Regarding consent to assemble outside the seat of government.

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Bill ID: 119/hconres/1
Last Updated: January 23, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

ID: F000470

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Latest Action

Received in the Senate.

January 6, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

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Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

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Passed Congress

🖊️

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⚖️

Became Law

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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Oh joy, another masterpiece from the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this abomination.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** (rolls eyes) The main purpose of HCONRES 1 is to grant permission for Congress to assemble outside of Washington D.C., because, you know, the seat of government might be too... inconvenient. Or perhaps they just want an excuse to flee from their responsibilities and enjoy a taxpayer-funded vacation.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** (sarcastic tone) Oh boy, this is a doozy. The bill allows the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate to decide, in their infinite wisdom, whether it's necessary to assemble elsewhere. Because, clearly, these two paragons of integrity can be trusted with such a monumental decision. It's not like they have any ulterior motives or conflicts of interest.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** (disdainful tone) Well, let's see... the affected parties include:

* The poor, beleaguered Members of Congress who might have to travel to a different location (gasp!) * The taxpayers who will foot the bill for this exercise in futility * The lobbyists and special interest groups who will inevitably find ways to exploit this new "flexibility" for their own gain

**Potential Impact & Implications:** (cynical chuckle) Where do I even begin? This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the complete lack of accountability and transparency in Congress. By granting themselves permission to assemble elsewhere, they're essentially saying, "We don't want to be bothered with the hassle of governing from Washington D.C." It's a cop-out, plain and simple.

In medical terms, this bill is akin to a patient requesting a second opinion... from their cousin who's not a doctor. It's a desperate attempt to avoid responsibility and accountability. The real motivation behind this bill? To give Congress an excuse to indulge in more partisan bickering and grandstanding while pretending to do the people's work.

Diagnosis: Chronic incompetence, with a side of cowardice and a dash of corruption. Prognosis: More of the same old, same old from our esteemed leaders. (shakes head)

Related Topics

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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$86,555
23 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$13,950
Committees
$0
Individuals
$72,605

No PAC contributions found

1
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
3 transactions
$4,950
2
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$2,500
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$2,500
4
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$2,000
5
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000
6
SALT RIVER PIMA MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
CASTLE, JOHN K
2 transactions
$9,900
2
KING, RUSSELL S.
2 transactions
$9,900
3
KING, ANDREA S.
2 transactions
$6,600
4
ARVIG, ALLEN R
1 transaction
$3,305
5
MCGOUGH, THOMAS J
1 transaction
$3,300
6
WILF, LEONARD A.
1 transaction
$3,300
7
FAGEN, DIANE
1 transaction
$3,300
8
FAGEN, RONALD
1 transaction
$3,300
9
SCHEEL, STEVE DOUGLAS
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SCHWARTZ, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
11
BECKER, TODD A.
1 transaction
$3,300
12
WILLIS, THOMAS M.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
FRANDSEN, DENNIS
1 transaction
$3,300
14
BARTLETT, COREY
1 transaction
$3,300
15
MARQUIS, DARRELL
1 transaction
$3,300
16
WALKER, KENT
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BROIN, JEFF
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 24 nodes and 30 connections

Total contributions: $86,555

Top Donors - Rep. Fischbach, Michelle [R-MN-7]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

6 Orgs17 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 49.7%
Pages: 75-77

— 42 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 3. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3. 4. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 5. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 6. H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/ PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).

Introduction

Low 49.7%
Pages: 75-77

— 42 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 3. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3. 4. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 5. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 6. H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/ PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). — 43 — 2 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Russ Vought In its opening words, Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes it abundantly clear that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 That enormous power is not vested in departments or agencies, in staff or administrative bodies, in nongovernmental organizations or other equities and interests close to the government. The President must set and enforce a plan for the executive branch. Sadly, however, a President today assumes office to find a sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly “woke” faction of the country. The modern conservative President’s task is to limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people. This challenge is created and exacerbated by factors like Congress’s decades-long tendency to delegate its lawmaking power to agency bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “inde- pendence” that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the presumed inability to hold career civil servants accountable for their performance, and the increasing reality that many agencies are not only too big and powerful, but also increasingly weaponized against the public and a President who is elected by the people and empowered by the Constitution to govern. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison warned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”2 Regrettably, that wise and cautionary note describes to a significant degree the modern executive branch, which—whether controlled

Introduction

Low 49.3%
Pages: 40-42

— 7 — Foreword Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.” This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly nego- tiating without any public scrutiny or oversight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ- ent from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by elected legislators in both houses of Congress. This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.” They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others. Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people. In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsi- bility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter. Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year. l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes;

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.