualMARIETTA, GA
$6,600
Jan 3, 2024
6
ZALIK, HELEN
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualATLANTA, GA
$6,600
Jan 6, 2024
7
BAUM, DAVID
ENTREPRENEUR • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualSANIBEL, FL
$6,600
Feb 13, 2024
8
WALDRIP, EMORY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
May 20, 2023
9
MANDELBLATT, DANIELLE
DMM PROPRIETA MANAGEMENT • MANAGER
IndividualASPEN, CO
$6,600
Jun 7, 2024
10
MANDELBLATT, ERIC
SOROBAN CAPITAL PARTNERS LP • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualASPEN, CO
$6,600
Jun 7, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 58 nodes and 36 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $189,200

Top Donors - Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

1 Org20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90

    The joint resolution disapproves the CFPB rule on 'Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions' (89 Fed. Reg. 106768). Overdraft fees are a significant revenue source for large commercial banks; blocking the rule prevents potential restrictions on overdraft lending practices, thus benefiting banks.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 22 contributions
    • SCHARF, CHARLES$8,300
    • LEOPOLD, ROBIN$3,300
    • DIMON, JAMIE$3,300
    • HEITSENRETHER, TERESA$3,300
    • HRANICKY, KYLE$2,900

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Very Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 869-871AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HJRES 59 seeks to nullify a CFPB rule, directly supporting Project 2025's objective to curb the CFPB's perceived overreach and increase accountability by limiting its regulatory authority."

Key themes:CFPB authority reductionregulatory rollbackagency accountabilityrule nullificationconsumer financial protection limitation

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Very Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HJRES 59 directly nullifies a CFPB rule, which aligns with Project 2025's objective to curb the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's regulatory authority and limit its reach over financial institutions."

Key themes:CFPB reformregulatory rollbackoverdraft rulefinancial institution oversightconsumer protection limits

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Very Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HJRES 59 directly seeks to nullify a CFPB rule regulating overdraft lending, which aligns with Project 2025's objective to curb the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's authority and reduce its regulatory burden on financial institutions."

Key themes:CFPB authority reductionfinancial deregulationoverdraft fee regulationconsumer protection rollbackagency oversight limits

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills