Regarding consent to assemble outside the seat of government.

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Bill ID: 119/hconres/1

Last Updated: January 22, 2025

Regarding consent to assemble outside the seat of government.

HCONRES. 1, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$86,555 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

40% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate.

January 5, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The pedestrian machinations of Congress. Let's dissect this bill, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** HCONRES 1 is a concurrent resolution that grants the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate the authority to convene Congress outside of Washington D.C. if they deem it in the public interest. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This bill amends Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which previously required Congress to assemble at a designated location within the District of Columbia. By allowing Congress to convene elsewhere, this resolution introduces flexibility – or chaos, depending on one's perspective.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The obvious stakeholders are members of Congress, who may now find themselves traveling to alternative locations for sessions. However, I'm more interested in the potential implications for my business interests and those of my fellow visionaries. This bill could lead to increased costs and logistical challenges for lobbying efforts, which might hinder our ability to shape policy.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From a purely rational perspective, this resolution's impact will be negligible. Congress is already an inefficient institution; relocating it won't significantly alter the trajectory of legislation. Nevertheless, I foresee potential opportunities for disruption and exploitation. By introducing uncertainty into the legislative process, we may be able to capitalize on the chaos and further consolidate our influence.

In conclusion, HCONRES 1 is a minor perturbation in the grand tapestry of American politics. Its effects will be felt primarily by those who still cling to outdated notions of representative democracy. As a visionary entrepreneur, I'll continue to monitor this development and adapt my strategies accordingly. After all, in the immortal words of the great philosopher, Ayn Rand: "The question isn't who is going to let me; it's who is going to stop me."

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$86,555

23 donors

PACs

Organizations

$13,950

Committees

Individuals

$72,605

No PAC contributions found

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

3 transactions

$4,950

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$2,500

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$2,500

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$2,000

MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS

1 transaction

$1,000

SALT RIVER PIMA MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY

1 transaction

$1,000

No committee contributions found

CASTLE, JOHN K

2 transactions

$9,900

KING, RUSSELL S.

2 transactions

$9,900

KING, ANDREA S.

2 transactions

$6,600

ARVIG, ALLEN R

1 transaction

$3,305

MCGOUGH, THOMAS J

1 transaction

$3,300

WILF, LEONARD A.

1 transaction

$3,300

FAGEN, DIANE

1 transaction

$3,300

FAGEN, RONALD

1 transaction

$3,300

SCHEEL, STEVE DOUGLAS

1 transaction

$3,300

SCHWARTZ, JOHN

1 transaction

$3,300

BECKER, TODD A.

1 transaction

$3,300

WILLIS, THOMAS M.

1 transaction

$3,300

FRANDSEN, DENNIS

1 transaction

$3,300

BARTLETT, COREY

1 transaction

$3,300

MARQUIS, DARRELL

1 transaction

$3,300

WALKER, KENT

1 transaction

$3,300

BROIN, JEFF

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

Show Also Donated To

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Organizations

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 53 nodes and 30 connections (64 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $86,555

Top Donors - Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

6 Orgs17 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal

Vector: 62%

Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill concerns congressional meeting location flexibility, while the Project 2025 FCC section deals with FCC leadership and regulatory authority; there is no substantive policy overlap."

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Minimal

Vector: 61%

Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HCONRES 1 concerns congressional meeting location flexibility and does not address the Executive Office of the President, Vice Presidential roles, or any of the policy themes in the Project 2025 excerpt provided. There is no thematic or policy overlap."

— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal

Vector: 61%

Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill addresses congressional meeting location flexibility, whereas the Project 2025 FCC section deals with communications regulation, spectrum auctions, broadband policy, and Section 230; there is no substantive overlap in topics or objectives."

— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). — 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023).

Federal Election Commission

Minimal

Vector: 60%

Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HCONRES 1 concerns congressional meeting location flexibility, while the Project 2025 FEC policy focuses on campaign finance regulation, litigation authority, and commissioner term limits; the two address unrelated policy areas with no substantive overlap."

Key themes:Congresslegislative process

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Department of Homeland Security

Minimal

Vector: 59%

Pages: 183-185AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HCONRES 1 addresses congressional meeting logistics, whereas the Project 2025 DHS section focuses on immigration enforcement policies; there is no substantive thematic or policy overlap."

— 150 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Congress should unequivocally authorize state and local law enforcement to participate in immigration and border security actions in compliance with Arizona v. United States.11 2. Congress should require compliance with immigration detainers to the maximum extent consistent with the Tenth Amendment and set financial disincentives for jurisdictions that implement either official or unofficial sanctuary policies. l Prosecutorial discretion. Congress should restrict the authority for prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement. l Mandatory detention. Congress should eliminate ambiguous discretionary language in Title 8 that aliens “may” be detained and clarify that aliens “shall” be detained. This language, which contrasts with other “shall detain” language in statute, creates unhelpful ambiguity and allows the executive branch to ignore the will of Congress. Regulations l Withdraw Biden Administration regulations and reissue new regulations in the following areas: 1. Credible Fear/Asylum Jurisdiction for Border Crossers. 2. Public Charge. l T-Visa and U-Visa reform. Unless and until T and U visas are repealed, each program needs to be reformed to ensure that only legitimate victims of trafficking and crimes who are actively providing significant material assistance to law enforcement are eligible for spots in the queue. l Repeal TPS designations. l H-1B reform. Transform the program into an elite mechanism exclusively to bring in the “best and brightest” at the highest wages while simultaneously ensuring that U.S. workers are not being disadvantaged by the program. H-1B is a means only to supplement the U.S. economy and to keep companies competitive, not to depress U.S. labor markets artificially in certain industries. — 151 — Department of Homeland Security l Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization. Executive Orders l Pathways for border crossers 1. Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries immediately. 2. Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain in Mexico Protocols. 3. Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP). 4. Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel into the interior of the United States, and government flights or transportation for aliens. 5. Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents) once permanent space is full. 6. Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and only with the explicit authority of the Secretary. 7. Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any categorical circumstance. l Enforcement 1. Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement. 2. Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with the government.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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Regarding consent to assemble outside the seat of government.