The bill
To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela that have not been authorized by Congress.
HCONRES. 64, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. McGovern, James P. [D-MA-2]
ID: M000312
Follow the money
The bill
HCONRES. 64, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Election Commission" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
(sigh) Oh joy, another exercise in legislative theater. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** (chuckles) Ah, the noble goal of "directing" the President to remove troops from Venezuela without Congressional authorization. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a feeble attempt by Congress to pretend they're not complicit in the executive branch's imperial overreach. It's a Potemkin village of accountability.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** (rolls eyes) The bill invokes the War Powers Resolution, which has been about as effective as a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. This resolution is nothing more than a symbolic gesture, as it doesn't actually change existing law or provide any meaningful enforcement mechanisms. It's a "resolution" – not even a binding law.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** (sarcastic tone) Oh, the usual suspects: politicians seeking to burnish their anti-war credentials, lobbyists for defense contractors who want to keep the gravy train rolling, and voters who are too naive to realize they're being played. The Venezuelan people? Ha! They're just pawns in this game of imperial chess.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** (disdainful laugh) Let's be real – this bill will have all the impact of a feather on a hurricane. It won't change the fact that U.S. troops are already embedded in Venezuela, and it won't stop future interventions without Congressional approval. The real disease here is the bipartisan addiction to militarism and the lust for power.
Diagnosis: This bill is a classic case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), where politicians pretend to address a problem while actually perpetuating the status quo. Symptoms include empty rhetoric, meaningless gestures, and a complete disregard for the Constitution. Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for the inevitable disappointment.
In short, HCONRES 64 is a farcical attempt to masquerade as accountability while maintaining the illusion of Congressional control over foreign policy. It's a Potemkin village built on quicksand, and it will inevitably sink into the swamp of Washington's perpetual hypocrisy. (shrugs) Business as usual in the Imperial City.
Rep. McGovern, James P. [D-MA-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 42 nodes and 25 connections (51 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $85,400
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 1 directs the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela, which could reduce defense contracts and military spending.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on war powers and withdrawing U.S. forces from Venezuela, while the Project 2025 section addresses Federal Election Commission reform; they share only a tangential connection through the theme of Congressional oversight and presidential recommendations to Congress."
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Defense section address U.S. military matters, but the bill seeks to limit overseas hostilities while Project 2025 focuses on rebuilding Army readiness, modernization, and resources; their objectives are largely divergent."
— 108 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise U.S. ARMY The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term. All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission. Needed Reforms l Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs. 1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power. 2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance. 3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness. 4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously. — 109 — Department of Defense 5. Reform recruiting efforts. The Army missed its 2022 recruitment goal by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers. l Focus on deployability and sustained operations. The U.S. Army’s very lethal ground force capability is irrelevant if it cannot quickly deploy to locations for employment in decisive operations to secure our global security interests. Additionally, Army logisticians provide the ground transportation (of both personnel and equipment); fuel, food, and water; munitions (bombs and bullets); medical supplies and services; and veterinary services (food safety) that are critical to sustainment of the other services. 1. Immediately increase the production and stockpiling of critical munitions and repair parts. 2. Prioritize expeditionary logistics in all force design and operational planning to guarantee entry into a contested theater of war. 3. Increase the level of Joint Force training, synchronization, and coordination focused on logistics. 4. Prepare to deploy forces from degraded U.S.-based transportation infrastructure that is compromised by opposing forces. l Transform Army culture and training. The Army can no longer serve as the nation’s social testing ground. A rebuilt Army that is focused again on its core warfighting mission and empowered it with the tools, resources, and authorities it needs to accomplish that mission must be the next Administration’s highest defense priority. 1. Stop using the Army as a test bed for social evolution. Misusing the Army in this way detracts from its core purpose while doing little to reshape the American social structure. The Army no longer reflects national demographics to the degree that it did before 1974 when the draft was eliminated. 2. Demand accountability in senior leaders to reverse the decline in public support for military service. 3. Reestablish the experiential base for the planning, execution, and leadership of Army formations in large-scale operations. Currently,
AI Analysis:
"HCONRES 64 concerns war powers and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Venezuela, whereas the Project 2025 DHS section focuses on immigration enforcement, asylum reform, unaccompanied minors, and related policies; there is no substantive thematic overlap."
— 148 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unaccompanied minors 1. Congress should repeal Section 235 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA),9 which provides numerous immigration benefits to unaccompanied alien children and only encourages more parents to send their children across the border illegally and unaccompanied. These children too often become trafficking victims, which means that the TVPRA has failed. 2. If an alternative to repealing Section 235 of the TVPRA is necessary, the section should be amended so that all unaccompanied children, regardless of nationality, may be returned to their home countries in a safe and efficient manner. Currently, the TVPRA allows only children from contiguous countries (Canada and Mexico) to be returned while every other unaccompanied minor must be placed into a lengthy process that usually results in the minor’s landing in the custody of an illegal alien family member. 3. Congress must end the Flores Settlement Agreement by explicitly setting nationwide terms and standards for family and unaccompanied detention and housing. Such standards should focus on meeting human needs and should allow for large-scale use of temporary facilities (for example, tents). 4. Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act and portions of the TVPRA to move detention of alien children expressly from the Department of Health and Human Services to DHS. l Asylum reform 1. The standard for a credible fear of persecution should be raised and aligned to the standard for asylum. It should also account specifically for credibility determinations that are a key element of the asylum claim. 2. Codify former asylum bars and third-country transit rules. 3. Congress should eliminate the particular social group protected ground as vague and overbroad or, in the alternative, provide a clear definition with parameters that at a minimum codify the holding in Matter of A-B- that gang violence and domestic violence are not grounds for asylum.10 — 149 — Department of Homeland Security l Parole reform. Congress should end the widespread abuse of parole in contravention of statute and return it to its origins as an extraordinary remedy for very limited purposes. l NGOs and processing. Congress should halt funds given to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to process and transport illegal aliens into and throughout the United States. Such funds and infrastructure, including the DHS joint processing centers, should be redirected to secure the border, detain aliens, and provide space for immigration court proceedings. l Other pathways for border crossers. While Congress should use its oversight authority to ensure that Expedited Removal is used to the fullest extent and followed to the letter of the law, other paths for border crossers should be included in a legislative package. 1. Migrant protection protocols. Update the statutory language providing the basis for the Remain in Mexico program as needed to withstand judicial scrutiny and executive inaction. 2. Asylum Cooperative Agreements. While the agreements themselves must be negotiated, Congress should mandate that the executive branch work faithfully to negotiate and execute ACAs and set parameters to ensure that an unwilling executive cannot renege on an existing agreement or abandon the effort. 3. Other expedited pathways. Congress should explicitly permit programs akin to the Prompt Asylum Claim Review (PACR) and Humanitarian Asylum Review Process (HARP) programs. l Employment authorization 1. Congress should reassert control of employment authorization, which is subject to rampant regulatory abuse, and limit it to certain categories of legal immigrants and non-immigrants. 2. Congress should also permanently authorize E-Verify and make it mandatory. l State and local law enforcement
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.