Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with presidentially designated terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere.

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Bill ID: 119/hconres/61
Last Updated: November 18, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5]

ID: M001137

Follow the money

The bill

Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with presidentially designated terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere.

HCONRES. 61, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$80,100 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Oh joy, another exercise in legislative theater. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** ( rolls eyes ) The main purpose of HCONRES 61 is to pretend that Congress cares about the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The objective? To appear concerned about the President's authority to engage in military actions without congressional approval. How quaint.

In reality, this bill is a weak attempt to curb the executive branch's power while maintaining plausible deniability for future military interventions. It's like trying to treat a symptom of a terminal illness with a Band-Aid.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** ( mocking tone ) Oh, wow! This bill "directs" the President to remove US Armed Forces from hostilities in the Western Hemisphere unless authorized by Congress. What a bold move! It's not like the President will just ignore this resolution or find ways to circumvent it... again.

The only change to existing law is that it adds another layer of bureaucratic red tape, allowing politicians to claim they're doing something about the issue while actually accomplishing nothing.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** ( condescendingly ) Let's see... who are the "stakeholders" in this charade?

* The President: Will likely ignore or work around this resolution. * Congress: Gets to pretend it's taking a stand against executive overreach while maintaining its own power and influence. * Lobbyists and special interest groups: Will continue to shape foreign policy behind closed doors, unaffected by this bill. * Voters: Remain blissfully ignorant of the fact that their elected representatives are playing a game of "Constitutional Kabuki theater."

**Potential Impact & Implications:** ( dark humor ) The potential impact? A slight increase in the number of press releases and talking points from politicians claiming to be champions of constitutional governance. In reality, this bill will have all the effect of a placebo on a terminal patient.

The implications? More of the same: continued executive overreach, congressional abdication of responsibility, and the perpetuation of a foreign policy driven by special interests rather than national security concerns.

In conclusion, HCONRES 61 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice – a shallow attempt to address a symptom while ignoring the underlying disease. It's a cynical exercise in political posturing, designed to appease the naive and the ignorant. ( muttering to himself ) And people wonder why I drink...

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsCongressional Rules & Procedures
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

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Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$80,100
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$9,100
Committees
$0
Individuals
$71,000

No PAC contributions found

1
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$5,800
2
AGUA CALIENTE BAN OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300

No committee contributions found

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CROWN, LESTER
1 transaction
$6,600
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ARMSTRONG, BRIAN
2 transactions
$6,600
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LIPPMAN, MARIE C.
1 transaction
$5,000
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CUKIERMAN, JORAM
1 transaction
$3,300
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SILVERMAN, DOUG
1 transaction
$3,300
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SHAMAH, ALAN
1 transaction
$3,300
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SHAMAH, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$3,300
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FRIEDMAN, AVI
1 transaction
$3,300
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HARMALA, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
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MINSKOFF, EDWARD J.
1 transaction
$3,300
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POLLACK, BRUCE
1 transaction
$3,300
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FOOKSMAN, EUGENE
1 transaction
$3,300
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TISCH, JONATHAN
1 transaction
$3,300
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ZEEV, OREN
1 transaction
$3,300
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PITTMAN, ALVIN L.
1 transaction
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RADOW, LINDA
1 transaction
$3,300
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RADOW, NORMAN
1 transaction
$3,300
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WEINBERG, DEBRA
1 transaction
$3,300
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RUSH, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5]

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Showing 53 nodes and 23 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $80,100

Top Donors - Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • −Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80

    Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities, which could lead to reduced military contracts and spending, harming defense contractors.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HCONRES 61 seeks to increase congressional oversight and accountability for military actions, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on defense oversight, accountability mechanisms, and congressional role in defense policy (e.g., GAO reports on defense intelligence and security, oversight expectations). However, the Project 2025 text focuses broadly on defense modernization, strategy, and acquisition rather than war powers specifically, resulting in only moderate thematic overlap."

Key themes:congressional oversightaccountabilitywar powersdefense policymilitary readiness

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

Department of Defense

Weak
Vector: 63%
Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HCONRES 61 seeks to increase congressional oversight of military engagements, whereas the Project 2025 DoD section emphasizes streamlining arms sales, defense industrial base collaboration, and personnel reforms; the only modest connection is their shared focus on defense-related congressional processes."

Key themes:congressional oversightdefense policywar powers

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10 — 102 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners. 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases. DOD PERSONNEL The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing Ameri- ca’s uniform. The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force. Needed Reforms l Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force. 1. Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention. 2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11 3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

Department of Homeland Security

Minimal
Vector: 63%
Pages: 183-185AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HCONRES 61 focuses on limiting presidential war powers regarding military actions against terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere, while the Project 2025 DHS policy section centers on immigration enforcement, border security, and asylum restrictions. There is no substantive overlap in subject matter or policy objectives between the two."

— 151 — Department of Homeland Security l Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization. Executive Orders l Pathways for border crossers 1. Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries immediately. 2. Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain in Mexico Protocols. 3. Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP). 4. Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel into the interior of the United States, and government flights or transportation for aliens. 5. Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents) once permanent space is full. 6. Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and only with the explicit authority of the Secretary. 7. Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any categorical circumstance. l Enforcement 1. Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement. 2. Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with the government. — 152 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Designate USCIS as Intelligence Community–adjacent, ensuring that it has access to national security and law enforcement databases. 4. Rescind all memoranda limiting enforcement of immigration laws including those identifying sensitive zones. 5. End ICE’s widespread use of termination and administrative closure of cases in immigration court. l Averting or curtailing a mass migration event 1. Provide that whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that an actual or anticipated mass migration of aliens en route to or arriving off the coast of the U.S. presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Secretary may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations prohibiting in whole or in part the introduction of persons from such countries or places as he or she shall designate in order to avert or curtail such mass migration and for such period of time as is deemed necessary, including through the expulsion of such aliens. Such rule and regulation making shall not be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 2. Provide that notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the Secretary makes such a determination and then promulgates, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations, the Secretary shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements of Title 8 that the Secretary, in his or her sole discretion, determines are necessary to avert or curtail the mass migration. Subregulatory Matters l USCIS priorities/structural changes 1. Ensure that focus is returned to vetting, base eligibility of applicants, and fraud detection. 2. Realign the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) to ensure agencywide consistency on implementation of fraud detection and vetting policies. 3. Review and repeal any internal agency memo that is inconsistent with the priorities described in this chapter.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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